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Edited for the
Academy of Political Science
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Paul-Henry Spaak
PIERRE-HENRI LAURENT

Anti-Pluralist Liberalism
EDWARD N. MEGAY

Republicanism Before 1776
W. PAUL ADAMS

Congress as Policy-Maker
RONALD C. MOE AND STEVEN C. TEEL

Latin American Diplomats' Views on U.S. Policy
KENNETH A. BODE

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Contributors to the June Issue

PIERRE-HENRI LAURENT, associate professor of history at Tufts University, also teaches at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is completing a monograph on the entire negotiations leading to the Treaty of Rome in 1957.

W. PAUL ADAMS teaches American history at the John F. Kennedy-Institut für Amerikastudien of the Freie Universität Berlin.

EDWARD N. MEGAY is associate professor of political science at the University of Nebraska where he teaches political theory and methodology. He is completing a book on the political philosophy of Heinrich von Treitschke and certain problems of German liberalism.

RONALD C. MOE is assistant professor of political science at San Diego State College and author of *Congress and the President: Allies and Adversaries* to be published in 1971.

STEVEN C. TEEL is a graduate student in political science at San Diego State College.

KENNETH A. BODE is assistant professor of political science at the State University of New York at Binghamton. During the 1969-1970 academic year, Professor Bode served as Research Director for the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection of the Democratic National Committee, which wrote the report *Mandate for Reform*. He is currently a legislative assistant to Senator George McGovern.

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Paul-Henri Spaak and the Diplomatic Origins of the Common Market, 1955-1956*

PIERRE-HENRI LAURENT
Tufts University

The most comprehensive voluntary amalgamation of national economies in the modern history of the West began in March 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome by France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg. Within ten years this agreement had liberalized and fused the separate economies of these six nations and pooled their atomic energy resources. Although much has been written on the evolution of the new European institution between 1955 and 1957, most of the literature on the diplomacy surrounding the *relance européenne* is sketchy. A combination of the lack of any substantiated research, the closed state and intergovernmental records, and the cleverly packaged journalistic and nationalistic misconceptions and clichés concerning the emergence of the European Economic Community and Euratom has made an understanding of the origins of the Common Market or its subsequent development extremely difficult. Moreover many who have dealt with these events have missed Miriam Camp's rule for the historian of the contemporary era, that he "share the moods, atmo-

* The author wishes to thank the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for its Research Fellowship in the Humanities.

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sphere and disabilities of those whose action he is reporting." Certainly, a full examination of the diplomacy of the *relance* would rectify many of these ills.[1] This paper explores only the first phase of negotiations, from the Council of Ministers meeting at Messina on June 1-2, 1955 to the Venice gathering on May 30-31, 1956, a period which produced the foundation of the market and atomic treaties in the form of the Spaak Report and its acceptance by the six states as the basis for multilateral negotiations.

The first and most essential point about this formative period of the European integration movement was the clearcut, dominant role of certain Beneluxers in initiating the ideas and work for the treaty projects. These men were in the forefront of the search for a strengthened Europe through close economic and/or political association with kindred, neighboring states, and formed the forces behind the early attempts at constructing a true economic union on the Continent. The leading men in this early, heretofore unexamined phase were Johan Beyen, Joseph Beck, Jean Hupperts, Robert Verrijn-Stuart, Jean-Charles Snoy et d'Oppuers, Jean Ray, and above all Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister. Spaak has been acknowledged by some to be the real father of the common market and euratom treaties (the market is called "Spaakistan" in certain "Europeanist" circles), but full comprehension of his key role demands still more specific scrutiny and proof. A review of his functions, positions, and thoughts not only celebrates his managerial and spiritual leadership in the creation of the report that bears his name, but it also constitutes a short history of the origins of the 1957 treaties.

In discussing the activity of these early leaders and Spaak primarily we will have to take into account six factors directly related

[1] Among the general histories of the movement are Hans A. Schmitt, *The Path to European Unity* (Baton Rouge, La., 1962); William Diebold, *The Schuman Plan* (New York, 1959); Ernst M. Van der Beugel, *From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership* (Amsterdam, 1966); Miriam Camps, *Britain and the European Community* (Princeton, 1964); Henri Brugmans, *L'idee Européenne* (Bruges, 1965); and Lucien de Sainte-Lorette, *Le Marché Commun* (Paris, 1958). On Spaak's role, see Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, 1958), 514-18; F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany & the New Europe, 1945-63* (Stanford, 1965), 242-47; Roberto Ducci's introduction to Achille Albonetti, *Euratom e sviluppo nucleare* (Milano, 1958); Paul-Henri Spaak, *Combats Inachevés*, Vol. II: *De l'espoir aux déceptions* (Paris, 1969), 61-100.

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to the formation of "The Six." These were (1) the pessimism and gloom attached to the defeats in 1954 of the European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community, (2) the relatively positive position of the French government, (3) the utilization in diplomacy of technical experts, (4) the Monnet-Spaak controversy over the proper procedural strategy, (5) the swiftness and incompleteness of the experts and diplomats' work, and (6) the success of accomodative negotiations and closed diplomacy.

I

In 1955 European unity was a distant and imprecise goal meaning many things, and although it had many supporters, they were scattered and disorganized. Supranationalism was in disrepute because of what Harry Ellis called "the yawning pitfall on the road to unity in 1954."[2] The dismay and disarray of the post-EDC period did not however deter two influential Benelux foreign ministers, Spaak and Beyen, who issued a recall to battle on the highest official level. They enthusiastically advocated a shift in the future integration work from the preoccupation with military and strictly political designs to the consideration of a more novel and complete interstate economic linkage within a joint market. Such a large home market on the American model, they thought, could create economic forces more powerful than any small development based on individual economies, and it would lead to more efficient exporting, introduce a measure of overall industrial planning in basic industries, cut production costs, and eventually raise sharply the standard of living. The economic intent of these statesmen dovetailed with their federalist ideas of building vehicles for the political unification of Western Europe. To them, true free trade and supranational experimentation went hand in hand.

Spaak and Beyen did more to convince the governments of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that such a proposal, stressing calm and rational consideration of total economic dis-

[2] Harry B. Ellis, *The Common Market* (Cleveland, Ohio, 1965), 53.

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armament, deserved immediate attention.[3] Their concentration on sweeping away European protectionism and economic stagnation opened up fields of collective endeavors when Europe writhed in the mire of defeatism and separatism. When most feared the initiative, Spaak and his colleagues had the courage and intelligence to shelve exclusively political goals and resuscitate economic ones, expecting that this might eventually result in more political centralism.

Although the foreign ministers of the ECSC met at Messina on the first day of June to settle several issues, the Benelux Memorandum for giant atomic and economic pools was the major point on the agenda. Beyen, the Dutch Minister who was seen to request that the British be invited to any subsequent talks, worked closely with Spaak and Beck in propelling the Benelux concept forward, his primary focus on encouraging more multi-state conferences rather than the classic diplomatic procedure of bilateral negotiations.[4]

This first encounter became a turning point for Spaak and Beyen, who together had drawn up the strongly worded plan for a customs union and cooperative market by building more supranational institutions similar to the ECSC. Since most Lowlanders by the mid-fifties felt strongly the necessity to protect their sovereignty by renouncing it, they experienced some difficulty understanding the painful choice this presented to many Frenchmen and Germans. The framers of the Benelux Memo did not realize that the responses of Paris and Bonn might hinge largely on the absence of any such sensitive and potentially destructive notions as surrendering more national sovereignty. Spaak particularly displayed an immediate willingness to adjust his views to a

[3] Guy Mollet, "L'unification de l'Europe," *Monde Nouveau*, 94 (1955), 1-11; M. Van der Goes van Naters, *Le Dévelopement de l'ntégration économique de l'Europe* (Strasbourg, 1955), 65-80; Pierre Wigny, *Un Témoignage sur la Communauté des Six* (Luxembourg, 1957), 31-32; Paul-Henri Spaak, *Texte intégral du Discours*, 20th session, Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, Sept. 18, 1954; and E. de la Vallée-Poussin, "L'opinion belge et la relance européenne," *Nouvelles de l'Europe*, 68 (1955), 16.

[4] J. C. Snoy et d'Oppuers, "Les Étapes de la Cooperation Européenne et les négociations relatives à une Zone de libre échange," *Chronique de Politique étrangere*, XII, no. 5-6 (1959), 589-91, 604-08; Camps, 24-28; *Le Monde*, June 5-6, 1955.

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more pragmatic orientation when he heard the rigid organizational views of Hallstein, Pinay, and even Martino of Italy.[5] Their reactions to the Beyen-Spaak formula made it clear that the three major powers would not delegate their diplomats to go against the prevailing anti-supranationalist climate of opinion. Spaak therefore altered his views on the means for achieving an economic union, emphasizing the end itself. On the need for accelerated and expanded economic cooperation, there was no argument at Messina.

The Beneluxers were not the only, although they were definitely the major, important source of optimism in this era. Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman also labored against the upsurge of national suspicions and dismal forecasts associated with the fiasco of 1954. Yet, the bold moves in the Benelux plan itself lacked the restraint and perspective that Paris and Bonn hoped might proceed from the ministers' meeting. At Messina, Spaak was reminded that EDC had floundered and died on the supranational issue and the desire of some to move swiftly into more European political unity, that such wishes and ideas demanded more caution since Europe was still convalescing from the fevers of the army debates. Spaak found that further serious French and German participation in the economic sphere would be approved, but not with any predetermined answer to the questions of political power in the form of another extranational bureaucratic institution. The three big powers wanted an atomic energy agreement when they convened at the 1955 meeting, but they also fought to leave open the form of any new institution, while leaning strongly, in France's case, toward an intergovernmental structure similar to the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

The spirit of the Geneva *détente* of that summer, the new intimacy of German-American relations, and some post-Stalinist relaxation in the "cold war" were by the end of 1955 to convince many Europeans that the time was appropriate for a renewed

[5] J. C. Snoy et d'Oppuers, "Le Marché Commun et l'Euratom," *Chronique de Politique étrangere*, X, no. 4-6 (1957), 419-24; Paul-Henri Spaak, "La relance Européenne," *Société belge d'Études et d'Expansion*, 159 (1956), 132-33. The Spaak change is found in Spaak, *Combats*, II, 66-72.

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development of western cooperation. But as early as March 1955, Beyen, Spaak, and Beck had already gone a long way in this direction by discussing the resumption of multilateral talks for interstate economic planning, regulation, organization. To bolster their attempt they produced evidence which would dispel any hesitancy of the governmental hierarchies concerning the benefits of past economic integration. To these men, the ECSC was already a success in sector integration, albeit aided by a mushrooming Europe-wide economic boom of prosperity. But their arguments were often that the task of economic growth, revitalization, and exchange would be lengthy and complex if vertical type integration were tested in each area of the economy. Integration by sectors, to the Beneluxers, could only yield limited results because of its restricted scope and because it was unconnected with other parts of the financial, transport, energy, and social systems. The real answer was a pluralistic, diversified approach, with a broad horizontal integration experiment covering as many facets of the economic process and allied fields as possible. One of their strongest points was made when they dissected the old postwar economic and trade organizations, such as OEEC, which they convincingly claimed had nearly reached their outer limits of effecting change.[6]

During the Messina conversations, Spaak and Beyen found that their goal of a vast European zone with a common economic policy fell on sympathetic and receptive ears. Not so their pronouncements on the institutional structure and powers called for in such an arrangement, for the French and German minimum requirement for more substantive talks, even before treaty drafting, was the elimination of the principle of supranationality from the language of the future. Although there was no question of the firm Benelux belief in constructing a plan in which various national interests and pressures could be overriden by an *esprit communitaire*, based on potent institutional devices like the High Authority of the ECSC, they nevertheless agreed to strike out from the diplomatic vocabulary of the preparatory talks any men-

[6] J. W. Beyen, "Le problème de l'Europe," *Nouvelles de Hollande*, no. 503-504 (1956); Johan W. Beyen, "Refléxions sur la relance Européenne," *Nouvelles de Hollande*, no. 509 (1956).

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tion of a powerful central organization beyond the national governments.[7] The men from Brussels and The Hague made the idea of a far-reaching, horizontal type economic union or a Euromart their primary goal, setting aside their political objective of creating supranational institutions, originally of equal importance to them. To Spaak, Messina demonstrated that of the two ends—political unification and the growth of productivity and exchange—the latter had to come first. The Council of Ministers meeting proved that the six nations would undertake in common good faith exploratory sessions dedicated to finding the widest agreements possible on economic, conventional and nuclear energy, transport, financial, and labor force problems. The question of supranationality, however, was not proper diplomatic subject matter. Paris, Bonn, and Rome stated their steadfast intention not to sanction any groundwork for political integration nor to make explicit commitments to political unification.

Instead of a treaty drafting conference, the ministers decided to assemble at Brussels a group of government representatives and outside technical experts "under an eminent political personality." They chose Spaak to lead this collection of study groups preparing multiple drafts for the governments. He was directed by his fellow ministers to enumerate specifically the techniques which might resolve the basic problems posed at Messina. Once the Beneluxers' zealous and blunt frontal attack on the vexing political and economic problems had absorbed the much needed prudence and caution of the big powers, a Lowlander could be safely appointed to the position which would give him greater influence on the future course of the "New Europe" than any other post World War II European would have.

II

In contrast to her persistent obstructionist tactics in meetings aimed at European integration, France for the first year, of the assemblage at Brussels took a careful yet generally positive stance toward issues like tariff reductions and the migration of workers

[7] Van der Goes van Naters, 66-71. For some "Europeanists," the motto became "Il faut reculer pour mieux sauter."

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and toward social questions and currency problems. France willingly contributed technicians and specialists, who were urged to seek constructive means for the solution of French and European problems.[8] The record indicates periodic coolness, particularly on questions about the organization that would accompany any pact, but never complete opposition which would have threatened the breakdown of the experts' talks. The French attitude was to work and participate in the various plans, which its diplomats in the later intergovernmental negotiations could debate, amend, revise, or oppose if necessary. When the Spaak Report was presented and discussed at Venice at the end of May 1956, France under the new Mollet government agreed quickly that the report was a more than adequate basis for a treaty drafting conference.[9] Only in the last half of 1956 did France and her dual *demand* for the inclusion of overseas territories and the harmonization of social policies cause friction and real danger in negotiations.

The major reason behind the French cooperation at the experts' conferences that took place in Brussels between July 1955 and March 1956 was Spaak. The fifty-five year old Belgian, chosen to be the director, coordinator, and "whip" of the experts' search, displayed a sympathetic attitude toward the unique problems and anxieties of France. He believed that one of his major responsibilities was helping the French take the jump into a united economic Europe. His keen awareness of the problems of Franco-German relations produced an atmosphere conducive to cooperation from the government in Paris. As U. W. Kitzinger has said, the "indispensible tactical move" was clearing out of the way any French arguments or misgivings and giving them "explicit safeguards and particular consideration."[10] The accuracy with which the framers of the Spaak Report sensed the temper of the French reflected Spaak's tactics during the experts' study sessions. Spaak instilled in his workers a sensitivity toward the French, with special instructions concerning possible concessions and even special

[8] Snoy et d'Oppuers, "Le Marché," 426-39; see Camps, 45ff., which demonstrates that the British attitude passed from indifference to opposition and from apathy to hostility in this period.

[9] *Le Monde*, June 2, 1956.

[10] U. W. Kitzinger, *Politics and Economics of European Integration* (New York, 1963), 15-16.

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preferential treatment. His actions when the French government fell in December 1955 were indicative of his approach. Although major issues were under discussion, Spaak put off further sessions for a long Christmas vacation and was rewarded by the "Europeanist"-leaning Mollet ministry in January.

Spaak's mandate to Pierre Uri (who headed the group that wrote the report) was very specific in those areas of special interest to France and her sheltered markets. Experienced enough to recognize the extreme difficulty of achieving results in an international conference with the veto power of the French National Assembly in the background, Spaak told Uri, von der Groeben, and Hupperts that they should sift through each of the committee reports and extract any points which might be objectionable to Paris. Since one of the major objectives of the report was to convince the French of its value, Spaak ordered his three agents into isolation for nearly five weeks with the primary task of smoothing over the possible problems pertaining to France. In their choice of phrases, in their editorial skill at eliminating, in some cases, equivocations and substituting, in others, ambiguous phrases for the precise ones of the experts, the authors of the report can be accused of favoritism and a pro-French bias.[11] Yet the fact remains that these guidelines, and the accompanying appeasement of the French, were recognized by all the governments at Venice as basically judicious and viable, encased as they were in an acceptable statement of the motivation and economic philosophy that should underlie the treaty.

Spaak was attuned to the doubts that plagued the French. He correctly saw the significant friction points to be the nature of the transitional stage leading to the destruction of tariffs and the exact form and power of the authority created to supervise the implementation of the treaty. In these areas, Spaak took steps obviously meant to accommodate French qualms. At strategic times, he indicated his support for French suggestions primarily or wholly for the benefit of the French economy, such as "escape

[11] Pierre Uri, "Pourquoi le marché commun?" *Enterprise*, no. 77, Juin 1, 1956; Paul-Henri Spaak, Consultative Assembly, Council of Europe, *Official Reports*, 1955, III, 615. M. Camps has called the Rome Treaty "a Gallic one," and so too was the Spaak Report, although less so.

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clauses." He constantly tried to dissipate French apprehension about escalated prices, the inundation of cheap German manufactured articles, and the disadvantages of obsolete French methods of production after such a treaty came into power, calling these "anti-market myths" and the exaggerated fears of those who would prefer the protectionist corset of the past.

Whereas most observers of postwar France point to the political disorder, inflation, and hopeless colonial wars, Spaak emphasized the real seeds of economic revolution that were begun by and continued under the Fourth Republic and stressed the lift such a pact could provide to that modernization and growth. Spaak's optimism and faith and his emphasis on economic capabilities over political instability may have been excessive, but they interjected a new note of hope into the deliberations. His contentions gained effectiveness when he hinted at the strengthened competitive position France would have within a broader European market. The plan, he claimed, would introduce a bit healthy of competition into oligopolistic Europe, yet at the same time provide France a cushion against radical change in the early stages, and thus he prodded the progressive elements in the public and private sectors of the French economy.[12] To those who saw the limitations of French small-scale enterprises and believed them to be a chief cause for the historical retardation of industrialization, Spaak pictured an economic system of larger sized industrial units and bigger export markets while assuring them of adequate protection in the transitional phase.

Nor did Spaak forget the other key to the *relance*, the Federal Republic. He was among those Europeans who thought there was no New Europe without West Germany and went further to suggest there was no solution to any German problem without German participation in a European economic partnership. A Franco-German *rapproachement* which might put an end to the antagonisms of the past was far more probable to Spaak after a European customs union and general market. This kind of agreement would reduce the tensions between the two peoples and their governments and possibly be the bridge to future political and diplo-

[12] For example, see *Le Monde*, Feb. 16, 1956. Also Pierre Drouin *et al.*, *French Industry and the Common Market* (London, 1962).

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matic understanding. Throughout the *relance*, the Belgian believed the central bargain had to be between Paris and Bonn, for in establishing a common market, France would open her markets to German industry on the condition that Germany opened hers to French agriculture.[13] Spaak's main worry was not German disagreement on any specific issues in the negotiations, but the menacing division within Germany in which the forces of Ludwig Erhard, opposed to such "economic incest," were aligned against Konrad Adenauer and his pro-marketeers.[14] The delicacy with which Spaak proselytized among German industrial circles nearly equalled his endeavors with the fretful French adversaries of economic union.

III

Diplomacy based on the thinking and judgments of experts has often been the preferred goal of multilateral negotiations on economic issues. The work behind the Rome Treaty was not the first such use of expert advice in economic treaty making, but it can be called one of the most successful applications of this method in modern history. The Council of Ministers had agreed to the method, but defined no further the experts' role or method of operation. Spaak, relying on the Benelux diplomacy of the preceding dozen years, worked out the experts' function, creating various *groupes d'experts*, one for each subject area to receive attention.

The ministers at Messina had ordered that the experts work alongside of instruction-bound diplomatic agents of the nations involved. At first, this blending appeared to Spaak to be an obstacle. Both he and Roberto Ducci have described the experts' role in drawing up the report, and these first-hand accounts note the strongly nationalistic flavor of the first reports and Spaak's deci-

[13] "M. Paul-Henri Spaak relance l'idée européenne," *L'économie*, no. 53, mars 22, 1956, pp. 7-9. This soon became the oversimplified monocausal thesis of Mr. Walter Lippmann.

[14] Heinrich von Siegler, *Dokumentation der europäischen Integration mit besanderer Berücksichtigung der Verhältnisses* (Bonn, 1961), 95-105; R. T. Nichols, *The Common Market and European Unification* (Santa Monica, Calif., 1969), 105. See also Karl Kaiser, *EWG und Freihandelszone: England und der Kontinent in der europäischen Integration* (Leiden, 1964).

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sion to transfer many of the decisions back to politicians in his committee. However, the specialists were asked to present their ideas to the various committees, and their contributions were important in several areas. This method established a precedent in diplomatic procedure which became the basis for the actual negotiations of the Rome Treaty in late 1956 and early 1957.[15]

The experts came mostly from the existing regional and transnational bureaucracies and institutions like OEEC, ECSC, and the Benelux Union, along with some borrowed civil servants from the national governments; thus Spaak assembled veterans of previous attempts at establishing and effecting integration and men generally committed to the principles of continued European interstate cooperation. He was convinced that the work to be done was for scholars and experts plus diplomats. Spaak directed committee heads like Robert Marjolin, Louis Armand, and Paul Delouvrier to simply consider all economic problems which might help the realization of a single European market and customs union and an atomic energy pact and to "ignore political overtones."[16] In directing the work groups which studied techniques to introduce a community market, Spaak asked the ministers to define for the experts the problems they wished resolved and asked the experts to provide the possible answers. The technical proposals that came forth suggested various means of eradicating barriers to the movement of goods, capital, and labor. These ideas were constantly subjected to the scrutiny of the diplomatic representatives who sat alongside the experts. When the national consciousness of the experts evidenced itself, the delegations of national representatives were given the task of drafting proposals.

During the winter of 1955-56 the experts' consultations remained under the near absolute control of the appointed president of the *comité*. Since Spaak was the highest ranking official in a rank conscious assemblage of diplomats and bureaucrats—and often the only formal and direct link among the specialists, diplomats, and the Council of Ministers—his direction of the pace, procedure, and personnel was a form of over-all management. In the guidance of the ambitious search for practical plans that a maze

[15] Spaak, *Combats*, II, 70-72, 84-86; Ducci in Albonetti, 3-11.
[16] *Le Soir*, Feb. 23, 1965; Ducci in Albonetti, 9-11.

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of technical committees was producing by the fall of 1955, Spaak assumed a direct, involved role. He attended most of the meetings on all levels and insisted on seeing the transcript of every session. He employed experienced and trusted intermediaries like Lodovico Benvenuti, Alpert Coppé, Dirk Spierenberg, and Lambert Schaus to constantly report events to him. The ultimate success of the experts' phase of the diplomacy owes much to Spaak's lieutenants, whose observations and comments became extremely valuable when disagreements lingered beyond one session or dominated the interplay in the cloakrooms. It was almost always after their counsel that Spaak postponed talks or redirected the investigators to relatively easy allied topics.[17] In this most delicate stage of treaty preparation, his quiet, undramatic hard work was clearly evident to the participants.[18]

Spaak provided working conditions with a minimum of problems for his staff of over two hundred workers. He obtained from the Belgian government the use of the Val Duchesse château outside Brussels where the peaceful surroundings offered no distractions. Some study groups he sent into temporary isolation at the Rue Belliard in the city or, as in the case of the report writers, to the Riviera in early spring. He obtained secretarial and clerical staff from the Belgian and later Dutch and Luxemburg governments. All of the participants spoke so highly of the locale, the procedures, and the general atmosphere that Val Duchesse and Spaak became a bundle the foreign ministers at the Venice meeting accepted as a whole when they chose the place and coordinator for the actual drafting conference.

IV

Jean Monnet has been called by many authorities the driving force behind the postwar integration movement and the real architect of the common market. While the first half of that statement

[17] Félix Gaillard, *La Relance Européenne* (Bruxelles, 1956), *passim;* Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, 1958), 515ff.; and Snoy et d'Oppuers, "Les Étapes," 605.

[18] Snoy et d'Oppuers, "Les Étapes," *passim;* Van der Goes van Naters, 84-87; Lambert Schaus, *Le Benelux devant le Marché Commun* (Luxembourg, 1957), 4.

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is largely true, the second half needs revision. Although Monnet and many of the Beneluxers like Spaak agreed on the technological imperative of common atomic and economic pooling, fairly sharp divisions had appeared by the time the ministers met at Messina and ordered actual explorations to commence. In essence, Spaak became the spokesman for a strategy which, at a crucial point in the European resurgence, opposed the French planner's points of view. These differences of opinion were on two crucial issues, both related to procedural matters. First, when the discussions began Monnet was convinced that the institutional form should be openly debated even by the experts. It was his hope that the debate would result in some improvement of the supranational executive structure found in the High Authority.[19] After the Messina meeting, Spaak, Luns, and Beyen rejected reproducing *l'affaire CED*, so that the sphere of activity would remain strictly economic and technological and the ominous questions of political power would be dormant. At a time when passions over the struggles and results of 1954 were subsiding and concrete preliminary advances in economic integration were being made, the reintroduction of political issues would be counterproductive, they argued.

A second and perhaps more fundamental disagreement grew out of Monnet's belief that all the experts' negotiations and later treaty drafting sessions were stalled because of the highly controversial market plan.[20] It was his assumption that an agreement for a nuclear agency could be more easily completed and passed if not attached to the plan for a union of the economies. He argued that the plan for a nuclear agency had to be seen separately, but Spaak believed separation would hurt if not doom the chances of the market project. France had indicated that she badly wanted the Euratom idea (as Armand was to name it); thus the Spaak strategy of making a "package deal" forced Paris into contemplat-

[19] Jean Monnet, *Les États-Unis d'Europe ont commencé* (Paris, 1955), *passim*; "Resolution du Comité d'Action pour les États-Unis d'Europe, sessions des 17 et 18 janvier, 1956," *La documentation française* no. 0.309, Jan. 21, 1956.

[20] J. G., "Le Mythe du Marché Commun," *Perspectives*, no. 552, Jan. 19, 1957; L. de Sainte-Lorette, "Les Travaux des Experts de Bruxelles," *Nouvelles de l'Europe*, no. 68 (1955).

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ing the whole package (in one form or another) or nothing. At the heart of the matter was Spaak's rejection of Monnet's concept that the nuclear community plan was more important than a Euromarket. To Spaak, considering Europe's needs, this was a classic example of mistaken priorities. For him, the free flow of goods, services, persons, and capital was the keystone to progress, more important than the transfers of sovereignty or political union.

Monnet also tried to use the apparent crisis in the supply of conventional energy that occurred in late 1955 and into 1956 as a reason for giving priority to the atomic power project. Even from the vantage point of some fifteen years later, it is dubious whether the pre-Suez economic distress in this area was as severe as Monnet and his Action Committee described it. Yet, at the time, Spaak and his supporters would not allow the Monnet thesis to stampede them into a complete division on the two main subjects of discussion at Brussels.[21]

The essential differences in that first year lay in Monnet's conviction, on political and economic grounds, that there was little value in a market venture without the complete merger of national sovereignty into some powerful central body. Therefore, he felt progress in political unification was as essential as achievements in economic cooperation, if not more so. In contrast, each day of the talks at Val Duchesse strengthened Spaak's case for surefootedness and flexibility (*souplesse*) in any institutional arrangement, for he became more and more reluctant to risk failure through inadequate preparation, impatience, or overreaching. It was true that by the winter, the idea of a nuclear pool found greater approval among European public opinion than did the market scheme, but Spaak decided, with a majority of the diplomatic advisers, against a gamble for one and possibly not the other. Directly and bluntly testing popular and governmental opinion on the issue of diminishing national power in such an all inclusive area as the entire economy of the nations flew in the face of the experience of the times. Convinced that the straightforward in-

[21] Walter Yondorf, "Europe of the Six: Dynamics of Integration" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1962), 162-90; "Troisième Session du Comité d'Action pour les États-Unis d'Europe, 19-20 septembre, 1956," *Nouvelles de l'Europe*, no. 78-79 (1956), 39-41.

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troduction of centralized control and regulation of either project would mean the end of talks, Spaak skirted any such unequivocal pronouncements. This did not mean, as some asserted, that he had dropped his intention of influencing the eventual institutional direction of the projects. Spaak continued to believe in the necessity for power residing in a supranational organization, but for pragmatic political and psychological reasons, this supranational solution had to be masqueraded under several guises. From the reports of the experts, he concluded that the concentration of concrete interests around a specialized European administration would not require a politically autonomous organization, but one endowed with administrative autonomy.[22] In this less far-reaching answer, he took a functionalist approach; he fostered the acceptance of the notion that decision-making powers within an economic union could remain in the respective governments, if a parallel depository of non-national power were established. Such bureaucracy with administrative power could create greater solidarity of common interests and rules and, given time, condition more and more decisions of the states. Like most of his Beneluxer friends, Spaak wanted an institution with power of its own and ability to act independently of the national governments, but he thought the current of opinion would not allow such a radical innovation. Spaak may have expunged *supranationalism* from his vocabulary, but he did not rid it from his mind.

Some observers have seen this move as a major surrender by Spaak and his functionalist colleagues. Compelling circumstances, however, had forced the divorce of theory and practice. What was theoretically and ideally preferable appeared unattainable; what was possible was workable and it was progress. For instance, rather than deserting completely the supranational theme, Spaak expressed his deep feelings repeatedly on the imperative need for some form of compromise. Out of the experts' opinions came a path to vast economic and technological cooperation which would necessitate a modification of Spaak's institutional aspirations, but a common-sensical and valuable modification. To Spaak, reason-

[22] P. H. J. M. Heuben, *Les Conseils de Ministres des Communautés Européennes* (Leiden, 1964), 56ff.; Spaak, *Official Reports*, III, 617.

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able agreement obtained as soon as possible did not exclude future revisions. It might be added parenthetically that with all its crises and failures, the power, prestige, and status achieved by the Commission of the Economic Community has very largely confirmed the wisdom of Spaak's course.

V

The relative speed of the technical experts' discussions and diplomatic negotiations (seven and eight months respectively) and the incompleteness of the Spaak Report and the actual treaties are telling historical aspects of the European unity movement. Any examiner of the report placed before the ministers at Venice is immediately struck with its thoroughness compared to the later often evasive and obtuse production of Rome, but in both cases the omissions and glaring generalities are evident.

As Spaak led the specialists at Brussels, he came to the conclusion that the time factor was crucial. Work was progressing slowly on the major task, which was not achieving balanced multilateral reduction of trade barriers or formulating a customs union, but erecting policies for a common market. The Council of Ministers met at Noordwijk in the fall of 1955 to hear Spaak's statement on progress, or the lack of it, and his request for an extension of the report's due date. When Spaak's attempt to get firmer pledges at that time from the ministers met with a lack of commitment beyond the generalities formulated at the Messina meeting, he was disquieted at their coolness. What worried him most was not outright resistance, but the ministers' uneasiness about any long, drawn out program of experts conferences which might produce unfavorable changes in the attitudes of the governments or the public. Again, when he later visited Adenauer in November, Spaak heard the same misgivings that the slow pace was a mortal danger. Then, the guideline schedule established at Messina had to be postponed a second time for nearly four weeks during the French elections in December.

By February 1956, Spaak was forced to realize the impossibility of getting agreements on many issues, given the dilatory tactics of some national delegations and the lack of accord in certain

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work committees. The events of the period led Spaak to place more problems into the insoluble category. Much of the technical underbrush Spaak had wished to cut away became inpenetrable, especially in social and fiscal policies, employment matters, and the common external tariff. Once general agreement was reached on a nuclear plan, Spaak's paramount concern was the market project. Transport issues, like monetary problems, held back a comprehensive attack on the complex market proposals. Wholesale reassignments of duties by Spaak in late February marked the end of efforts in several committees and a complete concentration on the work of the Verrijn-Stuart group which was probing the economic union and its policies.[23]

The report, itself gives some clues to his tactics. The framers searched often for agreements to agree later rather than settlements on matters of substance. General outlines in some major areas, with the exception of the market sphere, were virtually ready for the ministers by February. When Spaak cut short any further probes and put all the attention of the experts on the culmination of the commercial policy, he made a move of supreme importance in the *relance* diplomacy. Even before agents of the six states began their negotiations, Spaak concluded that the best (and possibly the only) market treaty would be a procedural treaty (*traité cadre*). Foremost in Spaak's thinking was the Mollet government in Paris, the friendliest he could hope for. Yet, events in North Africa could easily depose that ministry and Spaak would be faced with a government headed by the hostile Pierre Mendès-France or the like. The situation in Bonn was more stable, but even there, political considerations compelled Spaak to produce quickly some tangible results.

Not only were external factors working on Spaak; conflict within the talks had erupted several times and seemed to intensify daily. The combination of pressures in and out of the conference rooms led Spaak to surmise that heightened discord was the probable future of protracted discussions. The horse-trading atmosphere had petered out and had been replaced by unyielding par-

[23] Yondorf, 65; Miriam Camps, *The First Year of the European Economic Community* (Princeton, 1958), 15-25; Jean Fosty, "De la CED au Marché Commun," *La Revue Nouvelle*, XXV, no. 4, avril 15, 1967.

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ticipants haggling over details. Furthermore, the experts indicated that it was ludicrous to legislate exact rules on all of Europe's ills at once and expect across the board success, let alone to attempt to resolve beforehand difficulties that might conceivably arise later. Spaak nevertheless was sure that the national representatives might be receptive to the idea of transitional stages toward economic reform and change, which would blunt the possible discomforts and upheavals within the separate nations. The idea also had the attraction of a surrender in installments rather than at one date, which would relieve governments of the simultaneous wrath of many pressure groups and prolong the time they would have to make concessions to other states for the common good.

In one section of the market project, this strategem of delayed action but general agreement paid great dividends when intergovernmental negotiations began later in 1956. Spaak shared the opinion of experts like Sicco Mansholt that the answer to certain problem areas like agriculture lay in postpontment until after a general treaty was put into operation. Negotiations on farm tariffs, classifications, exchange rates, and subsidies had resulted in long angry clashes between several delegations, especially the Dutch and French. Mansholt's advice was based on his belief that detailed answers in this realm could not be worked out at that time, and Spaak told Uri that the farm section of the report to be given at Venice should contain only a vague statement of intent. Less than a year later, after many weeks of haggling about an agricultural policy, Spaak convinced the treaty drafters and ministers that simply committing the signatory nations to settle their farm economy quarrels by some specified but future date was adequate progress. The later episodes of deadlock in agriculture were abundant proof again that this avoidance contrived by Spaak averted what could have been an unhealthy collision that most certainly would have occurred among the experts.[24]

The postponement of certain problems and outright dumping of others designated by the Messina agreement were Spaak's way

[24] Jean Lecerf, *Histoire de l'unité européenne* (Paris, 1965), 62-70; John Newhouse, *Collision at Brussels* (New York, 1968), *passim;* Alan D. Robinson, *Dutch Organized Agriculture in International Politics* (The Hague, 1961), 92-105.

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of getting something of value in front the ministers before they lost any desire or before the entire general impetus for such change declined. The side-stepping decisions in agriculture, transportation, monetary and fiscal matters, the extent of the involvement of the colonies, the tariff reduction timetable, the external tariff, and even how best to reduce hardships liberalization would bring were all part of Spaak's strategy for avoiding friction and getting agreement on the positive achievements of the diplomats and experts. The conditions at Val Duchesse and in Europe determined the framework of the Spaak Report, but one individual made the decisions whether to present the issue in detail or in an abstract outline or whether to postpone entirely stalemated areas. Without these tactical moves, primarily the brushing aside of the numerous complexities, there would not have been a treaty conference in 1956 or a treaty in 1957 and, given the arrival of the DeGaulle regime some fourteen months later, possibly not even in the following decade.

Through the toilsome delays, the sometimes painful advance, and the necessary abandonment of whole fields of examination, the persistence, sagacity, and discretion of Spaak dominated the Brussels gatherings. Despite the lack of a real mandate from the six states until the Venice meeting, the instability of the French domestic and colonial situations, the Erhard-Adenauer debate over sector integration versus supranational communities, and the lingering often doctrinaire Dutch inclination to press the issue of national sovereignty, Spaak pursued his goals with a determined will.

One struggle in the construction of the final report illustrates both the personal beliefs and diplomatic style of Spaak. During the experts assemblies, he had dealt with institutional matters most circumspectly, but careful circumlocution could not continue when the ministers were to be given the results of the talks. If a specialized administration endowed with administrative and not political autonomy was desirable to Spaak and the majority of the committee studying this problem, even this fundamentally non-supranational solution required clever camouflaging and prudently worded arguments. Spaak reminded his workers almost to the point of boredom on the need for a compromise reply to the

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Council on the most perplexing dilemma, the concern with power. A direct confrontation over supranationality obviously would mean a quick death to any report. Unable, therefore, to face the question of institutional power either with indifference or with the conventional idealism of the federalists, Spaak sought a tenable and creative political accommodation. With political objectives still uppermost in his mind, he carefully reasoned a coherent plan which made the national governments the principal decision-making body in a Euromarket through the Council of Ministers. However, a separate independent organ with defined powers to initiate ideas and administer the treaties was included in the report. This watering down, or as some have called it capitulation of the federalist position on the type of integration institution, was advocated by the Belgian leader in order to facilitate the acceptance of the report, but also agreed upon by the men at Brussels as a pragmatic means of governing the projects once they came into operation.

To Spaak, the prevailing conditions of Europe with its partitioned markets, customs controls, imbalance of payments, exchange restrictions, and inequitable social security systems demanded some new configuration of transnational balancing, regulating, and merging of the six economies. Even though Spaak's strategy put a high premium on achievement in the political sphere, the European *zeitgeist* forced a gradualist approach. Any economic pact was too subject to European politics to be formed simply in the elitist-federalist mold of Monnet and his followers, desirable as that might be. The last committee chairmen's meeting, with Spaak presiding, invented an institutional scheme for the report's authors which did not deny national power, yet also gave authority of limited but real freedom of action to a "community" administration.[25] While many later critics of the Spaak Report choose to emphasize that the real power remained with the governments and the power of the "supranational technocrats" was highly delimited, they often omit the Report's deter-

[25] Irmgard Remme, *Paul-Henri Spaak* (Berlin, 1957), 80ff.; Jean-François Deniau, *Le Marché Commun* (Paris, 1966), 33-37. Yondorf quotes Spaak as saying "let the jurists decide whether the proposed institutions are supranational or not" (95). See also the critique of Raymond Bertrand, "The European Common Market Proposal," *International Organization*, X, n. 4 (1956), 571-74.

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mination (visible too in the final treaty) to give the executive organization scope, which in time could develop its prestige and authority.

The highly complicated and legalistic art of economic integration did not call for a full-fledged, closely knit political alliance, but Spaak still envisaged certain transfers of national policy-making to a new institution of the amalgamated nations. This was a part of the fundamental equation of the Spaak Report, just as it would be of the Treaty of Rome. The ultimate power of decision in the union could be twin-headed or based on the concept of shared power, especially after a trial period in which the states made all the final judgments. Thus, Spaak paved the way for a less marked supranational character in the report and its sections dealing with the new organization but he did not preside over the emasculation of the organization. Spurred on by Spaak, the experts sought to strike a balance between the legitimate interests of the member states and those of the entire community. To the *comité* head, a vital part of the philosophy behind such a system would make "the problems of one, the problems of all."[26] Therefore an economic and political community interest would come into existence and demand an institution properly equipped to reflect such regional concerns.

A step-by-step abolition of the economic frontiers by specific timetables would eventually mean the end of the confusion and disequilibrium of protectionism and would lead to total, free economic interchange. This, Spaak thought, would naturally, spontaneously, and irresistibly produce more instruments for true political union.[27] Spaak's mission in 1956 however was primarily the foundation of economic disarmament which would enhance substantially the future prospects for a Western European political community organization. A byproduct of economic union for Spaak and many "Europeanists" was the preservation of the European way of life which was at stake in the bipolar, nuclear,

[26] Spaak, "La Relance," 149.

[27] This idea, that once some agreements were consummated, other needs like a common commercial policy would become inescapable and later the same would be true for a coordinated foreign policy among the member states (the so-called "spill-over" effect of the *relance*) was central to Spaak's thinking in the negotiations. Spaak, *Combats*, II, 93.

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technological world of the mid-century. Moreover, the political decline of Europe could also be partially halted by the joint market which would bring in its wake increased psychological and cultural security.

If the Spaak Report was vital in evoking the call for the first intergovernmental negotiations, then its director's skillful decisions during its drafting paved the way for accomodative diplomacy. Spaak not only gathered the talent and established the rules and pace of work, but also dictated the overall style—closed diplomacy with little publicity given to the stumbling blocks or the accomplishments.[28] Spaak ordered absolutely closed sessions and limited press releases to the most generalized statements.[29] The air of semi-secrecy was associated with the sense of urgency, for Spaak was determined that no distortions or misconceptions leak out to the six governments. It also served to protect the experts and diplomatic agents against national retaliation.

Spaak also contributed to the growth of a non-national, and therefore regional or community, mentality. Just as he instilled this feeling in his co-workers, he encouraged his continental audience to adopt a new European outlook. This community consciousness was not to be a mystique, for it was to be centered on the reasonable and just treaties that would result from the Brussels meetings, despite all the various national divergences. Joint, effective action by the six states would be required to achieve a mass market in the era of industrial automation and atomic science, and Spaak emphasized the elimination of national frontiers between economies as a means of evolving into a giant interlocked competitive unit and not remaining six inward-looking middle powers.

The postwar recovery, reorganization, and rebuilding period indicated to Spaak the national sovereignty had been a basic obstacle to peace and progress. He therefore hoped to replace the anarchic system of everyone for himself with a legal order based on the "majority rule after full debate" principle. In effecting the structural reform of European society, however, Spaak felt that the enduring power and appeal of nationalism restricted revolu-

[28] Snoy et d'Oppuers, "Le Marché," *passim*.
[29] Spaak, "La Relance," 147-48; see also Spaak, *Combats*, II, 84-87.

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tionary change and called for an evolutionary pattern. His own political and philosophical development, from a rigid and bellicose Marxism in the twenties to a neutralist and pro-appeasement stance in the thirties and on to a broad, humanistic internationalism after the war, probably motivated Spaak's diplomatic decisions at Brussels.[30]

The patchy and schematic report provided for a slow, progressive coagulation of customs and interests around an administrative bureaucracy which men like Spaak discerned would be more farsighted and rational than the uncoordinated and myopic national governments. Based as much or more on faith than any demonstrable proofs of future success, these visions became translated into action and institutions which were in fact political. After more than a decade of disappointed hopes and false starts, the dream of European unity was one giant step closer to reality, for the Spaak Report would be the beginning of a permanent dialogue in Western Europe no longer divided and sealed hermetically into tight national compartments. The creation of the Common Market, which might well be one of the greatest diplomatic achievements of the second half of the twentieth century, had begun.

[30] Jakob H. Huizinga, *Mr. Europe: A Political Biography of Paul-Henri Spaak* (London, 1961), especially pp. 237-40.

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Republicanism in Political Rhetoric Before 1776

W. PAUL ADAMS
John F. Kennedy Institute for American Studies
Free University of Berlin

Few terms in the rhetoric of American politics are as uncontroversial as *republic*. It appears on title pages of countless history books, but finds its most frequent usefulness in oratory which may best be described as the opposite of critical analysis. In such a context *republic* is unfailingly used to evoke emotional attachment to the less appealing abstractions "government" and "state." This role for the term *republic* in political "positive thinking" grew out of the revolutionary experience of the founding generation. It was, indeed, one of the radical achievements of the American Revolution to have developed an "ideological attachment to republicanism."[1] Only in 1776 did *republic, republican,* and *republicanism* change from defamatory clichés used to stigmatize critics of the existing order to terms with affirmative connotations, stimulating a feeling of identification with the existing political system. The reversal of the rhetorical value of these terms set in on January 9, 1776 with the publication of Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*. Before this date, they had almost exclusively been

[1] Cecelia M. Kenyon, "Republicanism and Radicalism in the American Revolution: An Old-fashioned Interpretation," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., XIX (1962), 166. George M. Dutcher was the first scholar extensively to draw attention to this phenomenon in "The Rise of Republican Government in the United States," *Political Science Quarterly*, LV (1940), 199-216.

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used as smear words by loyalist writers and only cautiously and defensively by pamphleteers for the colonists' cause.

In fact, the first phase of the American Revolution can not be viewed at all as a struggle for "republican" government. At first the Americans clung tenaciously to what they considered to be their rights under the British constitution. In this respect the war for Dutch independence, the parliamentary resistance to Charles I, and the American and French Revolutions have in common that all resulted in the establishment of republican governments although republicanism was not the motivation or goal of the early phases of the revolutionary movements. The Dutch, after renouncing their allegiance to Philip in 1581, submitted to the rule of the houses of Hapsburg, Valois, and Tudor before establishing their stadtholder constitution. The British Parliament in 1641 set out only to limit monarchical power. The Americans resisted the Stamp Act because they resented the inferior position of colonists and wanted an equal place in the empire; they saw no reason for objecting to a king as its constitutional head. The French in 1789 defied absolute monarchy, but called for a limited monarchy of the British type.[2]

I

A major long-range effect of the American Revolution was the reversal in the prestige of the republican form of government. Before 1776 very few people in Europe and America believed a republic could fulfill adequately the needs of a modern state, and the American problems during the 1780s seemed to justify European prophecies of the failure of the American experiment with republicanism.[3]

On the other hand, since 1689, the British constitution had been widely praised by renowned political writers as happily realizing an optimal combination of individual freedom and political stability. Authors like Roger Acherley, Viscount Bolingbroke, David Hume, Sir William Blackstone, and Baron de Mont-

[2] H. A. L. Fisher, *The Republican Tradition in Europe* (London, 1911), 37-77; Pieter Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1555-1609* (2d ed.: London, 1958), 215; Francis D. Wormuth, *The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism* (New York, 1949), 89.

[3] Gerald J. Ghelfi, "European Opinions of American Republicanism during the 'Critical Period,' 1781-1789" (Ph.D. thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1968), *passim*.

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esquieu, whose opinions carried weight with educated Englishmen, had contributed to the esteem which the British constitution enjoyed in the anti-absolutist circles of Europe and in Britain and its colonies.[4] Montesquieu in his famous panegyric on the British constitution says of Britain that it is the only nation he knows "that has for the direct end of its constitution political liberty." It is true, at the end of this probably best known chapter of the *Spirit of the Laws* he points out that he has not said Englishmen are in full possession of their famous liberties, but that he has tried merely to show that the English constitution makes these liberties possible.[5] Such a distinction between the constitution in principle and the actual effect of the constitution, however, was irrelevant to an age in which the foremost aim of science and scholarship was to discover the unalterable laws governing all sectors of life. As long as the principles on which the English constitution rested were sound, the constitution was bound to endure.

John Adams almost repeated Montesquieu's words in the Boston *Gazette* in January 1766 when the bitter public debate over the Stamp Act was at its height. All governments, Adams wrote, claim to serve the "*salus populi.*" The British constitution, however, is unique in considering liberty a part of the *salus populi*, and in being formulated with the object to secure liberty: "liberty is its end, its use, designation, drift, and scope as much

[4] Roger Acherley, *The Britannic Constitution* (London, 1727), vi; On Acherley see Stanley Pargellis, "The Theory of Balanced Government," Conyers Read (ed.), *The Constitution Reconsidered* (New York, 1938), 43-45. Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, *A Dissertation upon Parties* (2d ed.; London, 1735), Letter 12, 147-49. David Hume, "Of Civil Liberty," Charles W. Hendel (ed.), *David Hume's Political Essays* (Indianapolis, 1953), 104. William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* (Philadelphia, 1771 [1st ed.; London, 1765]), I, 154-55. For the growing feeling of British self-complacency and of the uniqueness of the constitution see Bernard Bailyn, "The Origins of American Politics," *Perspectives in American History*, I (1967), 18-23; David L. Keir, *The Constitutional History of Modern Britain since 1485* (7th ed.; London, 1964), 289-92; William Holdsworth, *A History of English Law* (London, 1938), X, 11, 714.

[5] Baron de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, (trans.) Thomas Nugent, Introduction by Franz Neumann (New York, 1949), Book XI, chaps. 5 and 6; I, 151. All subsequent citations to *The Spirit of the Laws* refer to this edition. Further examples of French praise of the English constitution may be found in Gabriel Bonno, *La constitution britannique devant l'opinion française de Montesquieu à Bonaparte* (Paris, 1931).

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as grinding corn is the use of a mill, the transportation of burdens the end of a ship. . . ."[6] Similar statements frequently appeared in colonial newspapers and pamphlets up to 1776.[7] It was therefore perfectly reasonable for a man like George Mason, while pondering the constitutional crisis in Virginia in 1773, to conclude that "perhaps the Constitution may by Degrees work itself clear, by its own innate strength, the virtue and Resolution of the Community, as hath often been the case in our Mother Country."[8]

There was, in short, a general feeling among friends of liberty in Europe as well as in America that limited monarchy as developed in Britain was the least of all existing governmental evils. It had its flaws, especially for the colonists, but there was nothing to take its place. Republican government certainly was no alternative. In England it had been attempted and had failed. Its living examples—Venice, the Swiss city-republics, the Netherlands, and a few other tiny political entities—seemed sufficient proof that it was not the form of government for thriving empires. In the middle of the eighteenth century, the republican form of government was not considered something new but a relic of Europe's Greek and Roman past. It was associated with the early stage of a society—something to outgrow. A pamphlet dated 1755 defending Pennsylvania's proprietary government against the assembly's claim for power argued:

> Those who have made Politics their Study know very well, that Infant Settlements flourish fastest under a Government leaning to the republican or popular Forms, because such a Government immediately interests every Individual in the common Prosperity, and settles itself at

[6] "The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym—No. III," Boston *Gazette*, Jan. 27, 1766 in Charles Francis Adams (ed.), *The Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1850-1856), III, 479.

[7] Clinton Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic: The Origins of the American Tradition of Political Liberty* (New York, 1953), 143-44, gives references to the period 1734-1763; Bernard Bailyn (ed.), *Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750-1776*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), I, 44-45 gives references for 1763-1776; June E. Uphouse, "The Attitude of the Colonists toward the King and Royal Power during the Decade of Controversy" (Master's thesis, Indiana University, 1960), 1 ff., emphasizes the unreserved deference of the colonists to the institution of the monarchy at George's accession in 1760.

[8] George Mason, "Extracts from the Virginia Charters, with some Remarks on them, made in the Year 1773," Kate M. Rowland, *The Life of George Mason* (New York, 1892), I, 404.

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> once on a broad and firm Basis. Moreover, the People being but few, and but small Profit in public Offices, the Government may also be administered without the Faction and Anarchy incident to the popular Forms. But in Proportion as a Country grows rich and populous, more Checks are wanted to the Power of the People; and the Government, by nice gradations, should verge more and more from the popular to the mixt Forms.[9]

Ever since Aristotle's discussion of the most favorable size of the ideal state, republican government has generally been considered suitable only for small states. Montesquieu continued in that tradition when he said that "it is natural for a republic to have only a small territory; otherwise it cannot long subsist." In an extensive republic individuals might acquire fortunes large enough to dominate their fellow citizens politically. The "thousand private views" thriving in a large area among a numerous population might endanger the very idea of the public good. In a small state, however, "the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen."[10] The only form of government capable of dealing with the political and administrative problems of a modern state is monarchy, more or less "mixt" and limited, and more or less enlightened.

II

This consensus of the anti-absolutist political science of the day in combination with the English self-complacency of the mid-eighteenth century formed the background for the gloomy warnings against experiments in republicanism, and it is understandable that *republic, republican,* and *republicanism* became brickbats hurled in the political debate between mother mother country and colonists

[9] [William Smith] *A Brief State of the Province of Pennsylvania* (2d ed.; London, 1755), 6-7. The political context in which this argument was used is explained in J. R. Pole, *Political Representation in England and the Origins of the American Republic* (London, 1966), 109-16.

[10] *The Politics of Aristotle,* (trans.) Ernest Barker (Oxford, 1948), Book 7, Chaps. 4-6; 339-46. *Spirit of the Laws,* Book 8, Chap. 16; I, 120. A modern discussion of the relationship between area and form of government is given by Otto Hintze, "Staatenbildung und Verfassungsentwicklung" in Hintze, *Staat und Verfassung: Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte,* (ed.) Gerhard Oestreich (2d ed.; Göttingen, 1962), 34-51. Cf. Ghelfi, 8-43.

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and between loyalist and patriot Americans in the decades before independence. Like other party names later borne with pride, *republican* first gained currency as a term of opprobrium, invariably associated with the inglorious epoch of the Puritan Commonwealth.[11] After 1660, no one either in Britain or in the colonies earnestly hoping to exercise any political influence argued clearly against monarchical and for republican government. Those dissatisfied with the settlement of 1689 could be certain of the discrediting effect of the adjective. Accusing prominent Whigs of republican sentiments became almost routine for Tory writers after 1689. Thus John Locke, who never advocated republicanism, was held up for criticism because of "Republican Schemes."[12]

Whigs grew tired of this false but apparently effective accusation and published definitions of their understanding of the crucial terms. An anonymous Whig pamphlet of 1710 defined *antimonarchical principles* as "such principles as are against the absolute government of one person by mere will and pleasure, and without laws." The author defined *republican principles* as "much the same with antimonarchical; but particularly revolution principles are meant by them; such principles as defend the proceedings of the queen, the nation, and Prince of Orange, at the late Revolution."[13] In other words, this Whig writer accepts the disreputable term only after disowning any association with the Commonwealth period and redefining it as a name for a defender of the settlement of 1689. Redefinitions did not, of course, impress the Tories. They knew the weapon they had in *repub-*

[11] *Republic* and *commonwealth* are known to have been used synonymously in the sense of "a state in which the supreme power is vested in the people" at least since 1618; *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. "commonwealth." Rarely were they used in political debate in the neutral sense of *res publica* or *state*. From 1649 on they were predominantly used in their anti-monarchical meaning: F. W. Maitland, "The Crown as Corporation," *Selected Essays*, (ed.) H. D. Hazeltine *et al.* (Cambridge, 1936), 113; C. H. McIlwain, "Some Illustrations of the Influence of Unchanged Names for Changing Institutions," *Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies: Essays in Honor of Roscoe Pound*, (ed.) Paul Sayre (New York, 1947), 488; Wormuth, 90.

[12] *An Essay upon Government. Wherein the Republican Schemes Revived by Mr. Locke, Dr. Blackal, etc. Are Fairly Considered and Refuted* (London, 1705).

[13] *The True Genuine Tory Address—To Which is Added an Explanation of some Hard Terms Now in Use* (n.p., 1710) in *A Collection of Scarce and Valuable Tracts . . . Particularly that of . . . Lord Somers*, (ed.) Walter Scott (2d ed.; London, 1814; New York, 1965), XII, 658.

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lican and did not think of relinquishing it. An anonymous Tory published his own set of old-fashioned, clear cut definitions. "Republican principles," he declared, are "such principles as did once subvert our constitution in church and state; such principles as murdered the grandfather, and are in the grand-daughter's reign at this time openly professed and encouraged." The same author added a warning against the glib use of the term *Revolution Principles:* "Revolution comes from the Latin word *revolvere,* which signifies to turn about; so that by revolution principles are meant such principles as, under the specious pretence of justifying the last happy Revolution, prepare mankind for any, and allow of the same proceedings without the same necessity."[14]

The effectiveness of using *republic* and *commonwealth* as smear words can also be seen in the protest by the reformist Whigs who were discredited by their political opponents as "Commonwealth's Men." Robert Molesworth in 1721 rejected this appellation in words betraying his irritation: "There is one great Discouragement under which both I, and all other writers and Translators of Books tending to the acquiring or preserving the public Liberty, do lie; and that is, the heavy Calumny thrown upon us, that we are all *Commonwealth's-Men:* Which (in the ordinary Meaning of the Word) amounts to *Haters* of *Kingly* Government." Only after substantial redefinition of the Tory meaning did he accept the term.[15]

One generation later, reformist writers like Joseph Priestley and John Cartwright still fought the same, old accusation. To be sure of an audience for their reform program, they first had to pledge allegiance to limited monarchy. Priestley in 1768 declared that he could "heartily join with the greatest admirers of the English constitution in their encomiums upon it" and that it was "the best actual scheme of civil policy" he knew to exist.

[14] *The True, Genuine, Modern Whig Address* (n.p., 1710), *ibid.*, 662.

[15] Robert Molesworth (trans.), preface to François Hotman, *Franco-Gallia, or, an Account of the Ancient Free State of France* (2d ed.; London, 1738), v.; the first edition with Molesworth's preface was published in 1721. Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteen-Century Commonwealthman* (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), 3, 403; she does not sufficiently emphasize that *commonwealthman* was more of a derogatory term than anything else.

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In his remarks on Blackstone's *Commentaries*, Priestley appealed "to all persons who know the Dissenters . . . whether they be not, almost *to a man* (I may add, *woman* and *child* too) the firm and intrepid friends of the liberties of this country, and of its constitution, as a *monarchy;* notwithstanding the *republican principles*, with which we are generally and ignorantly charged."[16] Major Cartwright in 1776 founded his hopes for incisive reforms on the conviction that the British "constitution of government, *(supposing it labouring under no abuses)* is, in its spirit and principle, a *perfect* institution . . . having a natural tendency towards perpetuity; and being rightly calculated to protect the liberty, property, peace and good name of every member of the community."[17] James Burgh wanted to help bring about by his compilation of reformist writings a restoration and not an alteration of the British constitution. To ward off the old accusation, he assured his readers:

> Now I am mentioning republican government, I take this opportunity of entering an express caveat against all accusations of a desire to establish republican principles. I do not think a friend to this nation is obliged to promote a change in the constitution. The present form of government by king, lords, and commons, if it could be restored to its true spirit and efficiency, might be made to yield all the liberty, and all the happiness, of which a great and good people are capable in this world.[18]

When colonial officials reported their difficulties with colonial assemblies to their superiors and friends in England, they made sure of a sympathetic reaction by describing the unruly colonists as "republicans." In 1743 Governor Lewis Morris of New Jersey warned the Lords of Trade against the ambition of colonial assemblies and said that he feared they were following "the example of the parliament of 1641" and believed in "republicanism."[19] Governor Clinton of New York in 1747 denounced

[16] Joseph Priestly, *An Essay on the First Principles of Government* (London, 1768), 128. *Remarks on Some Paragraphs in the Fourth Volume of Dr. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England* in Blackstone, *Commentaries*, V [Appendix], 21.

[17] John Cartwright, *The Legislative Rights of the Commonalty Vindicated* (2d ed; London, 1777), 20-21.

[18] James Burgh, *Political Disquisitions* (Philadelphia, 1775), I, 9; cf. III, 299.

[19] Lewis Morris to Lords of Trade, June 10, 1743, quoted in Roy N. Lokken, "The Concept of Democracy in Colonial Political Thought," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., XVI (1959), 577.

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the majority of the Council and the Assembly as "ignorant, illiterate people of republican principles who had no knowledge of the English constitution."[20] In 1754, in a letter to a merchant friend in London, Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie complained about the House of Burgesses for not letting him raise an administrative fee on sales of public land, which would provide him with a source of income outside their control. He considered their behavior "very disrespectful" and extended his criticism to the electorate: "The People have been much inflam'd, and with republican Principles endeavour to act very inconstitutional."[21] In 1757 the Governor of North Carolina introduced his major opponent in the Assembly to the Board of Trade as "a professed violent Republican, in every instance taking from his Majesty's prerogative and encroaching upon the Rights of the Council and adding to the power of the Assembly to make himself popular."[22] In the months between the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act, the highest customs official in the port of Boston warned his superiors in England against any more leniency toward the colonists. The Americans, he observed, were "accustomed to more than British liberty." They wanted nothing but "democratical government." He did not understand the permissive reactions in the mother country:

> One is surprised to find that . . . Colonies, on which the fate of this country will be found to depend, should . . . be suffered to remain to this day under these little factions, democracies, which had their first rise in the republican spirit of licentious times; . . . even in the Provinces where the King appoints both Governor and Council, the authority of the crown is not sufficiently supported against the licentiousness of a republican spirit in the people, whose extreme jealousy of any power, not immediately derived from themselves . . . disposes them generally to send as representatives the most artful and factious among

[20] E. B. O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow (eds.), *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, (Albany, 1856-1887), VI, 670-71.

[21] Robert Dinwiddie to John Hanbury, March 12, 1754, R. A. Brock (ed.), *The Official Records of Governor Robert Dinwiddie, 1751-1758* (Richmond, 1883-1884), I, 103.

[22] William L. Saunders (ed.), *Colonial Records of North Carolina* (Raleigh, 1886-1890), V, 948.

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> them. These meet like so many tribunes, upon a principle of opposition.[23]

The horrors of the Commonwealth period were thus easily conjured up. In readers as steeped in Roman history as the educated Englishmen of the eighteenth century the "tribunes" he referred to must have evoked visions of the party strife and civil war in the times of the Roman republic.

These warnings are part of the well known struggle for power between the royal governors and the colonial assemblies in the half century before independence. Quite obviously, the labels used in such reports cannot be taken as fair descriptions of what the colonists either thought or did. They do not prove the existence of articulated republican sentiments among the colonists before 1776; they do show the use of a defamatory cliché.

III

In the opening article of a periodical started November 30, 1752, William Livingston, editor of the new *Independent Reflector*, deplored the style of political discussion in New York. Anyone suggesting reform of any kind was immediately pigeonholed and attacked by his opponents as an extremist of one sort or another:

> If he discants with Spirit on the Rights of the Subject; he is an Enemy to Monarchy, and a latent Promoter of republican Principles. Does he insist on the due Extent of prerogative; he is a Tool to the Administration, and an Advocate for lawless Dominion. If he combats the Libertinism of the Age; he is an enthusiastic Zealot, or a knavish Impostor. Does he plead for the free Exercise of Conscience, and disclaim the Unreasonableness of Persecution; he is disaffected to the Church, and a Foe to Religion.[24]

Livingston's editorial shows how two pairs of highly pejorative terms were used to polarize public debate of religious and secular issues: "Tool to the Administration" was opposed to "Promoter

[23] Comptroller Weare, "Observations on the British Colonies on the Continent of America," n.d., Massachusetts Historical Society, *Collections*, I (1792), 72-76. Weare does not speak of Massachusetts alone but also mentions his long years of experience in other New England and middle colonies; *ibid.*, 67, 74.

[24] Milton M. Klein (ed.), *The Independent Reflector* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 56.

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of republican Principles" and "Zealot" opposed to "Foe to Religion." A better illustration of the important and strictly negative role of *republican* in the colonies before July 1776 could hardly be imagined.

This function became more and more important in the Tory vocabulary as colonial resistance proved effective, and in the great debate about independence, warnings against the republican form of government became one of the major arguments against an America free from domination by one of the European monarchies.

When the colonists' resistance to the Stamp Act was being debated in 1765 in London newspapers, Benjamin Franklin in a published reader's letter complained of the use of epithets such as "republican race," "mixed rabble of Scotch, Irish and foreign vagabonds," "descendants of convicts," and "ungrateful rebels."[25] When the Continental Congress began taking shape, warnings against republicanism were voiced louder than ever before. After resolutions passed by a mass meeting in Philadelphia on June 18, 1774 supported by committees of correspondence throughout Pennsylvania had forced the Assembly to send delegates to the proposed continental congress and while the committees were continuing to pressure the Assembly for anti-British actions, a leaflet was distributed among the members of the Assembly on July 21, 1774. It supported their stand against the illegal committees and insisted they alone were the legal representatives of the people of Pennsylvania; the committees, it went on, originated in county meetings attended by less than one-fourth of the freeholders and were usually dominated by some "zealous partizan" and persons whose "only consequence" derived from the present troubles: "From this fountain originates the authority of the Committees; it is a fountain from which no legal authority can be derived; we know not where such precedents may terminate; setting up a power to controul you is setting up anarchy above order—IT IS THE BEGINNING OF REPUBLICANISM." The Assembly should not close its eyes to this attempt "to set up the resolves of the populace above the law, and

[25] "N.N.," *The Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, Dec. 28, 1765 in *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, (ed.) Leonard W. Labaree (New Haven, 1968), XII, 414.

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above the Constitution."[26] This cry of alarm contains the complete definition of *republicanism* shortly before and after 1776.

When by October 1774 the Continental Congress had proved that the colonists were willing and able to coordinate their resistance, Loyalist warnings became even more urgent. The most articulate critic of the Continental Congress, Samuel Seabury, Anglican minister in New York, alone wrote four pamphlets against Congress and its defenders between November 1774 and April 1775. In the week before fighting broke out at Lexington advertisements announced the revealing title of his last production, *The Republican Dissected: or the Anatomy of an American Whig*. It was to castigate the republicanism of the American Whig leaders in general and of young Alexander Hamilton in particular. This pamphlet may have been the most elaborate warning against republicanism published in the colonies before the Declaration of Independence, but it never came off the press and no manuscript copy is known to exist.[27] We can, however, surmise Seabury's arguments from his other writings. He believed that there was a group of "sly favourers of an American Republic" who with the help of the fanatical Sons of Liberty had managed the election of delegates in their favor to the Continental Congress; therefore, no reasonable action could be expected of this assembly from the beginning.[28] Distinguishing between submission to the crown and recognition of the sovereignty of parliament he considered a good specimen of the sophistry of these "American Republicans."[29] He rejected Alexander Hamilton's argument in *A Full Vindication of the Measures of*

[26] "To the Representatives of Pennsylvania, Now Met in this City," signed "A Freeman"; reprinted in Peter Force (ed.), *American Archives* . . . (Washington, 1837-1853), 4th Ser., I, 607-08.

[27] Thomas R. Adams, *American Independence: The Growth of an Idea. A Bibliographical Study of the American Political Pamphlets Printed Between 1764 and 1776 Dealing with the Dispute Between Great Britain and Her Colonies* (Providence, R.I., 1965), 143-44; Clarence H. Vance (ed.), *Letters of a Westchester Farmer* (White Plains, N.Y., 1930), 33-34, was unable to determine whether Seabury himself had withdrawn or destroyed the manuscript, or whether the Sons of Liberty did. Vance considers Charles Evans' comment in his *American Bibliography*, (New York, 1941-1959), V, 215, attributing the pamphlet to Isaac Wilkins as "unsupported."

[28] [Samuel Seabury], *The Congress Canvassed* (New York, 1774), 8.

[29] *Ibid.*, 26.

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the Congress that the colonists could not be taxed without their consent. "The position," he declared, "that we are bound by no laws to which we have not consented, either by ourselves, or our representatives, is a novel position, unsupported by any authoritative record of the British constitution; ancient or modern. It is republican in its very nature, and tends to the utter subversion of the English monarchy."[30] He depicted Congress as an assembly of "Republicans" who are "exerting all their influence, by sedition and rebellion, to shake the British empire to its very basis, that they may have an opportunity of erecting their beloved commonwealth on its ruins."[31] He portrayed the Continental Congress as a reincarnation of the omnipotent, one-chamber Long Parliament, fanatically determined to regiment the daily life of Englishmen:

> We shall not dare to eat, or drink, or sleep, or act, or speak, or think, but in the precise mode which they shall direct. They have already regulated our trade and commerce, our manner of living, and our diversions; . . . the *next* Congress is to regulate our *courts of justice*.—Then will their tyranny be established; a tyranny of the most dreadful kind; —which *makes* laws and *executes* them without *check or controul*. Then will our happy constitution be destroyed, and a REPUBLIC be raised on its ruins.[32]

The New England delegates to the Continental Congress were hated most by Seabury. The disputes between governor and assembly in Massachusetts, he maintained, had "awakened their republican principles." When disaffection from the mother country increased in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, Seabury described it as "Boston politics" finding new adherents. Least of all could Seabury forgive the delegates from New York for having been taken in by the rash New Englanders, and he asked the New York merchants the rhetorical question: "Are you sure that while you are supporting the authority of the congress,

[30] [Samuel Seabury], *A View of the Controversy between Great-Britain and Her Colonies* (New York, 1774), 10. For a thorough analysis of Hamilton's republicanism and its background, see Gerald Stourzh, *Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government* (Stanford, 1970).

[31] [Seabury], *A View of the Controversy*, 19-20.

[32] [Samuel Seabury], *An Alarm to the Legislature of the Province of New-York* (New York, 1775), 9.

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and exalting it over your own legislature, that you are not nourishing and bringing to maturity a grand American Republic, which shall after a while rise to power and grandeur upon the ruins of our present constitution?" The scheme, he was sure, was already in the minds of the New Englanders, "and in a little time, the *Common Wealth* [will] be completely formed."[33] Seabury did not think it necessary to explain why even a flourishing "grand American Republic" was undesirable. Either he earnestly believed that an American republic would be as short-lived as the English republic had been, or he dreaded independence, regardless of the future form of government of the new states, and simply made use of a proven and effective argument.

His intention to frighten and to shock becomes quite obvious when a few pages later, no longer certain that independence inevitably means republicanism, he predicts two civil wars in addition to the fight against the Redcoats. The first would be "to determine what kind of government we should have—whether a Monarchy or a Republic." The second war would then be "necessary to fix a Monarch, or to establish the commonwealth."[34] In retrospect, this vision seems grotesque. It does not seem very likely, however, that a man like Seabury, who was soon to be the first Anglican bishop in America, voluntarily made himself ridiculous by overblown metaphors. Granted the exuberance of eighteenth-century pamphleteer rhetoric,[35] Seabury did not want to amuse but to convince and he sought to do so with the aid of an established argument.

Other pamphleteers and newspaper writers repeated the same warning, supported by references to the jealousies and opposing interests of the thirteen colonies. Jonathan Boucher, a Maryland minister with strong Tory views, did this in a masterful way in a newspaper article in the summer of 1775 which he addressed to the Southern members of the Continental Congress. He asked them to consider what members of the Church of England could expect in a "wild Republic of mad Independents," pointed out that "Republicanism will but ill accord with the genius of the people whom ye say ye represent," and reminded them repeatedly of how widely

[33] [Seabury], *Congress Canvassed*, 7, 24.
[34] *Ibid.*, 27.
[35] Martin Christadler, *Der amerikanische Essay, 1720-1820* (Heidelberg, 1968).

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the interests of the Southern colonies differed from the "infuriate politics of the Republicans of the North."[36] The logical link between warnings against sectionalism and warnings against republicanism was the belief in the crown as fair mediator between divergent interests. The stereotype of the king as impartial umpire, used since time immemorial to justify monarchy, could be combined with the other conventional wisdom, which identified republican government with endless party strife. Both ideas lived on the paternalistic attitude at the basis of all attachment to monarchy. The colonists, it was suggested, were as incompetent as thirteen children to cooperate and argue their differences peacefully; once they had escaped the gentle pressure of the constitutional family circle, their "jarring interests" would never let them live in peace.[37] Daniel Leonard, who wrote in Massachusetts papers against the first Continental Congress, couched the same argument in the language of the political science of the day. He considered the "provincial constitutions" sufficient for regulating the internal affairs of each colony within the empire, but they could not stand for themselves. They "have no principle of stability within themselves." They might do for quiet times, "but would be merged by the violence of turbulent ones, and the several colonies become wholly monarchical or wholly republican, were it not for the checks, controuls, regulations and support of the supreme authority of the empire."[38]

IV

Paine's open call for independence and republicanism caused a new wave of warnings against republicanism. For the last time in American history, *republic, republican, republicanism,* and *commonwealth*

[36] Jonathan Bouchier [*sic.*] (ed.), *Reminiscences of an American Loyalist, 1738-1789* (Boston, 1925), 133-35; the publication date of this article is not given.

[37] Richard Wells, *The Middle Line* (Philadelphia, 1775), 45-47; "Hampden," [Dixon and Hunter's] Virginia *Gazette*, April 20, 1776; John Wesley, "A Calm Address to the American Colonies," *Massachusetts Gazette and the Boston Weekly Newsletter*, Feb. 1, 1776. See also Joseph Galloway, *A Candid Examination* (New York, 1775), 32, 48; Samuel Sewall, *A Cure for the Spleen* (Boston, 1775), 28; "Z.Z.," *Massachusetts Gazette and the Boston Weekly Newsletter*, Jan. 11, 1776.

[38] [Daniel Leonard], *Massachusettensis* (Boston, 1775), 44.

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were used in a pejorative sense. Soon after they became totally ineffective in that capacity.

In the public debate between January and July 1776 all the possible negative implications of these words were raised once again. Several fundamental arguments against republican government recurred:

(1) There was, basic to all other arguments, an appeal to the conservative instinct. The uncertainty of a republican experiment was contrasted with the known merits of the familiar English constitution. A frightened "Civis" of Pennsylvania saw only one alternative in April 1776: "Whether we shall preserve the ancient forms of government, which have led us to our present rank and importance in the world, or explore the dark and untrodden way of Independence and Republicanism." He refuted Paine's radical criticism of the British constitution. Pennsylvania, he maintained, had so far been able to enjoy the advantages of the British constitution without suffering from the symptoms of degeneration like venality and corruption. Pennsylvania's old constitution was good enough. "What is there", he asked, "either in theory or experience, that can make us in love with a commonwealth?"[39] As late as October 1778 the *Royal Gazette* published in occupied New York used the high regard enjoyed by the British constitution as an argument against the rebels. "A Comparative View of the Different Circumstances of the People of America in the Year 1773 and 1778," printed in two parallel columns, pointed out that in 1773 all colonies except Connecticut and Rhode Island were "of the mixed form, nearly resembling that of Great-Britain celebrated by all . . . , calculated to check and suppress the mischiefs of popular confusion, and the tyranny of one or a few." By 1778 all had turned to the worst: "All the governments are perfectly democratical and popular; which all experience has shewn, and all authors on political institutions agree, are the worst."[40]

(2) There was a recurrent appeal to trust in authorities. It was convenient to contrast the almost impeccable authority of Locke

[39] "Civis," Pennsylvania *Ledger*, April 6, 1776.

[40] "Aristides," "A Comparative View of the Different Circumstances of the People of America in the Year 1773 and 1778," [Rivington's] *Royal Gazette*, Oct. 7, 1778.

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or Montesquieu with the hysterical demands of "crack-brained Republicans" and the anonymous nonentity of the author of *Common Sense*. It could hardly be worth the effort, the New York *Gazette* wrote in April 1776, to bear the hardships of a war and after victory be left with a form of government "which Baron Montesquieu and the best writers on the subject have shown to be attended with many mischiefs and imperfections, while they pay high encomiums on the excellency of the British constitution."[41]

The provost of the College of Philadelphia and Anglican minister, William Smith, refuted *Common Sense* in a booklength series of articles published in Philadelphia newspapers over the signature of "Cato." He quoted Montesquieu's short assessment of the Puritan Commonwealth to refute Paine's devastating critique of the British constitution; "A very droll spectacle . . . it was in the last century," Montesquieu had written, "to behold the impotent efforts the English made for the establishment of Democracy or Republican Government." In his desire to crush Paine with the authority of Montesquieu, Smith did not hesitate to touch up his quotation in order to make it more suitable for this purpose. Montesquieu had always distinguished the democratic from the aristocratic variant of republican government. Smith ignored this and tacked on "or Republican Government" to Montesquieu's sentence to make certain its discrediting effect.[42]

Another authority cited by Smith against Paine was Algernon Sidney, known as a martyr to the cause of English liberty, who had been accused of high treason and had been decapitated for his libertarian convictions in 1683 and posthumously rehabilitated after the settlement of 1689. Sidney never intended anything else, Smith explained, than to stop the degeneration of "mixed Government" into "absolute Monarchy." He had therefore rejected both Charles I and Cromwell. He had not criticized monarchy in general but only kings who abused their power. He had believed that the best constitutions always have a monar-

[41] New York *Gazette*, April 8, 1776.

[42] "Cato," "To the People of Pennsylvania—Letter VII," *Pennsylvania Packet*, April 15, 1776, in Force, 4th Ser., V, 852. The sentence quoted by Smith is from *The Spirit of the Laws*, Book III, chap. 3; I, 20.

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chical, an aristocratic, and a democratic part. Therefore Sidney had never advocated "popular Governments." This opinion, Smith added, was shared by Thomas Gordon, whose standing with the colonists as an authority Smith hoped to enhance by identifying him not only as a "Whig" but even as an "Independent Whig."[43]

(3) The example of European experiences with republican government was used as another recurring argument against its establishment in America. One anonymous author, convinced that "history ancient or modern will make few Republicans," described the history of the Greek and Roman republics as full of confusion and civil wars. Their downfall did not stem from the failure of individuals, but from the very structure of the governments: "Like ill-constructed machines, set in motion, they perished by their own instability and unwieldiness." Moreover, the constitutions of the Greek republics had been designed by extraordinary individuals like Lycurgus and Solon, recognized by their contemporaries and by posterity as the great "lawgivers." But, he asked, is there in Pennsylvania in 1776 an American Lycurgus or an American Solon?[44]

This same critic found the records of modern republics no more convincing. The Netherlands, the Swiss and Italian republics he called aristocratical tyrannies.[45] Carter Braxton, in a pamphlet addressed to the convention of Virginia, said Venice, "once a Republick," had degenerated into tyranny and in Holland there remained only "the shadow of Democracy."[46] Readers of the Pennsylvania *Gazette* were challenged to "look for happiness and security in the Republick of *Holland*, so often mentioned, and so little known: let us recollect the fate of the two brothers, *Cornelius* and *John de Witt*, Dutch ministers, who were massacred by the people in the year 1672. *Holland* itself, from being

[43] "Cato," "To the People of Pennsylvania-Letter VIII," in Force, 4th Ser., V, 1050-51. On Thomas Gordon, see David L. Jacobson, *The English Libertarian Heritage: From the Writings of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon in The Independent Whig and Cato's Letters* (Indianapolis, 1965).

[44] "Civis," Pennsylvania *Ledger*, April 6, 1776; on the concept of "lawgivers," see Stourzh, *Hamilton*, 174-80.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] [Carter Braxton], *An Address to the Convention* (Philadelphia, 1776), quoted from Force, 4th Ser., VI, 751-52.

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a republick, is become a downright aristocracy."[47] The best known European failure with republicanism was, of course, the Puritan Commonwealth. Like hundreds of writers before, opponents of independence in 1776 called up the ghost of 1649: once before Englishmen had betrayed their constitution—"repeated efforts have been made towards *democracy*, and they equally failed. Once indeed republicanism triumphed over the constitution. . . ."[48] Parallels between American generals and Cromwell were drawn, and soldiers were told that they had everything to lose and nothing to gain: "Turn back a few pages of the English history; read the account of the civil wars of the last century; and view the triumphs and absolute sway of that tyrant *Cromwell*: he, like some of your leaders, began with humoring the enthusiasms of the times, and ended, the parricide of his country."[49]

(4) The cliché of the war-torn republic was a fourth argument. Paine's indictment in *Common Sense* that monarchies resorted to war more frequently than did republics was turned around. It was the factious little Greek republics that killed each other in never-ending wars. Rome at the time of the republic, it was maintained, had shed more blood and had caused more misery in the world than any three monarchies taken together. Only by accident had Holland escaped the last war.[50] Doubts in the existence of two alleged preconditions for republican government provided more arguments against it.

(5) One of the unquestioned truths of eighteenth-century political theory was that a viable republic presupposed "virtuous" citizens. The special connection between republicanism and virtue had been discussed at least since Machiavelli.[51] Montesquieu had stated categorically that monarchical or despotic government could exist on the naked force of arms, but that "virtue is necessary in a popular government." Montesquieu believed that

[47] "Rationalis," "To the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania," Pennsylvania *Gazette*, Feb. 28, 1776, quoted in Force, 4th Ser., IV, 1530.

[48] [Charles Inglis], *The True Interest of America* (Philadelphia, 1776), 70.

[49] "Z.Z.," Massachusetts *Gazette*, Jan. 11, 1776.

[50] [Inglis], 23.

[51] See J. H. Whitfield, "The Anatomy of Virtue," *The Modern Language Review*, XXXVIII (1943), 222-25.

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popular government could function only when all citizens acted from unselfish motives, from "a love of the republic" which expressed itself in the love of equality and frugality. The emotional attachment to this ideal he called "political virtue."[52] Following Montesquieu's model, Adam Ferguson investigated the laws of decay of forms of government and found the greatest danger to republics to reside in the lack of this virtue; "A corrupted people," he warned, "are no longer fit to share in the administration of a state."[53]

Since American Whigs had publicly accepted the idea that "the principle and foundation" of republican government was "virtue," it was very easy to turn the postulate into a warning and to state that the American people was not ready for republicanism.[54] The fate of a republic whose citizens lack political virtue was exemplified in an "Account of the Government of the Republic of the Seven United Provinces." The Netherlands, it explained, degenerated into an oligarchy because private interests became more powerful than the public interest: "The necessary principle of a Republic, Virtue, subsists no longer there. The great riches of private people (though the public is poor) have long ago extinguished that principle."[55] The effectiveness of the argument lay, of course, in the conflict of the idea of a frugal republic with the American dream of a thriving and ever extending trade empire. The argument created the impression that the colonists could have only one or the other, republican government or a modern state with a prospering economy.

(6) Another argument was based on the same presumed conflict between rising American hopes and the stifling prerequisites of the republican mode of government. The idea that republican govern-

[52] *The Spirit of the Laws*, Book III, chaps. 3-5, Book V, chaps. 1-3; I, 20, 22, 23, 40, 41. See the interpretation of Gerald Stourzh, "Die tugendhafte Republik: Montesquieus 'Begriff der 'vertu' und die Anfänge der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," *Österreich und Europa: Festgabe für Hugo Hantsch zum 70. Geburtstag* (Graz, 1965), 247-67. See also Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic* (Chapel Hill, 1969), 65-70.

[53] Adam Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (London, 1767), 342. More European voices to the same effect are discussed in Ghelfi, 44-85.

[54] John Adams, "Thoughts on Government," Adams (ed.), *Works of John Adams*, IV, 194-95 furnished this argument for Carter Braxton, *Address*, quoted in Force, 4th Ser., VI, 751.

[55] This essay by Lord Chesterfield was reprinted in the Pennsylvania *Ledger*, Feb. 10, 1776.

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ment was impractical for large states was firmly established by eighteenth century political science and effectively refuted only by the *Tenth Federalist*. An Englishman writing in the year of the Sugar Act assumed that "whoever shall consider the nature of a Republic, where every member has some share of power, will find it calculated for small societies and territories; where a man is capable of feeling he is somebody."[56]

When in 1766, for some interesting reason, the College of Philadelphia ran a competition for the best essays "On the Reciprocal Advantages of a Perpetual Union between Great-Britain and Her American Colonies," one of the winners argued that America was too big to govern itself without breaking apart into several small states. A solution of the Dutch or Swiss kind, he said, would be no help to Americans, because, "the vast extent of the Colonies . . . would give being to an aristocracy,—a kind of government, as repugnant to the genius and temper of America as despotic monarchy."[57]

The same argument was used effectively by Charles Inglis in his refutation of *Common Sense*. He used the terms *democracy* and *republican form* interchangeably and declared that "America is too extensive for it. That form may do well enough for a single city, or small territory; but would be utterly improper for such a continent as this. America is too unwieldy for the feeble, dilatory administration of democracy." The fate of the extending Roman republic was a warning example. Holland was no proof to the contrary because of its small size.[58]

A Loyalist broadside published in New York in October 1776 pointed to the fate of the Puritan Commonwealth as proof of the incompatibility of republican government with the exigencies of an empire and declared it "fit only for the citizen of a small state."[59] On the same grounds an otherwise obscure Englishman, John Andrews, as late as 1783 warned his countrymen as well as the Ameri-

[56] *A View of the Internal Policy of Great Britain* (London, 1764), 183, quoted in Ghelfi, 11.

[57] Joseph Reed, "Essay on the Reciprocal Advantages of a Perpetual Union between Great-Britain and Her American Colonies," *Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed*, (ed.) William B. Reed (Philadelphia, 1847), I, 412.

[58] [Inglis], 53.

[59] Broadside signed "Camillus," dated New York, Oct. 18, 1776, in Force, 5th Ser., II, 1116.

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cans against republican government. He thought it "fittest for a people not numerous, and inclosed within a narrow space of land, whose wealth is too moderate to create and support luxury, and who at the same time, have no views of extending themselves, nor have any reason to apprehend invasions." The history of Athens, Rome, and Carthage proved that beyond a certain size there was a choice only between suicidal party strife and monarchy.[60]

(7) And finally there was the argument that a republican constitution could never protect religious and civil liberty as securely as the English constitution could. The balance of power in the English constitution, so the political science of the time assured, firmly protected these liberties. The reputation of the British constitution in just this point was so unshakable that warnings against republicanism as late as April 1776 could be based on the conviction that it was the English constitution alone which at this moment protected the only free citizens in the inhabited world.[61] Montesquieu's definition of *political liberty* as "that tranquillity or peace of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety" was quoted and the capacity of kingless government to provide the same feeling of security was doubted.[62] Paine had called the House of Commons "the new Republican materials" in the British constitutional system. This unguarded expression was taken up and turned into an argument against republican government: the colonists' resistance to the House of Commons, the avowedly "republican" component of the British constitution, should have taught them that republican institutions could very well be an enemy to the citizen's liberty.[63] The Netherlands, again, were a frightful example of the loss of liberty in a republic.[64] Moderate John Wesley in February

[60] John Andrews, *An Essay on Republican Principles, and on The Inconveniencies of a Commonwealth in a Large Country and Nation* (London, 1783). Ghelfi, 9, unsuccessfully tried to identify Andrews.

[61] "Civis," Pennsylvania *Ledger*, April 6, 1776.

[62] "Cato," "To the People of Pennsylvania—Letter VII," in Force, 4th Ser., V, 852. Smith quotes from *Spirit of the Laws*, Book XI, chap. 6; I, 151.

[63] Paine in *Common Sense*, *The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine*, (ed.) Philip S. Foner (New York, 1945), I, 7; taken up by William Smith in "Cato," Letter VII; see n. 62.

[64] "Rationalis," "To the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania," Pennsylvania *Gazette*, Feb. 28, 1776, quoted in Force, 4th Ser., IV, 1530.

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1776 tried to hold back the colonists from secession with the surprising argument:

> Suppose: after numberless dangers and mischiefs, you should settle into one or more Republics: would a republican government give you more liberty, either religious or civil? By no means. No governments under heaven are so despotic as the Republican: No subjects are governed in so arbitrary a manner, as those of a Commonwealth. If any doubt of this, let him look at the subjects of Venice, of Genoa, or even of Holland. Should any man talk or write of the Dutch government as every cobler does of the English, he would be laid in irons, before he knew where he was. And then woe be to him! Republics show no mercy.[65]

Why republics were prone to be as despotic as he claimed Holland, Genoa, and Venice to be, Wesley did not say. His warning against the mercilessness of republics does, however, make sense, when the paternalistic cliché behind it is remembered. The monarch was capable of forgiving and tempering the strictness of the law with the mercy of a father. In republics, however, impersonal institutions administered impartial law. "Where the people are oppressed," a 1778 English warning against republics read, "there is much less reason to hope for redress from a republic than a monarch, because a body of men can never be supposed to be moved by pity or compassion as a single man may."[66]

V

How did defenders of the colonists' cause react to these warnings? Those who intellectually and politically led the resistance, rightly or wrongly, found themselves in the same position as the English reformist Whig writers. Like Molesworth, Priestley, Cartwright, and

[65] John Wesley, "A Calm Address to the American Colonies," Massachusetts *Gazette*, Feb. 1, 1776.

[66] [G. Usher], *Republican Letters* (London, 1778), 118-19. Despite the assistance of the reference departments of the Library of Congress, the British Museum, and the National Library of Ireland, I could not identify the author of this interesting pamphlet. His name is on the title page of the copy in the Library of Congress; the copy in the Beinecke Library is anonymous. *An Essay upon Government: Wherein the Republican Schemes Revived by Mr. Locke . . . Are Fairly Considered and Refuted*, 63, similarly praises monarchy because "it mitigates the literal Rigour of the Law, allows room for Repentence, and so gives Mercy a triumphant rejoicing over strict Justice."

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Burgh they tried to escape the stigma of republicanism if they could help it.[67] Unable to divest *republic, republican,* and *republicanism* of their connotations, they shied away from these words and left them, like *democracy* and *commonwealth,* largely to those attacking the colonists.[68]

When did those who warned against republicanism knowingly use the term for its rhetorical effect, and when did they use it to warn against an evil they feared? Whichever function *republicanism* may have served more often, what is significant is that it could be effective in both roles. Before the experiment with republican government was launched for good, there was fear and doubt whether the principle of popular sovereignty, the undeniable basis of republicanism, would provide effective government for an extensive territory and secure the liberty of the citizens. There were no models, historic or present, to dispel this fear. Authorities on political theory had praised the British constitution above any other form of government. No wonder then that many colonists hesitated before they completely did away with the proven combination of king, lords, and commons in exchange for an untested form of government. How could a mass of common voters replace the king in parliament as the source of legitimate power? How could they make the same decisions that so far had seemed to take all the education and statecraft of the upper class? And how could a nation exist without a monarch high above quarrelling interest groups?

The negative effect of these warnings against republicanism was, however, just as limited as the expression of any other political opinion in print. Those who did not care to buy and read a weekly paper or the latest pamphlet could hardly have been influenced in their attitudes toward independence by political theory of this kind. The majority may very well have taken a pragmatic view and long before 1776 concluded from the efficiency of colonial self-govern-

[67] The relation of the English reformist Whigs to American political ideas is discussed in Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 33-54 and in Staughton Lynd, *Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism* (New York, 1968), 24-37.

[68] Leonard Woods Labaree, *Conservatism in Early American History* (Ithaca, 1959), 140, reports an almost synonymous use of *republican* and *democratical* in conservative rhetoric before 1776. Cf. Lokken, 570. Little analysis is given by Robert W. Shoemaker, " 'Democaracy' and 'Republic' as Understood in Late Eighteenth-Century America," *American Speech: A Quarterly of Linguistic Usage,* XLI (1966), 83-95.

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ment that government without a king and nobles would do for them. The success of *Common Sense* and the quick acceptance of *republic, republican,* and *republicanism* as key words of the new order suggest a widespread conviction of this sort.[69] But there was no "Vive la république!" on the fourth of July. Before going to Congress on the morning of July 1, John Adams wrote in a mood partly of suspense and partly of relief, "This morning is assigned for the greatest debate of all. A declaration that these colonies are free and independent States." He had good reason to add, "May Heaven prosper the new-born republic, and make it more glorious than any former republics have been!"[70]

[69] "The American colonies developed the characteristics of what would later be known as a republican form of government many years before they were to claim to be republican in principle"; J. R. Pole, *The Seventeenth Century: The Sources of Legislative Power* (Charlottesville, Va., 1969), 69.

[70] John Adams to Archibald Bullock, July 1, 1776 in *Works of John Adams,* Adams (ed.), IX, 414. On the emergence of articulate American republicanism, see W. Paul Adams, "Republikanismus und die ersten amerikanischen Einzelstaatsverfassungen, 1775-1780" (Ph.D. thesis, Free University of Berlin, 1968); Wood, *passim*; and Stourzh, *Hamilton, passim.*

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Anti-Pluralist Liberalism: The German Neoliberals*

EDWARD N. MEGAY
University of Nebraska

Currently, there is a challenging discussion among political scientists regarding the merits and limitations of pluralism in American government and politics and the role of liberal ideas and attitudes that have been commonly associated with it.[1] It is seldom noticed that many of the critical views raised in the literature have been anticipated by the arguments of the German neoliberals; aside from one very informative and perspicacious bibliographical article on the entire movement,[2] German neoliberalism has received only meager attention in this country, and that almost exclusively from economists.[3] Yet the German neoliberal movement has im-

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[1] Henry S. Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford, 1961); Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York, 1967); Theodore Lowi, "The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (1967), 5-24 and Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York, 1969); some essays in Bertram M. Gross (ed.), *A Great Society?* (New York, 1968). Cf. also Samuel H. Beer, *British Politics in the Collectivist Age* (New York, 1965). The impetus might have been given by Hans J. Morgenthau, *The Purpose of American Politics* (New York, 1960), 266-67, 274-75, 280-90.

[2] Carl J. Friedrich, "The Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism," *American Political Science Review*, XLIX (1955), 509-25.

[3] Henry M. Oliver, Jr., "German Neoliberalism," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXIV (1960), 117-49; Oliver, "Ordo and Coercion: A Logical Cri-

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portant implications for the current debate because it is both liberal and anti-pluralist.[4] The traditional view that regards pluralism as a liberal doctrine may well depend on specific conceptualizations of liberalism and pluralism which are not necessarily the only valid ones. Thus "the inconsistencies between the two criteria" of liberalism and liberal policies that Theodore Lowi found might stem from the choice of these criteria as sufficiently representative of liberalism rather than from liberalism itself.[5] Similarly, it may well be that political attitudes and proposals usually identified with pluralism do not necessarily follow from the descriptions and analyses offered by Arthur Bentley and David Truman,[6] but rather represent a shift to the normative plane, to "doctrinal affirmation" and "orthodoxy" going beyond pluralism itself.[7]

In an effort to explore the relation between liberalism and pluralism, the present paper analyzes the relevant aspects of German neoliberalism, seeking to show, first, that it is indeed liberal; this claim will be supported primarily by a discussion of neoliberal views regarding social freedom and power. The anti-pluralist position can be seen to follow logically from these views, as does the resulting inclination to a somewhat elitist government by experts and bureaucrats. Ultimately, the study is offered in support of two hypotheses—namely, that liberalism is not necessarily pluralist and that pluralism as a normative doctrine is not necessarily liberal.

I

Much of the confusion and misunderstanding in many discussions of liberalism arises because the term covers a great variety of psychological and ethical doctrines supporting a wide spectrum of po-

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tique," *The Southern Economic Journal*, XXVII (1960), 81-91; Egon Sohmen, "Competition and Growth: The Lesson of West Germany," *American Economic Review*, XLIX (1959), 986-1003; and discussion thereof *ibid.*, L (1960), 1015-31.

[4] McConnell, 97, 119-20; Lowi, "Public Philosophy," 12 *et passim*; Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York, 1963), 146, 322, 553; Ernst Fraenkel, *Oeffentliche Meinung und Internationale Politik* (Tübingen, 1962), 17.

[5] Lowi, "Public Philosophy," 8.

[6] Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago, 1908); David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, 1951).

[7] Grant McConnell, review of Bertram M. Gross (ed.), *A Great Society?* in the *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (1969), 185.

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litical philosophies. Disagreements stem from different definitions of freedom and primarily from the fact that different societal circumstances demand different policies to maximize liberty, however defined. But most will agree that "the essence of liberalism, whatever its form," consists "in its deep concern for individual liberty" and that all those primarily motivated by this concern "must be included as liberals."[8] Thus, as a basis for judging whether or not German neoliberalism is liberal, *liberalism* will be defined as the doctrine, attitude, or program which aims at maximizing for every person in an organized society opportunities to pursue and achieve goals freely chosen in accordance with a constant, integrated, rationally defensible pattern of purposes. The maximization of such opportunities for everybody is most likely to result from an optimal balance between public and private power. The problem of the liberal consists precisely in locating this balancing point in any specific situation. For this reason, *liberalism* is best defined, not in terms of any one given ratio of public to private power, but rather as the constant search for the ever-changing location of the balancing point which will maximize individual opportunities.

A variety of groups and persons acknowledge neoliberal attitudes and beliefs while differing on a number of details.[9] For our purpose, however, these differences are of minor significance compared to the sharp distinction between neoliberalism and old-style laissez faire, called paleoliberalism by Alexander Rüstow, who until his death in 1963 was a leading spokesman of German neoliberals.[10] Briefly, neoliberalism wants the government to establish *and maintain* the economic order—namely an open, free, and com-

[8] H. J. McCloskey, "The Problem of Liberalism," *Review of Metaphysics*, XIX (1965), 249.

[9] Friedrich A. Hayek, *Individualismus und wirtschaftliche Ordnung*, (trans.) H. Hayek (Erlenbach-Zurich, 1952), 141, has complained about the lack of a common neoliberal program. (This passage is not in the original *Individualism and Economic Order* [Chicago, 1948].) Latin-American neoliberal groups seem to display a similar diversity; cf. Norman A. Bailey, "The Colombian 'Black Hand': A Case Study in Neoliberalism in Latin America," *Review of Politics*, XXVII (1965), 446. For the German groupings see Oliver, "German Neoliberalism," 119, 132.

[10] Alexander Rüstow, "The Remnants of Western Imperialism: A German View," *Review of Politics*, XXII (1960), 57-58. The disagreement became open in 1938; cf. Centre International d'Études pour la Rénovation du Libéralism, *Le Colloque Walter Lippmann* (Paris, 1939), 13, 30, 32-34, 36-37, 62, 80-81, 91-

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petitive market economy—but to leave the economic process to free private decisions within that economic order.

Apparently the first statement of some of the core ideas of neoliberalism by one of the originators of the movement was an article published in 1923 in which Wilhelm Röpke protests against the identification of liberalism with the night-watchman state and Manchesterism and urges genuine liberals to work "for the idea of the state and against the lack of freedom in which private economic monopolies—supported by a government leading a shadow existence—keep the economy captive." Liberals must take the initiative "when the government in its weakness or lack of judgment capitulates to private business."[11]

Usually, however, the origin of the neoliberal movement is identified with two simultaneous, but entirely independent, statements by Alexander Rüstow and Walter Eucken in the fall of 1932. At a meeting of German economists, Rüstow contributed a short paper in which he opposed monopolies and cartels, pluralism, and planless government interventions in the economic process. Government interventions in the economy should be "liberal," that is conforming with economic developments and the market, rather than "re-

92, 99. Also Wilhelm Röpke, "Grundfragen rationeller Wirtschaftspolitik," *Zeitschrift für schweizerische Statistik und Volkswirtschaft*, LXXVII (1941), 105. The most detailed statements to this effect are by Rüstow, "General Sociological Causes of the Economic Disintegration and Possibilities of Reconstruction," Appendix in Röpke, *International Economic Disintegration* (New York, 1942), 267-83; and Rüstow, *Das Versagen des Wirtschaftsliberalismus* (Istanbul and New York, 1945; 2d ed., Bad Godesberg, 1950). Cf. also Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart* (Erlenbach-Zurich, 1950-57), III, 564-65, n. 79; Rüstow, "Die Situation" in *Welche Wirtschaftspolitik kann das Vertrauen des Wählers rechtfertigen?*, Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft Tagungsprotokoll No. 9 (Ludwigsburg, 1958), 15-16 (this series will be cited henceforth as ASM Protokoll). Rüstow (in discussion) in *Sinnvolle und sinnwidrige Sozialpolitik*, ASM Protokoll No. 12 (1959), 149-50, where he disowns "those paleoliberals who incorrectly call themselves neoliberals." Röpke, *A Humane Economy* (Chicago, 1960), especially 123-24. Franz Böhm, "Marktwirtschaft von links und rechts," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Oct. 24, 1953. Cf. Peter H. Merkl, *Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow* (New York, 1965), 223; and Friedrich, "Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism," 509, n. 2.

[11] Wilhelm Röpke, "Wirtschaftlicher Liberalismus und Staatsgedanke," *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, Nov. 13, 1923, reprinted in Röpke, *Gegen die Brandung*, (ed.) Albert Hunold (Erlenbach-Zurich, 1959), 44, 45. Similarly, Röpke, *Mass und Mitte* (Erlenbach-Zurich, 1950), 142-43.

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actionary," that is trying under pressure by interest groups to stop a long-range economic process. Linking the economic problems of the depression to political questions, he calls for a "strong and independent state" (government), which—instead of being a football of interest groups—must be "vigorous, . . . independent, . . . neutral . . ., powerful not by coercion and imperative control, but rather by its authority and leadership."[12] When Rüstow made these proposals, Eucken's paper on the relation between changes in the political structure and the crisis of capitalism was in press. In it Eucken argues that the politicization of the economy had led to domination of the government by interests, resulting in incoherent and often contradictory interventions in the economic process. The government is weak and without a will of its own, rather than strong as its interventionist policies would lead one to believe.[13]

Eucken's view that the increase in the extent of governmental interventions and regulation make modern governments appear powerful when their authority or power of independent decision has actually been reduced is reflected in Rüstow's claim that the functions of government should be reduced to those which only the government can perform and which must be performed in view of social goals and values. But, Rüstow adds, this does not mean a return to the night-watchman state of laissez-faire paleoliberalism.[14]

[12] Alexander Rüstow (in discussion), *Schriften des Vereins für Sozialpolitik*, CLXXXVII (1932), 68.

[13] Walter Eucken, "Staatliche Strukturwandlungen und die Krisis des Kapitalismus," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, XXXVI (1932), 303-04, 307-08, 319. The similarity between the neoliberal idea of the "strong and independent state" above the conflicting interests of civil society and the thought of Hegel has been dismissed by the neoliberals as superficial, accidental, or even illusory: Friedrich, "Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism," 512-13, 522, n. 40; Edward N. Megay, "Treitschke Reconsidered: The Hegelian Tradition of German Liberalism," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, II (1958), 316-17. See Hegel, *Philosophy of Law and Rights*, paras. 182-86, 256, 260-61. The neoliberal idea might possibly stem from Robert von Mohl, *Die Polizei-Wissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates* (3 vols.; Tübingen, 1832-34). Cf. Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition* (Boston, 1957), 260.

[14] Walter Eucken, *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik* (Bern and Tübingen, 1952), 327. Alexander Rüstow, "Weltpolitische Folgerungen" in *Hat der Westen eine Idee?*, ASM Protokoll No. 7 (1957), 93. This entire little paper (pp. 85-101) is a catalog of neoliberal goals and wishes. Similarly, Goetz Briefs, *Laissez-faire-Pluralismus: Demokratie und Wirtschaft des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* (Berlin, 1966).

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This, then, is not a laissez-faire demand for the minimum-function state, but rather a demand for the independence of the government from interest group pressures, which push it into ever wider areas of regulation and interventions for which there is no need from the point of view of the public interest.

Another distinctive feature of German neoliberalism, which indicates its position somewhere between laissez-faire and welfare-state liberalism, is its view of the market economy as an indispensable but in itself insufficient means for attaining trans-economic values of a political, social, and cultural nature. This position was established in 1938 and it has been restated ever since, sometimes in the form that organized competition is not an ultimate end but a means to the solution of social problems.[15] Eucken, who according to some sources was strictly an economist, stresses the primacy of non-economic social problems declaring that social (welfare) measures *(Sozialpolitik)* are not just an appendage to economic policy and that the economic order must secure primarily an existence that grants human dignity (*menschenwürdiges Leben*) for all. Röpke repeatedly emphasizes the neoliberal social and cultural critique of both socialism and laissez-faire liberalism, the latter being "blind to the deep-seated intellectual and social evils of our . . . civilization." The market economy, he writes, "is a necessary but insufficient condition for a free, happy, prosperous, just, and well-ordered society."[16]

Rüstow attributes the charge that the neoliberals overemphasize economic questions to the circumstance that "contemporary representatives of paleoliberalism call themselves neoliberal, although our neoliberalism arose precisely in contrast to . . . paleoliberalism." He repeatedly stresses the subordination of economic consid-

[15] See *Le Colloque Walter Lippmann*, n. 10 above. Louis Baudin, *L'Aube d'un nouveau libéralism* (Paris, 1953), 146. [Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm], "Preface," *Ordo: Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, I (Düsseldorf and Munich, 1948), vii, ix, xi.

[16] Eucken, *Wirtschaftspolitik*, 313. Röpke, *Mass und Mitte*, 152. Röpke, "Markwirtschaft ist nicht genug" in *Hat der Westen eine Idee?*, 10, 11-12, 14-15, 19. Röpke, *Humane Economy*, 35, 91, 98-99, 124-25. Röpke, *Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart* (5th ed.; Erlenbach-Zurich, 1948), 280 (available in an English translation: *The Social Crisis of Our Time* [London, 1950]). But see Friedrich-Wilhelm Dörge, "Bericht über einführende Literatur zur neuliberalen Wirtschaftspolitik," *Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*, I (1956), 206.

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erations to trans-economic values; in this he is seconded by Wolfgang Frickhöffer, his successor as president of the German neoliberal organization, the Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft (ASM).[17]

While the foregoing exposition of some central doctrines of German neoliberalism clearly indicates the liberal character of the movement—when liberalism is defined broadly—it remains to present its position on a key issue of any kind of liberalism, the question of freedom and power.

II

It is not easy to find a clear definition of *freedom* in the writings of any one of the German neoliberals, but a few examples of what they say about it may indicate the general tenor of their thought and especially their great concern about the question of freedom, which has already been noted as the mark of liberalism. Eucken, for example, considers the securing of freedom for everybody the key to the social question and at the same time its central issue. If he does not provide a definition of *freedom*, he does say what it is not: freedom does not include the right to restrict or deny the freedom of others. The state (*Rechtsstaat*) must secure the freedom and rights of its citizens against the arbitrary use of power both by its own executive and administrative organs and by private persons. Eucken modifies this position by listing three threats to freedom: the private power of the other party in economic relations, the power of the leaders of associations over their members, and the power of the state which has allied itself with private centers of

[17] Alexander Rüstow, "Wirtschaft als Dienerin der Menschlichkeit" in *Was wichtiger ist als Wirtschaft*, ASM Protokoll No. 15 (1960), 7-8. Rüstow (in discussion) in *Politik für uns alle oder für die Interessenten?*, ASM Protokoll No. 16 (1961), 170-71. Wolfgang Frickhöffer, "Schlusswort," *ibid.*, 203. Rüstow, "Zielgemeinschaft tut not" in *Was nun?*, ASM Protokoll No. 17 (1962), 12. Similarly Ludwig Erhard, *The Economics of Success* (New York, 1963), 278-81, 284, 287-90; and Alfred Müller-Armack, "Die Wirtschaftsordnung sozial gesehen," *Ordo*, I (Düsseldorf and Munich, 1948), 148-49; the term "social market economy" was coined and proposed here, p. 150. Also Alfred Müller-Armack, "Soziale Irenik," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, LXIV (1950), 181-82.

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power.[18] A similar view has been expounded by Ludwig Erhard, who considers freedom to be "a civic right which is inalienable" and declares: "The freedom claimed by the procartel school to limit or suppress freedom is certainly not the freedom I have in mind, which is designed to safeguard the continuance of free enterprise."[19]

Rüstow maintains that "freedom to" is more important than "freedom from." The true content of freedom is humanness in the sense of the new basal anthropology:

> Freedom is a negative and, at first, an empty concept. There immediately follows the question: freedom to what purpose?, and depending on the content given to the skeleton-concept of freedom, it assumes different meanings. In my opinion, this skeleton-concept of freedom must be filled in with humanness, . . . and we must clearly understand why we reject unfreedom and oppression, namely because they prevent one from being a human being. . . . freedom is needed for being a man, for the actualization of humanness.[20]

Opposing the mania for definitions, Rüstow has not offered any more precise definition of *freedom* or any elaboration of supporting institutions such as the *Rechtsstaat*.[21] Rather, the neoliberal concern with freedom manifests itself in a general rejection of social power and its effects. Freedom is seen in the absence or minimization of subjection to the power of others, rather than in the actual exercise of power or powers. The neoliberals are concerned over the availability of meaningful choices of action, not for the powerful but for the powerless or weak members of society. Hence they reject not only all autocratic and totalitarian regimes but also

[18] Eucken, *Wirtschaftspolitik*, 126, 189, 193; 176, 178-79; 48, 52, 128-29, 175; 177.

[19] *The Economics of Success*, 134. Also Ludwig Erhard, *Prosperity through Competition* (New York, 1958), 119, 127. Cf. Gerard Braunthal, *The Federation of German Industry in Politics* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1965), 236-46.

[20] Rüstow, "Weltpolitische Folgerungen," 87. For "humanness" in the sense of the new basal anthropology, Rüstow refers to the work of the biologist Adolf Portmann and the philosophical sociologist Helmut Plessner.

[21] Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung*, III, 25, 27-28, 33-34. Rüstow, "Menschenrechte oder Menschenpflichten?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 29, 1960, p. 9; also available in a somewhat expanded reprint. Similarly Rüstow, "Die Bewältigung des Wohlstandes," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Dec. 7, 1960; the full text of the lecture is available as a reprint. Friedrich, "Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism," 518, 520, n.34. Merkl, 265.

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and even more prominently the social effects of capitalism both of the Manchester and the social Darwinist variety. Eucken was aware of the "dilemma" posed by the relation between freedom and power. The freedom from state interference in economic relations led to the development of private concentrations of power, which in turn threatened the freedom of others: "The grant of freedom can become a threat to freedom if it allows the formation of private power." When in response to this the interventionist state developed, it soon tended to concentrate economic power in the hands of the government and to lead to a centrally administered economy, which in turn resulted in a serious curtailment of freedom. Laissez faire failed by leaving to the private sphere both the determination of the economic order or framework and the conduct of the economic process.[22]

According to Franz Böhm, the neoliberal specialist on anti-trust legislation, the primary concern of German neoliberals is the struggle against private concentrations of power even more than the struggle for freedom: "Freedom . . . consists in the latitude of activity which accrues to me by the fact that neither the government nor any fellow-citizens have power of command over me." Freedom under law, however, becomes meaningless when private centers of power arise and limit the freedom of others. This situation develops when competition, "one of the most wonderful instruments for the denial of power (*Entmachtungsinstrument*)," is absent; "the elimination of power, however, is synonymous with freedom." Böhm reluctantly acknowledges that denial of power is possible only through governmental restrictions upon the freedom ("the latitude of activity") of powerful members of the society when he admits that an economic order providing and maintaining complete (not perfect) competition requires a great deal of governmental coercion and control. However, in the interest of reducing private power differentials, at least an attempt in that direction should be made.[23]

The neoliberal condemnation of power can be summed up best in

[22] Eucken, *Wirtschaftspolitik*, 53, 176, 178-79, 54. Cf. Kariel, 26.

[23] Franz Böhm, "Die vier Säulen der Freiheit" in *Was muss die freie Welt tun?*, ASM Protokoll No. 13 (1959), 55-56. Franz Böhm, *Wirtschaftsordnung und Staatsverfassung*, Recht und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Nos. 153-154 (Tübingen, 1950), 49.

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words attributed to Erhard: " 'Power is always barren, dangerous, brutal and, in the last analysis, stupid.' "[24] Alexander Rüstow's major work, the three volume *Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart*, is a general and pitiless indictment of the use of power from prehistoric times to the present. Eucken agrees that, "like all of history, economic history is replete with abuses of power." Reviewing various economic orders from laissez faire to state socialism, he concludes that "the problem of economic power can never be solved through further concentration of power."[25] Röpke deplores how under the pressure of popular demands, power becomes concentrated in modern democratic governments.[26]

Applied to the economic structure, the neoliberal rejection of power takes the form of opposing the formation and very existence of concentrations of power—such as monopolies, trusts, and cartels—as the only effective policy rather than supporting governmental regulation of the behavior of such entities. Such prevention of power positions is considered part of the economic order (sometimes referred to as the economic constitution), while the regulation, control, and supervision of the behavior of legally existing concentrations of power is rejected as an intervention in the economic process. This position is central to the thought of Rüstow, Eucken, and Böhm. According to Eucken, "Economic policy should primarily be directed, not against the abuses of existing power centers, but against the very formation of power centers," because governmental prohibition and control of abuses of positions of power comes to nought. There are two reasons for the failure of such a policy, first the difficulty of defining *abuse* and second the fact that concentrations of economic power gain and exercise political influence which renders governmental control ineffective.[27] In the debates leading up to the cartel law of 1957, Erhard defended his bill with the same arguments.[28]

[24] Merkl, 269.

[25] Eucken, *Wirtschaftspolitik*, 169, 173-74.

[26] Röpke, *Humane Economy*, 32-33; Röpke, *Mass und Mitte*, 24-26, 143, 152.

[27] Eucken, *Wirtschaftspolitik*, 172, 264-70, 291-99, and chap. xix, sec. 4. Similarly Böhm, *Wirtschaftsordnung*, 32, 40-43. Probably the first neoliberal statement of this position was Rüstow's anonymous "Monopolkontrolle oder Monopolverhütung?" *Magazin der Wirtschaft* [Berlin], IV (1928), 913-15.

[28] Erhard, *Economics of Success*, 64, 130, 133, 135, 172-73. Braunthal, 237-38, 240, 242, 245-46.

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Where a market is dominated by power concentrations, Rüstow argues for drastic government intervention; under existing law, the labor market is a bilateral monopoly in which power relations determine matters of national economic consequence. Since the outcome of power struggles in a bilateral monopoly situation cannot be relied upon to produce either social justice or a solution in the national interest, he proposes that wage contracts should be subject to approval by a kind of "Royal Commission" of independent experts. In his horror of non-responsible exercise of power by private persons, he comes to the conclusion that "power is a monopoly of the state. Where there is power, the government . . . , not private persons, must assume this power."[29]

The neoliberal discussion of freedom in terms of power, and the rejection of power as a threat to freedom, are prompted by considerations and lead to conclusions quite similar to those of Felix E. Oppenheim, who also links freedom and power and comes to the conclusion that one actor's freedom to act in a given way "often depends" on somebody or everybody else's unfreedom to act in a way that restrains the actor from acting in that way. In the end this means that social freedom is defined negatively, as the absence of restraint.[30] Thus, the neo-liberals run into the dilemma of power encountered by American progressivism and seem to succumb to the illusion of a society without any power differentials. The neoliberals, however, realize that power can be controlled only by power, and in reasserting the public interest over and against private interests, they are willing to entrust the government with the balance of power. At the same time, when speaking of threats to individual freedom, they agree that the power of the state is the greatest threat.[31]

III

The neoliberal dilemma over power indicates an awareness of what

[29] Alexander Rüstow, "Die Unordnung des Geldwesens—eine moralische Krankheit" in *Vom Wert des Geldes* (Stuttgart, 1961), 172-73. Similarly Eucken, *Wirtschaftspolitik*, 46, 214. Rüstow, "Wirtschaftsethische Probleme der sozialen Marktwirtschaft" in *Der Christ und die soziale Marktwirtschaft*, (ed.) Patrick M. Boarman (Stuttgart, 1955), 71.

[30] Felix E. Oppenheim, *Dimensions of Freedom: An Analysis* (New York, 1961), 106, 112-13, 116. Cf. also John Somerville, "Toward a Consistent Definition of Freedom and Its Relation to Value" in *Liberty*, Vol. IV of *Nomos*, (ed.) Carl J. Friedrich (New York, 1962), 293-94, 298-99.

[31] Cf. McConnell, *Private Power*, 23, 29, 32-33, 47.

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Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan have called the principle of agglutination of power;[32] that is the phenomenon that the possession of one kind of power tends to lead to the acquisition of other forms of power. The German neoliberals oppose private concentrations of power not only because they directly restrict the freedom of other members of the society, but also—and perhaps primarily—because economic power results in political power and the ability to influence the formation of the will of the government.[33] Perhaps the best statement of the neoliberal position regarding the political role of powerful interests is found in the relevant passages from the Action Program of the neoliberal organization ASM; the wording also indicates the moral indignation with which interest group politics is condemned:

> The further actualization of the social market economy . . . is opposed . . . by the influence of all kinds of interests. In several cases . . . the attempt has been made to transgress the legitimate degree of representation of group interests and to influence legislation or personal decisions by more or less open pressure.
>
> Offenses of this sort are irreconcilable not only with parliamentary democracy, but also with the system of order of the social market economy. Government interventionism which favors group interests over the common interest, however, is not only disruptive and dangerous, but frequently injurious to the real interest of those in whose favor it is being demanded. . . . As opposed to pluralist interest politics of this kind, the social market economy demands an independent policy made in one piece.[34]

Eucken blames the pressure of powerful economic interests for the inconsistent and incoherent government interventions in the economy and claims that by such pressures "the independence of the state's volition, on which its existence rests, is being undermined." Furthermore, interest groups pursue their particular interests as they see them, while neglecting the public interest.[35] The

[32] Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry* (New Haven, Conn., 1950), 97.

[33] Böhm, *Wirtschaftsordnung*, 30.

[34] Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft, "Aktionsprogramm" [March 1958], 2.

[35] Eucken, "Staatliche Strukturwandlungen," 307-08; Eucken, *Wirtschaftspolitik*, 17-18, 171, 188-89.

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Rousseauian flavor of these views is even more pronounced in Röpke's ideas. He insists that originally democratic doctrine was monistic and had no room for interest groups since there is only one common interest. The positive value placed upon pluralism in the Anglo-Saxon countries should be considered by liberals, however, and he therefore proposes to modify the monistic view by admitting that there is a "sound pluralism," which he defines as group action to defend an interest against ruination by the state. Influence upon the government to use the power of the state offensively to attain the satisfaction of a special interest is "unsound pluralism." From the example Röpke gives—landlords versus tenants regarding rent control—it appears that "sound," or defensive, pluralism aims at market-conform governmental policy, while "unsound," or offensive, pluralism aims at "reactionary" (in Rüstow's terms) or non-market-conform interventions.[36]

According to Rüstow, the best definition of the pluralist state is Frédéric Bastiat's analysis of French politics in 1848: " 'The state is the great fiction by means of which everybody wants to live at the expense of everybody else.' " The struggle of interest groups for control of the government seals the fate of democracy because "the government which begins by feeding the beasts of special interests ends up being devoured by them," Rüstow concludes.[37] He considers the concept of the democratic state as a competition among interests for political power and economic advantage to be "perverse, sick." Erhard and other neoliberals agree that the public interest is a genuine synthesis which does not automatically arise from political competition among interest groups.[38] The guiding principle in these criticisms of pluralism is the public interest or

[36] Röpke, *Humane Economy*, 142-45.

[37] Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung*, III, 175, 179.

[38] Alexander Rüstow, "Schlusswort" in *Was wichtiger ist als Wirtschaft*, 89. Similarly Rüstow, "Die staatspolitische Krise unserer Gesellschaft" in *Politik für uns alle*, 98-99. Also Rüstow in *Le Colloque Walter Lippmann*, 82. Cf. Kariel, 3-4, for a similar view. Erhard, *Prosperity*, 101-02; Goetz Briefs, "Katholische Soziallehre, Laissez-faire-Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft" in *Was wichtiger ist als Wirtschaft*, 42-43; Briefs, "The Ethos Problem in the Present Pluralistic Society," *Review of Social Economy*, XV (1957), 47-75; Briefs, *Laissez-faire-Pluralismus;* Wolfgang Frickhöffer, "Muss jeder Wahlkampf ein Schritt zur Unfreiheit sein?" in *Heisse Eisen im Wahlkampf*, ASM Protokoll No. 14 (1960), 25, 36.

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common good, which is said to be overlooked in policy decisions resulting from interest-group politics.

Another set of neoliberal arguments against pluralism claims that it leads to interventionism, which is objectionable because it makes the operation of the competitive market economy impossible and introduces curtailments of freedom. Government interventions, because they usually interfere with the economic process, lead to economic difficulties, it is claimed, although certain kinds of such interventions are favored by many German neoliberals; in general the government should determine, maintain, and police only the economic order. When various interests demanded state interventions in the economic process—not to abandon the capitalist system, but rather to improve their respective positions in it—the resulting intrusion of politics into the economy transformed the liberal state into the "economic state," according to Eucken. The interventionist economic state, however, makes the functioning of the price system as economic regulator impossible, primarily by facilitating and encouraging the formation of concentrations of economic power, and it thereby ultimately destroys the market economy. In the interest of making the state-planned and state-directed economy function, the freedom of action of individual and corporate persons must then be curtailed.[39]

Worse still, the neoliberals argue, pluralism, by creating the interventionist state, ultimately leads to dictatorship. Eucken specifically criticizes Joseph Schumpeter's view that in a centrally administered economy the political sphere can be separated from the economic and social spheres and democratic processes and freedom can thereby be preserved. The threat to freedom caused by private concentrations of power under the laissez-faire system would now arise from the concentration of all power in the government. The interventionist state gradually would assume central direction of the economic processes, and the central organs responsible for the success of the economic plan could and would not tolerate its impairment and possible failure through the exercise of free choices by enterprises or employees. This would lead to restrictions upon the judicial protection of rights, government control of intellectual and artistic production, and finally censorship in support of government

[39] Eucken, "Staatliche Strukturwandlungen," 302-08.

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propaganda. Thus the interventionist state tends to the adoption of a centrally administered economy, which in turn tends to produce dictatorship.[40]

In view of the existence and widespread acceptance of pluralism, Rüstow is willing to make some concessions to it. On a lower level of society—apparently the market—the competitive struggle of special interests may take place, although its outcome is not necessarily in the public interest, but the government must act in the public interest on a higher level: "At the top, a unitary and clearly responsible will is indispensable," and "the task and art of free democratic constitutional politics consists in making the pluralism below converge without oppression into unity above." Interest associations should furnish the government with expert advice, but never exercise influence or pressure upon it, since the adjustment of various interests by either compromise or log-rolling is not the meaning and purpose of policy-making. Erhard agrees with this view of the proper role of interest groups.[41]

There are various reasons for the pronounced anti-pluralist attitude of the German neoliberals. Franz Neumann has pointed out that Germany had never known a popular movement of the nature of American progressivism and therefore underwent the disintegration of politics in the Weimar Republic which in turn led to the economic organization in the Third Reich. The neoliberals, like many other Germans, blame interest-association pluralism for contributing to the breakdown of democratic government in the Weimar Republic. The experience of Nazism and the example of East Germany, on the other hand, make economic planning appear as control and coercion leading to dictatorship. Finally, the political power of interest associations in Bonn is pervasive and effective, although they are less ideological than they were in the Weimar Republic and not disrupting the operation of governmental institutions.[42]

[40] Eucken, *Wirtschaftspolitik*, 127-33. Similarly, Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung*, III, 56-57, 440.

[41] Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung*, III, 182-83. Rüstow, "Die staatspolitische Krise," 96-98. Erhard, *Economics of Success*, 177, 379; Erhard, *Prosperity*, 106-07.

[42] Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (New York, 1942), 15, 221-92. Merkl, 213. Charles E. Frye, "Parties and

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The negative attitude of Germans toward pluralism and the role of interest groups in the democratic decision-making process has been empirically established. It may be related to a Rousseauian view of legislation as an expression of the will of the state as the hypostatization of the nation and "can ultimately be explained by the doubt of the possibility that an appeal to universal principles of justice and social order could prevent a disintegration of state and society."[43] Rüstow, for example, insists that a distinction must be made between man as a citizen and man as an interest-oriented individual as well as between various opinions regarding the requirements of the common good and various special interests. While every citizen has interests, every person with interests also is a citizen. Thus, interest groups are to pursue their respective interests in the context of the common good. The task of government is not the adjustment of competing interests but the pursuit of those orientations of the will which concern the citizen rather than the interested party. Expressing a view shared by Robert MacIver, Rüstow maintains that the citizen and the government are concerned with differences of opinion regarding the content of the common good or the public interest rather than with conflicting special interests that could be adjusted by some compromise. Since in this imperfect world there may be some connection between a person's opinion regarding the common good and his selfish special interests, Rüstow demands that an individual search his own soul and that he be asked by the public how far his selfish interest might influence his civic opinion. The competition among interests belongs on the market; politics

Pressure Groups in Weimar and Bonn," *World Politics*, XVII (1965), 644-46, 647, 648-50, 653. Hans-Joachim Arndt, *West Germany: Politics of Non-Planning* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1966), *passim*. Werner Feld, "National Economic Interest Groups and Policy Formation in the EEC," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXI (1966), 397-98. Gerhard Loewenberg, *Parliament in the German Political System* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966), 44-45, 56, 60-61, 128-29. Lewis J. Edinger, *Politics in Germany* (Boston, 1968), 207-11, 230-33, 275. Braunthal, chaps. iv, vii, viii, ix, x.

[43] Ernst Fraenkel, "Deutschland und die westlichen Demokratien," *Dokumente* [Cologne], XVI (1960), 97-98, 102. For the empirical studies, cf. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J., 1963), 429, 494; and Edinger, 157, 199.

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is the competition among various opinions as to what will best serve the common good.[44]

While it is quite true that the public interest—if it can ever be determined—is likely to be neglected when interest groups capture segments of formal state power,[45] it should be pointed out that the neoliberal notion of interest groups is incomplete. It disregards the existence and effectiveness of groups not oriented to selfish interests, such as its own ASM, and the reduction of the disintegrative effect of groups because of overlapping membership.

Considered in the light of David Easton's systems analysis, the neoliberal fear of the effects of special interest demands upon the government is justified since demands may introduce stresses into the political system, indirectly by reducing support for the system if the demands remain unfulfilled and directly if by their number and/or contents they overload the capacity of the system to deal with them within a specified interval of time, for example, between two national elections. On the other hand, without the incentive of demands the authorities could hardly be expected to perceive and focus upon problems that should be attended to; in other words, without inputs there are not likely to be any outputs.[46] Applying this insight to the neoliberal views that the influence of interest groups upon the authorities is incompatible with parliamentary democracy and that politics must be restricted to expressions of various opinions regarding the best means for attaining the common good, at most in the form of expert advice to the decision-makers, it appears that the neoliberal political system is expected to operate without demand inputs. It has been seen that the various opinions as to what will best serve the common good must not be mere rationalizations of special interest and that these opinions are to be stated as expert, that is impartial, advice and thus not as demands. According to Easton, such expressions of opinion do not constitute demands; in fact, even "the expression of an interest . . . is not identical with the input of a demand" unless it is coupled

[44] Rüstow, "Die staatspolitische Krise," 94, 98-99. Robert M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, 1947), 210. Rüstow, "Schlusswort," 89.

[45] McConnell, *Private Power*, 162.

[46] David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York, 1965), 37, 57-60, 64, 48-49. It might be interesting to conceptualize pure or perfect autocracy in terms of the identity of the producer of inputs and outputs.

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with "a proposal that authoritative action be taken with regard to it."[47] In all neoliberal statements regarding the role of interest groups in politics, it is precisely the conversion of interests and opinions into demands and inputs which is rejected; in other words, interest groups are not to take part in the political process, their role is to be non-political. This view logically leads to the demand for government by elected and responsible expert statesmen with high leadership qualities.

IV

If government is to prevent private concentrations of power from forming and existing ones from using their power, is to resist demands and pressures of interest groups, and is to perceive and pursue the common good alone, it will have to consist of some elite of disinterested, benevolent, expert, and courageous men enjoying tremendous public support. Such is indeed the government neoliberals believe to be required and attainable in a liberal democracy. Rüstow condemned Adenauer's "false *Realpolitik*" as damaging the government's economic policy by making concessions to interest groups before elections. This is the political realism of small-time politicians; statesmen appeal to the voters' decency, fairness, and willingness to sacrifice. Rüstow repeatedly claims that the German voters have often proved their readiness to follow courageous leadership even against their narrow self-interest. The saying that politics is the art of the possible applies only to "politicians that are a dime a dozen. Statesmanship is the art . . . of making the impossible possible." Men in power have the moral duty to exercise courage and fortitude and to do what they know to be right and necessary. With the proper initiative and leadership from above by the government, the people are ready and willing to work for any worthwhile social goal.[48]

[47] *Ibid.*, 38, 42, 45-47.

[48] Rüstow, "Die Bewältigung des Wohlstandes," 4; Rüstow, *Die Antriebskräfte und Gefahren des wirtschaftlichen Aufstiegs*. Protokolldienst No. 32/1959, Part 2, pp. 3, 4, 9, 10, 11 (Mimeographed); Rüstow, "Die staatspolitische Krise," 103; Rüstow, "Wer ist schuld: der Wähler—oder Regierung und Parteien?" in *Heisse Eisen im Wahlkampf*, 13-14; Rüstow, "Die Situation," 16-17; Rüstow, "Die Unordnung des Geldwesens," 171, 185-86. For his proposal to give extraordinary powers to the chancellor, said to be reflected

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Röpke agrees that it is never "politically impossible" to make decisions in accordance with expert knowledge. The revolt of the masses should be countered by a "revolt of the elite," which he defines in platonic terms as the "natural aristocracy" of those who lead "an exemplary life of self-denial and exertion for the whole [society]" and who are courageous, above classes, interests, passions, and malice. Political decision-makers of this kind would soon earn popular confidence.[49] Eucken believed that mass democracy and its deplorable effects are a historical trend limiting the freedom of choice of governments, but not a fore-ordained necessity. Economic policy and structural forms are shaped by human ideas and concepts, not determined by inescapable regularities of development. Human beings, and therefore governments, are free to solve social and economic problems in various ways. Erhard echoes this denial of determinism, acknowledging that "there may be trends," but asserting that "we can and shall direct the structural development of our economy."[50]

Thus all neoliberals agree that political decision-makers are free to do what they judge to be truly in the public interest and that they should have the courage to act accordingly. Eucken and Röpke are suspicious of the masses, while Rüstow and Erhard have faith in human nature and the common man. Eucken and Erhard do not develop a specific model of an elite. Rüstow's insistence on the moral and personality qualities of statesmen requires at least unusual men in leading positions. Only Röpke

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in the constructive no-confidence provision of the Basic Law, see Rüstow, "Diktatur innerhalb der Grenzen der Demokratie," *Deutsche Führerbriefe*, II (1929), 53-66, reprinted in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, VII (1959), 87-102. Cf. Rüstow, "Weltpolitische Folgerungen," 90. Loewenberg, 221, n. 3.

[49] Wilhelm Röpke, "Die politische Oekonomie: Was heisst 'politisch unmöglich'?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Dec. 12, 1959, p. 5; Röpke, "Die politische Dimension der Wirtschaftspolitik" in *Wirtschaftsordnung und Menschenbild*, Aktionsgemeinschaft Soziale Marktwirtschaft, Schriftenreihe Heft 4 (Cologne, 1960), 102-03, 107-10, 112; Röpke, "Marktwirtschaft ist nicht genug," 20. Similarly Röpke, *Humane Economy*, 130-31.

[50] Eucken, "Staatliche Strukturwandlungen," 313-15. Eucken, *Wirtschaftspolitik*, 16, 18, 200, 204-05, 208, 210, 213-17. The German word *Tendenz* here means a trend, in contrast to inescapable necessity. Erhard, *Economics of Success*, 378-79.

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indulges the frequent German predilection for a Platonic elite of expert intellectuals.[51]

The search for expert decision-makers removed from the pressure of interest groups, devoid of social, material, and ideological interests of their own, and acting impartially and objectively for the public interest leads the neoliberals to stress the beneficial role of a professional bureaucracy. According to Rüstow, pluralism developed late in Germany because of the independent governmental authority of the Prussian bureaucracy from the Stein-Hardenberg reform (1809) until the Weimar Republic. Theodor Eschenburg, who agrees with the neoliberal critique of the political influence of interest groups, believes that the bureaucracy often knows best what is in the public interest because it is removed from and independent of special interests.[52] The neoliberals do not advocate a self-appointed, non-responsible elite of policy-makers; rather, they propose, in Burkean fashion, that the democratically elected policy-makers, with due attention to the expert advice and opinions of interest groups, act entirely on the basis of their own judgment regarding the common good. This view resembles what Glendon Schubert has called the Idealist theory of the public interest. It may be significant that Lowi's prescriptions for a cure for interest-group liberalism include "a truly independent executive," especially an independent, professional senior civil service.[53]

The primary orientation to the bureaucracy when in search of

[51] Merkl, 267, 292. Friedrich, "Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism," 518. For Erhard's performance in this respect as chancellor, see Edinger, 275, and Arthur J. Olsen, " 'Herr Bundeskanzler' Comes to See Us," *New York Times Magazine*, June 7, 1964, p. 115.

[52] Rüstow, *Ortsbestimmung*, I, 244-46; III, 178, 181. Rüstow, *Worin bestand die geschichtliche Leistung des Freiherrn vom Stein?* Address delivered at the conferment of the Freiherr-vom-Stein prize at Hamburg, May 10, 1961 (Hamburg, n.d.), 39-40. Theodor Eschenburg, "Wahlkampfentartung und Staatspolitik" in *Heisse Eisen im Wahlkampf*, 15-16. Rüstow's view of the role of the bureaucracy in modern democratic systems resembles that of Max Weber. Cf. also Friedrich, "Political Thought of Neo-Liberalism," 520-21.

[53] Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest* (Glencoe, Ill., 1960), chap. iii and pp. 200-01, 214-17, 221-22. Schubert, "Is There a Public Interest Theory?" in *The Public Interest*, Vol. V of *Nomos*, (ed.) Carl J. Friedrich (New York, 1962), 166-67, 173-74. Lowi, "The Public Philosophy," 23, and Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, 304-05.

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the common good—which implies impartiality and fairness—is not specifically neoliberal, but rather a general feature in the German civic culture, where *government* largely means administration and where confidence in the bureaucracy is generally very high and has been increasing.[54]

It appears that the German neoliberals, in their attempts to maximize social and economic freedom by minimizing private power differentials and their effects, propose political arrangements which are not likely to satisfy the liberal demand for responsive as well as responsible government. Henry Kariel has touched upon this problem of how to control "the hierarchies of organized private power . . . by some means short of establishing an illiberal political order."[55] The political thought of the German neoliberals emphatically reveals the problem of the liberal, namely the ambivalent attitude toward public and private power and the continuous search for that balancing point of the two which will result in maximizing individual freedom. The neoliberals' combination of definitely liberal goals and values with a decidedly antipluralist political program appears to support the hypotheses that liberalism is not necessarily pluralist and that pluralism as a normative doctrine is not necessarily liberal.

[54] Almond and Verba, 106-07, 109-11, 151-53, 201, 202-03, 225-27, 428-29 495. Edinger, 98-101.

[55] Kariel, 2.

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Congress as Policy-Maker: A Necessary Reappraisal

RONALD C. MOE
STEVEN C. TEEL
San Diego State College

The literature of discontent with legislatures in general and Congress in particular has reached immense proportions in recent years. While few will argue that the power of the twentieth-century American Congress has declined in an absolute sense, most would agree that the position of Congress relative to that of the president has declined.[1] Congressional critics maintain that this shift in the balance of power is most apparent in the declining role of Congress as an initiator of legislation and as a force for innovation. This decline, generally regarded to have begun around the turn of the century and to have been subsequently accelerated by the New Deal, the Second World War, and, more recently, the technological revolution, they attribute to the fragmented institutional power of Congress. Critics and defenders alike tend to agree Congress is congenitally incapable of formulating and pushing through a coherent legislative program except under the most unusual cir-

[1] There are dissenters from this view. See, for example, K. C. Wheare, *Legislatures* (New York, 1963), 223 and Curtis Arthur Amlund, "Executive-Legislative Imbalance: Truman to Kennedy," *Western Political Quarterly*, XVIII (1965), 640-45.

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cumstances. The Congress now awaits the president's program, for it is he who establishes much of the legislative agenda and sets priorities.[2] The result is both the weakening of Congress vis-a-vis the president and, often, the frustrating of the majority will.

There is no dearth of reformers offering remedies to cure the alleged ills of Congress. The motives of the reformers are so diverse, however, that the reformers cannot all be placed under one heading. Some seek to reform Congress by making it stronger in its relations with the president and the bureaucracy, and thus, presumably, better equipped to fight the good fight. Using much the same rhetoric, however, others seek to reform Congress in order to make it more "efficient" and less an obstruction, or counter-force, to the president and bureaucracy.[3] Clinton Rossiter rightly sees criticism of Congress as part of a much larger battle in which the stakes are well understood by the participants, but rarely articulated: "In point of fact, the struggle over the powers of the Presidency as against the Congress . . . is only a secondary campaign in a political war over the future of America."[4]

Congress has not been completely passive in the face of its critics' attacks. It has attempted to counter executive encroachments on the legislative process by establishing professional staffs and exploiting committee leverages to provide more effective adminis-

[2] See Richard E. Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance," *American Political Science Review*, XLVIII (1954), 641-71; and Neustadt, "Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program," *ibid.*, XLIX (1955), 998-1021. Samuel Huntington goes even further: "The President now determines the legislative agenda of Congress almost as thoroughly as the British Cabinet sets the legislative agenda of Parliament"; Samuel Huntington, "Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century," *The Congress and America's Future*, (ed.) David B. Truman (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1965), 23.

[3] Frustrated members of Congress are frequently found among the most vociferous critics of their institution and its procedures. A collection of suggested "reforms" to help Congress battle the executive may be found in a book of essays by Republican members of the House: James C. Cleveland (ed.), *We Propose: A Modern Congress* (New York, 1966). On the other side, also written in the name of reform, are a number of essays and books with the thesis that the strong Congress is a centralized, efficient, and party-oriented Congress following the lead of a vigorous president; see, for example, Richard Bolling, *House Out of Order* (New York, 1965) and Joseph C. Clark, *Congress: The Sapless Branch* (New York, 1964).

[4] Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (New York, 1956), 150-51.

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trative oversight. It has counter-attacked with encroachments of its own on areas of executive discretion, for example, the annual authorization. Although these efforts may have achieved some success, critics, and many defenders, see Congress continuing to lose ground.

Samuel Huntington suggests that Congress is weaker today because it has insulated itself from the nationalizing trends and sources of power in society at the same time that its own powers have become increasingly dispersed.[5] According to Huntington, any significant reform of Congress is dependent upon the central leadership breaking with the "oligarchy" in each chamber and institutionalizing its power: "Centralization of power within Congress would also, in some measure, help solve the problem of insulation."[6]

Professor Huntington carries his argument one step further by suggesting that Congress ought to redefine its function:

> Legislation has become too complex politically to be effectively handled by a representative assembly. . . . The redefinition of Congress' functions away from legislation would involve, in the first instance, a restriction of the power of Congress to delay indefinitely presidential legislative requests. Constitutionally, Congress could, as Walter Lippmann and others have suggested, bind itself to approve or disapprove urgent Presidential proposals within a time limit of, say, three or six months. If thus compelled to choose openly, Congress, it may be supposed, would almost invariably approve presidential requests. . . .
>
> Explicit acceptance of the idea that legislation was not its primary function would, in large part, simply be recognition of the direction which change has already been taking. It would legitimize and expand the functions of constituent service and administrative oversight which, in practice, already constitute the principal work of most congressmen.[7]

I

Legislation is traditionally a collective endeavor involving a variety of governmental and non-governmental participants. An exact

[5] Huntington, "Congressional Responses," 18.
[6] *Ibid.*, 27.
[7] *Ibid.*, 29-30.

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determination of the relative contributions of Congress, the president, the bureaucracy, and interest groups in a given piece of legislation is impossible. Notwithstanding the obstacles that confront any attempt to assign credit for legislation to the several major sets of actors in the political system, the effort is worth making because of the current challenge to our polity.

The evidence indicates that Congress is underrated as an innovator in our political system. Historically, Congress has exhibited more initiative and leadership in policy-making than has the president. In an extensive study of ninety major laws in ten categories spanning a fifty-year period ending in 1940, Lawrence Chamberlain found that the president could be given credit for approximately 20 per cent, the Congress for about 40 per cent. Thirty per cent were the product of both the president and Congress, and less than 10 per cent of external pressure groups. Furthermore, one of the points brought out most clearly by his study was "the depth of the legislative roots of most important statutes." Of the 90 laws, 77 stemmed from bills introduced without the sponsorship of the administration. Chamberlain concludes that while legislation represents a joint effort, Congress has tended to be more aggressive and innovative than the executive branch: "These figures do not support the thesis that Congress is unimportant in the formulation of major legislation. Rather, they indicate not that the President is less important than generally supposed but that Congress is more important."[8]

Looking at the question of which branch is more likely to provide recognition to new policy problems, Chamberlain is once again convinced that Congress has been dominant either by spurring the president to action or by taking independent action. Chamberlain believes that of even greater importance has been the role of Congress as "a center for the origination and maturing of innovative legislation":

> Even the most severe critic of Congress would not deny that it has been sensitive to the ever-increasing areas demanding recognition by the Federal Government. Most of the great mass of regulatory legislation of the past decade, popularly dubbed New Deal legislation, had a

[8] Lawrence Henry Chamberlain, *The President, Congress and Legislation* (New York, 1946), 453, 454.

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well-defined prenatal history extending back several years before it was espoused by the Roosevelt Administration.[9]

There have been no subsequent studies of a comparable nature to determine whether Chamberlain's generalizations remain valid for the post-1940 period. It is widely accepted among contemporary academicians, as we have indicated, that Congress is now relatively weaker in relation to the president than previously and that what innovative influence it might once have enjoyed has been largely dissipated.[10] We would like to ask, therefore, whether in the years since Chamberlain's work appeared, Congress has maintained its influence over the substance of the legislation it handles, or whether the "legislative roots of most important statutes" have, indeed, been entirely displaced by the resources of executive innovation. To answer this question we plan to replicate, to some degree, Chamberlain's approach using as our data the major legislative acts since 1940.

II

The methodology employed by Chamberlain was designed to determine the relative contribution of the president, Congress, and interest groups to the initiation and passage of legislation.[11] The ninety laws he studied were divided among ten categories: business, tariff, labor, national defense, agriculture, federal credit, banking and currency, immigration, conservation, and railroads. Although these categories did not embrace all federal legislation and the choice of specific acts within these fields to some degree reflected a subjective judgment, Chamberlain argued that his mix

[9] *Ibid.*, 462.

[10] See James A. Robinson, *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative* (rev. ed.; Homewood, Ill., 1967): "An extension of Chamberlain's study from 1945 to 1965 would be expected to show that this collaboration has now yielded to virtually exclusive initiation by the executive" (p. 175).

[11] Robinson, 1-5, notes that studies of legislative influence generally employ an "intra-institutional" approach, which permits a more extensive use of quantitative methods and data. Although he bemoans the dearth of work showing the relationships among institutions, he does not offer any such examination. Chamberlain's book stands virtually alone in the literature as an "inter-institutional" study.

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represented a cross-section of each particular field. Chamberlain classified each law "according to the instrumentality which was chiefly responsible for its substance and passage," but it appears that he weighted influence over passage more than influence over substance. In tabulating the results of his classification, Chamberlain credited the president with preponderant influence over laws which grew out of one or more bills that "had been introduced without administration support and had received substantial consideration in Congress before the administration took a definite position."[12] By discounting this "preliminary activity" and giving disproportionate weight to presidential influence over the passage of given statutes, Chamberlain's tabulation obscured a major area of congressional innovation in legislative policy-making. Perhaps for this reason Chamberlain's conclusions have been so frequently misinterpreted by contemporary scholars.[13] David A. Baldwin has made clear the important distinction between "initiative" and "influence" in policy-making.[14] It is similarly necessary to distinguish between influence on the substance of a particular bill and influence on the eventual passage of a bill.

Credit for an idea is frequently difficult to assign. Because the annual presentation of the president's program is conspicuously treated in the news, it is easily assumed that the major proposals originate in the White House or some executive agency. Although it is true that the president establishes much of the agenda for Congress, his subordinates study the issues and ideas that are under discussion in Congress. In other words, the ideas germinating in Congress are like a shopping list to presidential assistants from which they select those ideas most appropriate for presidential cooptation. Also, it is difficult to determine the exact point at which modification of executive proposals becomes genuine legislative

[12] Chamberlain, 450.

[13] Strangely, or perhaps not so strangely, Chamberlain is usually cited as a proponent of the argument that the period from 1890 to 1940 was an era of substantial presidential aggrandizement in policy-making at the expense of Congress. Such careful scholars as Huntington and Robinson, among others, cite Chamberlain in this vein. Although some of his data might be interpreted this way, Chamberlain himself does not reach this conclusion. His data have frequently been distorted to serve ends contrary to those he intended.

[14] David A. Baldwin, "Congressional Initiative in Foreign Policy," *Journal of Politics*, XXVIII (Nov. 1966), 754-73.

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initiative.[15] For these reasons, in attempting to attribute influence, we will give greater prominence to congressional "preliminary activity" and congressional modification of executive proposals than did Chamberlain.[16]

A substantial number of legislative case studies have appeared since the publication of Chamberlain's book. The conclusions of the authors of these case histories will be used, as nearly as these conclusions can be determined, to test whether Chamberlain's results hold true for the period 1940 to 1967. The laws studied over this twenty-seven years span are divided into twelve categories: economic, tariff, labor, transportation, urban problems, technology, agriculture, conservation, immigration, civil rights, national defense, and foreign policy (exclusive of tariff, defense, and immigration).[17]

The selection of legislative categories and of the representative laws within those categories necessarily is, in part, a subjective process. In addition, the selection of individual laws to be evaluated is limited by the material available in scholarly case studies. Nevertheless, the question of whether the Congress is capable of performing a legislative function today and in the future is important enough that the absence of precise measurement techniques ought not discourage investigation.

III

Economic. Historically, Congress has exerted considerable influ-

[15] The term *initiative* is frequently assigned a positive connotation when, in fact, it ought to be viewed neutrally. Certainly, from a scholarly standpoint, ideas originating in the executive are neither inherently better nor worse than those originating in the legislature.

[16] Since Chamberlain's work, collective attribution has frequently been employed to credit the president with policy formulation more accurately attributable to lower executive agencies. That being the case, it is also fair to credit Congress collectively for work done by its individual members or committees.

[17] The changing nature of federal legislation since Chamberlain's study has necessitated modification of his categories. Following the Congressional Quarterly Service/William A. Dorns, *Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964* (Washington, D.C., *1965*), *337-561*, we have consolidated Chamberlain's federal credit, banking and currency, and business categories into one general category labeled "economic." We have expanded Chamberlain's category of "railroad" legislation to the more general category of "transportation." Finally, we have included four additional categories: "civil rights," "technology," "urban problems," and "foreign policy (exclusive of tariff, defense, and immigration)."

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ence over legislation affecting the nation's economy. Chamberlain, when his economic categories (business, banking and currency, and federal credit) are combined, gives the president credit for 9 statutes, the Congress for 10, and gives joint credit for 8 statutes. Possibly of more significance, however, Chamberlain notes that of the 27 pieces of "economic" legislation studied, 23 had a record of considerable congressional "preliminary activity."[18] For example, while the Securities and Exchange Act is credited to the president, the subject and proposed legislation had long been under study by Congress. Generally, the situation has not changed to any marked degree since 1940. Commenting on the role of Congress in influencing economic policy, Harvey Mansfield has noted: "In the field of domestic economic policy, Congress deals from constitutional strength. It can have a large say if it wants one—if it is moved and organized, that is, to exert its full potential."[19]

The first significant piece of economic legislation following World War II was the Employment Act of 1946.[20] Stephen Bailey's legislative history of this Act, while critical of Congress and its decision-making process, indicates that Congress, and not the president, was attempting to develop a policy to meet an anticipated post-war unemployment crisis. Bailey credits Senator James E. Murray with initiating the bill and observes that the president was a relative latecomer to the legislative conflict over its passage.[21] In more recent years much attention has been given to the problems of poverty and economic underdevelopment. Both Congress and the executive have exhibited initiative in this field; the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961 is largely attributed to congressional initia-

[18] Chamberlain, 450-52, 456.

[19] Harvey C. Mansfield, "The Congress and Economic Policy," *The Congress and America's Future*, 122. For an excellent analysis of Congress and economic policy see Ralph K. Huitt, "Congressional Organization and Operations in the Field of Money and Credit," *Fiscal and Debt Management Policies* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963), 399-495.

[20] This legislation formally acknowledged the role of the national government in influencing the economy. Congress initiated a less significant piece of legislation in the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945. See C. Herman Pritchett, "The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945," *American Political Science Review*, XL (1946), 495-509.

[21] Stephen K. Bailey, *Congress Makes A Law* (New York, 1950), 40-41, 161, 237.

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tive[22] while much of the "Great Society" economic legislation is a product of the executive.[23]

Few major statutes dealing with banking, antitrust, currency, or credit have been passed in the years since Chamberlain concluded his study. The need for new broad legislation has diminished since the Supreme Court is no longer inclined to construe economic questions as essentially constitutional ones. Change has tended to come about incrementally through amendments to existing statutes and through regulatory implementation.

Even when the executive has been clearly dominant in initiating economic legislation and implementing programs, the Congress has seldom been left without any influence. The several poverty programs, nurtured under presidential guidance, were greatly modified as the alliance between established bureaus and congressional committees brought full pressure to bear to dismember the special, presidentially-oriented, poverty agency.

Tariff. Traditionally, pressure groups have exerted great influence on tariff legislation.[24] Of the eight major tariff acts passed between 1890 and 1940, four were "almost completely dominated by pressure politics."[25] Chamberlain credits the president and Congress with two each of the remaining four acts. During World War II trade policy was dominated by a spirit of bipartisanship; the legislative battles over extensions of the Trade Agreements Program in 1940, 1943, and 1945 allowed the program to continue in more or less its original form. These renewals, however, received close congressional scrutiny, motivated by congressional fears that the extensions would bind members to the administration's postwar trade

[22] Sar A. Levitan, *Federal Aid to Depressed Areas: An Evaluation of the Area Redevelopment Administration* (Baltimore, 1964), vii.

[23] John Bibby and Roger Davidson make note of the dual source of initiative: "The most significant feature of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, from our point of view, was that it was 'legislated' almost entirely within the executive branch and, indeed, virtually without proding from congressional or other 'outside' clienteles. . . . Thus, the war on poverty forms an instructive contrast to the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961—a measure that, although in an adjacent policy area, was initiated and defined largely by Congress"; *On Capitol Hill; Studies in the Legislative Process* (New York, 1967), 220.

[24] See E. E. Schattschneider, *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1935).

[25] Chamberlain, 460.

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policies. In the years immediately following the war, the goal of Congress was to resume its "normal" level of participation in trade policy formulation by modifying specific Trade Commission procedures and inserting in subsequent extensions of the Trade Agreements Program restrictive provisions, such as the "peril point" and import quotas. Thus, Joe R. Wilkinson terms the 1951 renewal the "nadir" of post-war executive discretion and liberal trade policy under the Trade Agreements Program.[26]

By 1954 Congress, having largely won its point against the president and interest groups, found the making of tariff policy an unpleasant burden and actually sought to relinquish its dominance in tariff policy-making because the "power to dole out favors is not worth the price of having to beat off and placate the insistent pleas of petitions."[27] Congress therefore voluntarily reduced its power to set individual tariff rates in favor of deciding on matters of general tariff policy and establishing the procedure for rate-setting. Protectionists in Congress also sought to inhibit executive discretion by influencing appointments to the U.S. Tariff Commission while broadening and insulating the Commission's powers.[28]

Concessions to congressional protectionist sentiment were reflected in the formulation of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Again Congress chose the indirect route of influencing trade policy by establishing the rules for rate-setting rather than by determining individual rates. The Kennedy administration assumed a role of leadership in the passage of the Act, and was forced to make "bargains with special interests": "The concessions that were made and the obligations that were incurred concerned administration action or special bills."[29] In passing the Trade Act of 1962, Congress moved

[26] Joe R. Wilkinson, *Politics and Trade Policy* (Washington, D.C., 1960), chaps. 2, 3; p. 66.

[27] Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade* (New York, 1963), 37. The conclusions of this study with regard to the role of interest groups in the legislative process differ from those found in Schattschneider's work. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter found that interest groups' "best contribution was when they could become auxiliaries to a legislator, not propagandists to him"; that is, "their direction of influence was the reverse of what is usually assumed," and "frequently the lobby is a service agency for a movement led by or even initiated by a congressman" (p. 441).

[28] *Ibid.*, 455-56, 33, 45, 71-73.

[29] *Ibid.*, 78.

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to retain its right to determine the extent to which the executive can use trade policies as an instrument of international politics. The Act incorporates the principle of negotiating policy according to categories, or sectors, rather than on an individual industry, or even company, basis.[30] This new approach facilitates trade negotiations between the United States and the European Economic Community, whose common market arrangements are stated in broad categories. By determining the procedures and formulas utilized in rate reduction, Congress continues to define the limits of executive discretion in the area of trade policy.

Labor. Congress has traditionally been conspicuous in labor legislation according to Chamberlain: "... the record shows that from the very beginning Congress has taken a more active part in legislating in the interest of labor than has the President and the record of the past ten years of New Deal hegemony has not upset the historic pattern."[31] Since 1940, two major pieces of labor legislation have passed. The first, credited almost exclusively to Congress, is the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley), which according to Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown represented the culmination of ten years of effort by a congressional minority to revise the Wagner Act and impose new restrictions upon unions and upon collective bargaining.[32] The other major piece of labor legislation was the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin). In his case history of this Act, Alan K. McAdams credits Congress with both influencing the substance of the legislation and contributing to its eventual passage. For example, Title I of the Act, the "Bill of Rights" for labor, was developed by Senator John McClellan's staff. McAdams attributes passage of the bill to the work of the McClellan committee and a

[30] *Ibid.*, 73-79. See also, Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, XVI (1964), 699.

[31] Chamberlain, 456.

[32] Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, *From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley* (Chicago, 1950), 362-92; R. Alton Lee, *Truman and Taft-Hartley* (Lexington, Ky., 1966), chaps. 3-4. The Smith Connally Act of 1943 was actually the first successful legislation to modify the Wagner Act. Although of limited impact, it is an example of labor legislation which originated in the Congress and was passed over a presidential veto.

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well-organized publicity campaign led by "congressmen and a group of management representatives."[33]

Transportation. During the prewar period the federal government was concerned primarily with railroad legislation, and Chamberlain reports that ". . . the President has not been a powerful figure in railroad legislation. Major enactments in this category during the period under study total eight. Not one of these can be classified as primarily executive."[34] Except for the 1967 emergency strike settlement acts, no major railroad legislation has been enacted in recent years. Perhaps the most striking feature of transportation legislation in the postwar era has been the limited number of basic statutes enacted: "During the postwar period, the Federal Government promoted, by subsidies and grants-in-aid, and regulated transportation activities under authorities granted by various acts, many of which had their origins in the prewar period."[35]

Since World War II Congress has been active in all phases of transportation. Congress has been an innovator of highway policy. For example, the idea of the Interstate Highway System was born and matured in Congress.[36] The national government has become involved in the problems of metropolitan mass transportation only within the last twelve years; yet individual congressmen played major roles in the development of the Transportation Act of 1958,[37] the mass transportation features of the Housing Act of 1961, and the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964.[38]

Congressional involvement in merchant marine policy has been

[33] Alan K. McAdams, *Power and Politics in Labor Legislation* (New York, 1964), 83-84, 179, 180-82, 194-95. McAdams's conclusions on congressional influence over the substance of the Act are supported by William P. Murphy, "The Background of the Bill of Rights and Its Provisions" in *Symposium on LMRDA of 1959*, (ed.) Ralph Slavenko (Baton Rouge, La., 1961), 279-81; Benjamin Aaron, "The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959," *Harvard Law Review*, LXXIII (1960), 1086-127.

[34] Chamberlain, 457.

[35] William A. Korns, *Congress and the Nation* (Washington, D.C., 1965), 518.

[36] Winston Wade Riddick, "The Politics of Highways: The Bureau of Public Roads and the American Political System," (Ph.D. dissertation in progress, Columbia University).

[37] Michael N. Danielson, *Federal-Metropolitan Politics and the Commuter Crisis* (New York, 1965), 24-25, 28-44, 117-33, 155-79.

[38] Frederic N. Cleaveland, "Congress and Urban Problems," *Journal of Politics*, XXVIII (1966), 291, 298.

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considerable. The detailed nature of maritime legislation increases the influence of congressional committees over major policy innovation.[39] Finally, in legislation dealing with air transportation, Congress has played a highly innovative role. One case study on the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 by Emmette Redford concludes that Congress was very active in its relations with the executive in the development of a national policy on air safety regulations. Although dealing with highly complex and technical matters, the relevant congressional committees were fully able to comprehend the issues and had to prod the executive agencies and the interest groups into action.[40]

Urban Problems. Although much has been written about the problems of urban government, urban problems as an aspect of congressional politics has been largely ignored. Robert Connery and Richard Leach, although sensing an imminent change, nonetheless found the Eighty-fifth Congress (1957-59) basically uninterested in urban problems: "Unlike the farm problem, for example, which is a major legislative item in virtually every session of Congress, the metropolitan area has been on the periphery of congressional interest. In a sense, this is understandable, because there is a fundamental difference between the kind of one-interest situation that exists in the case of agriculture and the many-interest situation that exists in metropolitan areas."[41]

While the structure of Congress appears ill-designed to ensure a comprehensive consideration of urban problems, it still has acquired a creditable record since the Eighty-fifth Congress. Frederic Cleaveland, commenting on a series of case studies conducted under the auspices of the Brookings Institution, notes that Congress has

[39] Samuel Lawrence, *United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics* (Washington, D.C., 1966) 310-15. Lawrence found that "postwar presidents have generally been satisfied to delegate legislative initiative in maritime matters to their department officers or to the Congress" (316).

[40] Emmette Redford, *Congress Passes the Federal Aviation Act of 1958*, Inter-University Case Program, Series No. 68 (University, Ala., 1961), 9. See also Redford's, "Civil Aviation, 1957-58," *Journal of Politics*, XXII (1960), 255-56.

[41] Robert H. Connery and Richard H. Leach, *The Federal Government and Metropolitan Areas* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 94. See also chap. 3, "Congress and Metropolitan Areas."

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become a major source of initiative in urban policy-making. Seven major acts passed during the Eighty-sixth, Eighty-seventh, and Eighty-eighth Congresses were studied and the conclusions differ from those reached in the earlier study of Connery and Leach:

> . . . these case studies attest to the vitality of Congress as a source of initiative in legislating on urban problems. Congressional leadership was clearly decisive in several instances, both in generating policy ideas and in providing the political skill necessary to gain passage. In aid to airports and both water and air pollution control congressional concern, with interest group support, carried the day despite executive branch reluctance. This finding casts some doubt upon the stero-typed image of Congress reduced to the passive stance of simply responding to Presidential initiatives. Champions of urban-metropolitan causes can look to Capitol Hill, as well as to the White House, for leadership in pressing legislation.[42]

Technology. If Congress is to be found wanting in innovative spirit and competence, surely it would be most evident in legislation dealing with technological breakthroughs. Complex technological advances generally necessitate new public policy to guide their development, and to make such policy requires special expertise, more likely to be found, it is generally claimed, in the executive agencies than in the Congress, a body composed of generalists.[43]

Since 1945 three major acts have been passed establishing organizational mechanisms to make public policy in new fields resulting from scientific and technological advances, and Congress has been an equal or dominant partner in fashioning all three. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, is largely credited to Senator Brian

[42] Cleaveland, "Congress and Urban Problems," 292. Congressional legislation for urban areas passed during the Eighty-sixth, Eighty-seventh, and Eighty-eighth Congresses, a period spanning three administrations, were: Federal Airport Act of 1959; Walter Pollution Control Act of 1961; Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1961; Establishment of Department of Urban Affairs and Housing Act of 1962; Clean Air Act of 1963; Food Stamp Act of 1964; and Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964.

[43] The view that Congress is at a distinct disadvantage in policy-making because of its lack of technical expertise and information is occasionally disputed. See, for example, Henry M. Jackson, "Congress and the Atom," *The Annals, American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, CCXC (1953), 76-81; Roger Hilsman, "Congressional-Executive Relations and the Foreign Policy Consensus," *American Political Science Review*, LII (1958), 725-44.

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McMahon and his committee staff.[44] Nor did congressional interest in atomic energy policy diminish once the organizational structure was complete; the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has been viewed as the most powerful congressional committee in the nation's history and one with distinct policy preferences.[45] The Joint Committee is not merely a legislative mechanism; it is a policy-maker often dominating the Atomic Energy Commission.

In 1958, Congress, reacting quickly to Sputnik, established an organization to conduct a national program in outer space through drafting and passing the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.[46] Four years later it was Congress cajoling a rather reluctant executive branch to action which finally resulted in the Communications Satellite Act of 1962.[47] In both instances Congress, through its repeated investigations, established the basic public record, sharpened the relevant issues, and provided a marketplace for ideas with all interested groups being given a chance to present their cases.

Agriculture. In assigning credit for six pieces of agricultural legislation, Chamberlain awarded a score of one to the president, two to Congress, and three to "joint Presidential-Congressional influence."[48] Postwar agricultural legislation has been characterized by the absence of a unified national policy. Agricultural programs tend to be commodity-oriented, a tendency reinforced by the subcommittee organization of the two agricultural committees along commod-

[44] Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, *Government of the Atom: The Integration of Powers* (New York, 1963), 2, 3. See also, Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, *The New World, 1939/1946* (University Park, Pa., 1962), chaps. 12-14; Morgan Thomas, *Atomic Energy and Congress* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1956), chap. 1.

[45] Green and Rosenthal, 266. According to Green and Rosenthal there is some debate over whether the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is functionally an integral part of Congress: "Indeed, its effectiveness seems to be based in large part on its semi-autonomous, quasiadministrative role. If Congress has, through the JCAE, enhanced its own position, it has done so by creating a legislative-administrative hybrid whose operation has taken away from the Executive far more than it has given to Congress" (272).

[46] Alison Griffith, *The National Aeronautics and Space Act: A Study of the Development of Public Policy* (Washington, D.C., 1962), chap. 10.

[47] Ronald C. Moe, "Telecommunications Policy: The Legislative History of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962," (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1968), chaps. 8-9.

[48] Chamberlain, 450-52.

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ity lines.[49] The organization and membership of these committees contribute to the formulation of farm legislation for the protection of producers of specific farm commodities.[50]

The fractionization of farm policy into separate commodity programs has been abetted by the commodity orientation of lower administrative units in the Department of Agriculture and the growine influence of commodity interest groups.[51] Agencies responsible for the coordination and planning of policy are subject to the combined hostility of congressional committees, general farm organizations, commodity interest groups, and commodity-oriented lower divisions of the Department.[52] The fragmented commodity approach permits each of these groups maximum leverage in the formulation of policy, but the primary beneficiary has been Congress.[53]

While the agricultural committees of Congress have extensive power over farm legislation, individual congressmen have also made significant contributions to the formulation of farm programs. Congressmen have often acted to spur the executive into action, as in the case of the "soil bank"[54] and the disposal of domestic farm surpluses.[55] In other instances congressmen have worked jointly with administrations, as in the development of the

[49] Charles Hardin, "The Tobacco Program: Exception or Portent?" *Journal of Farm Economics*, XXVIII (1946), 920-38; Charles O. Jones, "Representation in Congress: The Case of the House Agricultural Committee," *American Political Science Review*, LV (1961), 358-67.

[50] Dale E. Hathaway, *Government and Agriculture: Public Policy in a Democratic Society* (New York, 1963), chap. 7.

[51] See, for example, an account of the activities of the National Association of Wheat Growers in Don F. Hadwiger and Ross B. Talbot, *Pressures and Protests—The Kennedy Farm Program* (San Francisco, 1965).

[52] See Charles Hardin, "The Bureau of Agricultural Economics Under Fire: A Study of Valuation Conflicts," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XXVII (1946), 667-68.

[53] Hathaway points to a deadlock over agricultural policy resulting from the demise of the "farm bloc" and the emergence of the "supreme power" of the congressional committees to prevent policy changes without themselves being able to alter policy independent of nonfarm support. Congressional influence over farm policy derives also from Congress's key position in the appropriations process; see Charles Hardin, *The Politics of Agriculture* (Glencoe, 1952), 159-64.

[54] Korns, 702.

[55] Peter A. Toma, *The Politics of Food For Peace* (Tuscon, Ariz., 1967), chap. 2; D. S. McLellan and D. Clare, *Public Law 480: The Metamorphosis of a Law* (New York, 1965), 1-7.

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Food and Agricultural Act of 1962, which departed somewhat from a strictly commodity-oriented policy.[56]

In the 1950s partisan politics became an increasingly evident part of farm policy.[57] Some observers saw direct involvement of political parties in agricultural policy-making as one means of producing more unified and coherent programs;[58] however, the more likely effect of such involvement would have been a shift in influence over farm policy from congressional agricultural committees to the national party leader, the president. Nevertheless, the 1960s have witnessed no substantial increase in partisan politics in the area of agricultural policy. On the contrary, during this period farm policy has continued to follow a commodity orientation that facilitates congressional preeminence.

Conservation. Chamberlain notes that of the ten laws he studied dealing with conservation, none could be credited personally to the president.[59] Congress had been an equal or dominant partner in all conservation legislation prior to 1940. In recent years the impetus for most new policies has come from a "subsystem" of subordinate executive bureaus, congressional committees, and interest groups with each element of this "triple alliance" concentrating its strength on a limited range of subjects and accommodating its interests on the remainder.[60] Congressional influence is exerted in large measure through the appropriations process, when it is able to review the operations and policies of the Agriculture and Interior Departments.[61] Robert Morgan suggests that congressional influence on the key conservation policies of the Department of Agriculture has

[56] Hadwiger and Talbot, 92-95, 234-43.

[57] R. M. Christenson, *The Brannan Plan* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1959), chap. 4; R. L. Frishknecht, "The Democratization of Administration: The Farmer Committee System'" *American Political Science Review*, XLVII (1953), 722-24; C. M. Hardin, "The Republican Department of Agriculture," *Journal of Farm Economics*, XXXVI (1954), 223-27.

[58] Christenson, chap. 5.

[59] Chamberlain, 457.

[60] For a discussion of the conservation policy "subsystem," see Robert S. Gilmour, "Policy-Making for the National Forests" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1968).

[61] David C. Knapp, "Congressional Control over Agricultural Conservation Policy: A Case Study of the Appropriations Process," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXI (1956), 257-81.

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increased measurably since 1945.[62] The president, on the other hand, has been interested in conservation policy only sporadically and his role is more that of an "influential supporter" of executive bureau positions than that of an initiator of new policies.[63]

Immigration. A clear pattern of congressional dominance is revealed in Chamberlain's analysis of immigration legislation. He attributes to the Congress controlling influence over the substance and passage of all nine pieces of immigration legislation enacted between 1880 and 1940.[64] Congress has continued its dominance over immigration legislation. Fred W. Riggs, in his study of the Chinese Exclusion Laws of 1943, concludes that while support of the President was one of the decisive forces in the success of the repeal campaign, the President was a relative latecomer to the struggle.[65] Robert A. Divine has demonstrated that the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 embodied restrictionist provisions which were so far removed from the President's original proposals that he signed the bill "with great reluctance." Two years later liberal amendments to the Act owed their passage to the efforts of individual congressmen such as Representative Emanuel Celler.[66]

Divine also suggests that passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950 signaled a significant shift in the thrust of immigration policy. The shift was away from a fear of the loss of racial and cultural homogeneity to a fear of Communist infiltration. In overriding a presidential veto specifically designed to expunge from the Act a section excluding Communists and Fascists from admission into

[62] Robert J. Morgan, *Governing Soil Conservation: Thirty Years of the New Decentralization* (Baltimore, 1965), 370. Like Robert Gilmour, Morgan sees most policy emanating from a subsystem: "Congressional predominance in soil conservation legislation has continued as a result of the 'symbiotic' relationship between federal conservation agencies such as the Soil Conservation Service and key congressional committees . . ." (374).

[63] Gilmour, 207.

[64] Chamberlain, 451.

[65] Fred W. Riggs, *Pressures on Congress: A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion* (New York, 1950), 145-69, 195-96. James A. Robinson, in his brief study of the Repeal Act, agrees with Riggs and notes: "The repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Laws in 1943 illustrates legislative superiority in immigration policy"; *Congress and Foreign Policy-Making* (rev. ed.; Homewood, Ill., 1967), 29.

[66] Robert A. Divine, *American Immigration Policy* (New Haven, 1957), chaps. 6 and 7.

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the United States, Congress indicated its strong feelings on the matter.[67]

In 1965 Congress passed legislation which eliminated the national origins quota system. While the President was primarily responsible for the passage of the legislation and the provisions repealing the quotas, Congress, in response to active interest group pressure, succeeded in extensively modifying the original bill.[68] Thus, "the final bill was significantly different from the original Administration bill and represented numerous concessions by the Administration."[69]

Civil Rights. After passing the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the political system waited eighty-two years before enacting another piece of civil rights legislation. Since 1957, however, four major civil rights acts have been passed by Congress. Unfortunately, the available case study literature on these acts is uneven in quality, journalistic, and highly subjective. Although the general impression conveyed by most commentators is that the president took the initiative, more detailed analysis indicates that the president was often a reluctant leader. J. W. Anderson, in his study of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, notes that President Eisenhower was less than enthusiastic about two major sections of the Act. Pressures from individual congressmen combined with the initiative of the Attorney General Herbert Brownell and the heat of the final weeks of a presidential election campaign forced Eisenhower to back these sections publicly.[70] Similarly, Berman describes moments of presidential hesitancy in regard to the 1960 Act.[71] The remaining literature tends

[67] This "vital change in attitude toward immigration" was amplified in the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, again over a presidential veto. The restrictionist provisions of the McCarran Act, reflecting primarily congressional concern for the internal security of the United States with respect to immigration, were authored primarily by the Senate Judiciary Committee. See Divine, chap. 9.

[68] *1965 Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* XXII (Washington, D.C., 1966), 459-82.

[69] *Congressional Quarterly,* XXIII, Oct. 8, 1965, pp. 2036-39.

[70] J. W. Anderson, *Eisenhower, Brownell, and the Congress: The Tangled Origins of the Civil Rights Bill of 1956-57* (University, Ala., 1964), 24-43, 88-89, 122, 135-36.

[71] In 1959 President Eisenhower decided against renewing his 1957 legislative recommendation authorizing the Attorney General to request injunctions in federal courts to prevent the violation of individual rights. In 1961 President

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to be concerned with specific aspects of the laws and is of limited usefulness in an attempt to weigh the relative contributions of the president and Congress.[72] It is our impression, however, that the president and the executive agencies, in alliance with certain interest groups, have tended to dominate this policy field since 1957.[73]

National Defense. Chamberlain found that from 1880 to 1940 Congress exerted considerable influence over national defense policy. Of the thirteen pieces of national defense legislation which he studied, only six were attributed exclusively to the president and seven were the subject of congressional "preliminary activity."[74] The postwar literature is dominated by descriptions and analyses of the substance of national defense policy.[75] Few case studies relate policy-making processes to specific defense decisions, and these are concerned primarily with "structural" decisions.[76] "Strategic" decisions are presented infrequently and then they are usually discussed only briefly in general works.[77]

Kennedy made specific civil rights recommendations which "were as modest as those of Mr. Eisenhower"; see Daniel Berman, *A Bill Becomes A Law: Congress Enacts Civil Rights Legislation* (New York, 1966), 7-10. Clifford M. Lytle suggests that a pattern of presidential hesitancy in this area has resulted from the political problem of whether it is worth endangering the bulk of his legislative program in order to pass a specific civil rights proposal. It is a question of allocation of political resources; "The History of the Civil Rights Bill of 1964," *Journal of Negro History*, LI (1966), 277-78.

[72] See, for example, Howard E. Shuman, "Senate Rules and the Civil Rights Bill: A Case Study," *American Political Science Review*, LI (1957), 955-75.

[73] Donald G. Morgan, *Congress and the Constitution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), chap. 14; Lytle, 279-85.

[74] Chamberlain, 450-52.

[75] See, for example, David M. Abshire and R. V. Allen, *National Security* (New York, 1963); William R. Kintner, *Peace and Strategy Conflict* (New York, 1967); Bernard Brodie, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option* (Princeton, 1966).

[76] The distinction between *structural* and *strategic* decisions is Samuel P. Huntington's. Strategic decisions are those dealing with the "units and the uses of force," while structural decisions are those concerned with the "procurement, allocation, and organization of men, money, and material which go into the strategic units and uses of force"; *The Common Defense* (New York, 1961), 3-4. Case studies on structural decisions include: Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification* (New York, 1965); C. E. Jacobs and J. F. Gallagher, *The Selective Service Act: A Case Study of the Governmental Process* (New York, 1967).

[77] See, for example, Edward A. Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress: 1945-1963* (Columbus, Ohio, 1966), chap. 7. For an exception, see Robert J. Art, *The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military* (Boston, 1968).

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The thrust of the postwar literature is to give Congress a vital, but subordinate, role in national policy-making.[78] Scholars differ, however, in their estimates of the extent of congressional participation. Some credit individual congressmen and congressional committees with considerable influence in specific policy decisions;[79] others minimize the influence of Congress.[80] Congressional participation in defense policy-making may be viewed as a "process of expansion and contraction" rather than a role of permanent subordination to executive initiative.[81] John C. Ries notes that one period of congressional assertiveness resulted when "the secretary of defense decided to abdicate his role in the policy process."[82] The more recent reduction of congressional impact on defense policy coincided with the rise of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Under his administration, decision-making in the department was centralized to an unprecedented degree.[83] Thus, congressional-executive relations since World War II have been characterized by wide oscillations in congressional participation in defense policy-making depending in part on the working philosophies of incumbent secretaries of defense and the international environment within which each secretary works.

Foreign Policy (exclusive of tariff, national defense, and immigration). Traditionally, the president has acted from a position of constitutional and political strength in foreign affairs. The Congress, on the other hand, has tended to have a more limited and ambiguous role in foreign policy making. It is generally assumed that congressional influence has been on the decline and that the

[78] Works representative of this view include: Huntington, *The Common Defense;* Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification;* Elias Huzar, *The Purse and the Sword* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1950); and Warner Schilling (ed.), *Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets* (New York, 1962).

[79] Theodore, J. Lowi, "Bases in Spain," *American Civil-Military Decisions,* (ed.) Harold Stein (University, Ala., 1963).

[80] Three separate case studies reaching this conclusion are included in Schilling.

[81] Kolodziej, 421.

[82] John C. Ries, *The Management of Defense* (Baltimore, 1964), 146. Another period of executive abdication and of resulting congressional ascendency is described in Kolodziej, 273.

[83] Paul Y. Hammond, "A Functional Analysis of Defense Department Decision-Making in the McNamara Administration," *American Political Science Review,* LXII (1968), 61-65. See also Art, 80-81, 157-66.

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shift away from initiating public policies toward a role of legitimating and amending executive initiatives has been most pronounced in foreign affairs.[84] Such an assumption presupposes, however, that in some earlier period congressional influence in foreign policy was greater than it is today. Sometime in the past there must have been a "golden era." If such an era existed prior to World War II, no one has written about it.[85] What evidence we have of the role of Congress prior to the War is impressionistic and hardly suggests that this was the high point of congressional influence, power, and prestige.[86]

While it is true that the president's power in foreign affairs has vastly increased since World War II, this increase has not been at the expense of Congress. Quite the contrary, both the president and Congress have found their powers and responsibilities increased. Although Robert Dahl, writing in 1950, did not view the congressional role in foreign policy to be growing,[87] more recent writers have suggested that the period from 1945 to 1955 was really the "golden era."[88] The diminution of congressional influence, they argue, coincides with the 1960s and what Holbert Carroll calls the international "new environment" which is not congenial to legislative institutions.[89]

Much of the lament of Carroll, Senator Fulbright,[90] and others over the plight of Congress is directly attributable to their feelings

[84] Robinson, 173-75.

[85] Chamberlain did not even see fit to discuss "foreign policy" as a separate category of presidential-congressional relations.

[86] See Holbert N. Carroll, *House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs* (rev. ed.; Boston, 1966), chap. 1; Albert C. F. Westphal, *The House Committee on Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1942), 13-26; Joseph Martin, *My First Fifty Years in Politics* (New York, 1960), 49.

[87] Robert Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1950), 58.

[88] See, for example, H. Bradford Westerfield, "Congress and Closed Politics in National Security Affairs," *Orbis* (1966), 747.

[89] Carroll, 363-68.

[90] Senator William Fulbright's attitude toward executive discretion in foreign affairs has shifted in recent years. This is most evident in his attitude toward foreign aid. In 1964 he argued that specific restrictions on the use of foreign aid ought to be minimized: *Old Myths and New Realities* (New York, 1964), vii-viii. By 1966, however, he had changed his tone; "I think it prudent for the Congress to retain its full authority to review the authorization as well as the appropriation of funds for foreign aid": *The Arrogance of Power* (New York, 1966), 236.

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on the war in Vietnam. They bemoan the seeming inability of Congress to influence general policy. While acknowledging the possibility that Congress, on balance, has increased its strength since World War II, they suggest that increments of power have not flowed to the institution itself, but to several of its committees and are most visible on peripheral issues and points of detail. The goal of those who currently champion the cause of a strong Congress is to be included in the general or strategic policy-making as well as in formulating the details of policy and executive action. Whether these proponents of balance between the president and Congress will hold to their positions after the war in Vietnam is settled is only problematical.[91]

While there is no general agreement about the relative standing of the president and Congress in initiating foreign policy legislation or about trends presently underway, there are a large number of legislative case studies to provide assistance in our evaluation. The case studies of foreign affairs tend to given credence to Cecil Crabb's observation: "A striking phenomenon associated with the control of foreign relations in recent American history is the expanded role of Congress in virtually all phases of external affairs. . . ."[92] Much of the increased role played by Congress in foreign policy is related to its constitutional powers of the purse. Few major policies envisioned by the executive can be implemented without appropriations from Congress. The preeminence of the appropriations process since World War II has also altered the relative influence of the two chambers, the House making greater gains than the Senate.[93]

Contrary to the general view, both chambers of Congress have been involved in great policy decisions as well as in the slower process of modification of existing policies. The Senate, for its part, is constitutionally required to participate in the process of

[91] In point of fact, Congress is not viewed by everyone as impotent in general policy-making. Lyndon B. Johnson, for one, might argue the point. He would probably agree with his predecessor who said, " 'The Congress looks more powerful sitting here [in the White House] than it did when I was . . . one of a hundred in the Senate' ": Theodore Sorenson, *Kennedy* (New York, 1965), 346.

[92] Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age* (New York, 1965), 91.

[93] Carroll, chap. 14; Crabb, 22-26.

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treaty-making, and case studies of its activities in this area—for example, the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952,[94] the North Atlantic Treaty,[95] and American participation in United Nations[96]—attest to the vigor it brings to the task. The House, particularly the Appropriations Committee, has found its views often anticipated in administration proposals.[97]

Furthermore Congress dominates many areas of foreign policy which in themselves appear to be peripheral. Collectively, however, they constitute a major portion of U.S. foreign policy. For example, Congress is generally credited with dominant influence over decisions on economic aid policy,[98] military assistance,[99] agricultural surplus disposal,[100] and the locations of facilities,[101] to name only a few. In addition, immigration and tariff policies are generally considered part of foreign policy and there is considerable evidence to indicate that Congress remains a major actor in these fields.

To Senator Fullbright and others who argue that Congress ought to abdicate its interest in short-term policies and day-to-day operations and concentrate its attention on long range, basic questions, Richard Fenno offers the following rejoinder:

> To relegate Congress to the making of broad policy decisions and to oversight in terms of broad program management is to prescribe precisely those tasks which Congress is least capable of performing. To

[94] Bernard C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement* (Princeton, 1957), chaps. 8, 11.

[95] R. H. Heindel, T. V. Kaljawi, and F. Wilcox, "The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate," *American Journal of International Law*, XLIII (1949), 633-65.

[96] Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *Bipartisan Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality* (Evanston, Ill., 1957), 44-53.

[97] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The Power of the Purse* (Boston, 1966), 362. Also, H. Field Haviland, Jr., "Foreign Aid and the Policy Process: 1957," *American Political Science Review*, LII (1958), 689-724.

[98] John D. Montgomery, *The Politics of Foreign Aid* (New York, 1962), 219-21. Michael K. O'Leary, on the other hand, denies extensive congressional influence in economic aid policy: *The Politics of American Foreign Aid* (New York, 1967), 89-90.

[99] See, for example, William Adams Brown, Jr. and Redvers Opie, *American Foreign Assistance* (Washington, D.C., 1953), part 5.

[100] Toma, chap. 2.

[101] Lowi, "Bases in Spain," 669-703.

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> criticize Congress for intervening in a specific and detailed fashion is to attack it for doing the only thing it can do to effectively assert its influence. Specifics and details are indispensable handles which Congressmen use to work inductively toward broader kinds of oversight judgements.[102]

The simple fact is that most broad foreign policy positions taken by this country have been developed, not from a comprehensive model of a better world order, but rather from an incremental evolution of often vague and ambiguous precepts applied pragmatically to a changing world situation. What the critics fail to see is that the oversight function of Congress, with its penchant for detail, cannot be arbitrarily divorced from the policy-making process. In all, the evidence does not substantiate the thesis that Congress is declining as a participant in foreign policy making or that its present, decentralized structure weakens it vis-a-vis the executive. Congress is required by the Constitution to play a less visible role than is the executive. Even so, the case studies indicate that the contemporary Congress is very capable of conceptual innovation, legislation modification, and energetic oversight.

IV

The limitations of legislative case studies and of the more comprehensive field studies are numerous and obvious; they tend to stress new questions over new answers, the unique over the routine, and bloodshed over peace. Critics of the case study method complain of the absence of integrative theory which would permit data to be analyzed cumulatively.[103] Despite these shortcomings, the existing literature is sufficiently complete to allow us to draw some conclusions about the state of Congress as a policy-maker and the relative strength of Congress and the president in policy formulation.

Our conclusion challenges the conventional wisdom that the president has come to enjoy an increasingly preponderant role in

[102] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., review of Joseph P. Harris, *Congressional Control of Administration*, in *American Political Science Review*, LVIII (1964), 674.

[103] See, for instance, Herbert Kaufman, "The Next Step in Case Studies," *Public Administration Review*, XVIII (1958), 52-59. Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory," 678-715.

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national policy-making. The evidence does not lend support to Huntington and his thesis that Congress ought to recognize its declining state and forego what remains of its legislative function. Quite the contrary, the evidence suggests that Congress continues to be an active innovator and very much in the legislative business.[104] Thus the findings presented here tend to confirm the findings Chamberlain made a quarter of a century ago.

In a period when legislatures throughout the world have experienced a decline in power relative to the executive, why has the American Congress retained its vitality? The answer appears to lie in the decentralized structure of both chambers. Much of the literature on Congress maintains that it is weakened by the dispersion of power inherent in its committee system and by weak chamber and party discipline over members. It is our view, however, that it is precisely this dispersed character of power in Congress which gives it the strength to meet the presidential and bureaucratic challenges. Power in Congress is dispersed because power in the executive is dispersed. Because executive decision-making is essentially incremental and piecemeal, congressional behavior, to be effective, must also be incremental and piecemeal.

It appears that not a little of the criticism of legislative institutions and their alleged inability to introduce innovative policy is based on an inaccurate conception of the policy-making process and a too limited definition of *innovation*. Charles Lindblom suggests that two major approaches exist for making public policy. The approach finding most acceptance in the literature is what he labels the "root method," which starts with fundamentals, "building on the past only as experience is embodied in a theory, and always prepared to start completely from the ground up." This

[104] It may be that the whole question of who is more powerful, the president or Congress, is less relevant today than in past decades. Richard Neustadt suggests that the real struggle is between the bureaucracy and the politicians. The institutionalization of the presidency has not meant, as often assumed, that the powers and responsibilities of Congress have diminished commensurately. There is no one-to-one mode extant here. The president has sought to increase his powers not so much to overcome Congress as to maintain some semblance of control over the bureaucracy. Scholars a century from now may very well write of the ebbs and flows in the relationship between officialdom and politicians, not Congress and the president. See Richard Neustadt, "Politicians and Bureaucrats," *The Congress and America's Future*, 102-20.

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method assumes intellectual capacities and sources of information, Lindblom argues, that are simply beyond the capabilities of man. It is a method which can be described, but not practiced. In contrast Lindblom outlines a "branch method," which is "continually building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees." This method of "successive limited comparisons" is more modest, but more realistic and thus "superior to any other decision-making method available for complex problems in many circumstances, certainly superior to a futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness."[105]

Congress provides innovation in policy through "successive limited comparisons." As an institution Congress shies away from an architectonic role and prefers its public policy interventions to be corrective and supplemental. Its decentralized committee system permits it to be simultaneously involved in many policy fields and to develop the expertise necessary to compete with the bureaucracy. Congress tends to think and act inductively rather than deductively. The concern for details and oversight often obscures the true intent of the body. Like the lawyer, with which Congress abounds, it builds its case from specifics and only concludes with the general proposal. Does change qualify for the appellation "innovation" only when it is comprehensive in nature? We think not.

Congress is often criticized for being too closely tied to local, parochial interests. To critics, the "public interest" does not consist of the sum of the particular interests; a good congressman is one who thinks in national terms and is not unduly concerned with the local interests of his constituency. What appears to some as a congressional deficiency, however, appears to others as a virtue. Because the congressman is close to his constituents and their problems, he is able to keep "distant" government responsive to their needs. It is Congress which provides interest groups, great and small, articulate and inarticulate with access to government. Innovation, then, while occasionally of the dramatic and comprehensive variety, as illustrated in most case studies, is more

[105] Charles Lindblom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through,'" *Public Administration Review*, XIX (1959), 81,88.

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often achieved in modest, yet important, changes in public policy. These changes act as safety valves for the discontented:

> Congress has the strength of the free enterprise system; it multiplies the decision-makers, the points of access to influence and power, and the creative moving agents. It is hard to believe that a small group of leaders could do better. What would be gained in orderliness might well be lost in vitality and sensitiveness to pressures for change. Moreover, Congress resembles the social system it serves; it reflects the diversity of the country. There is much to be said for a system in which almost every cause can strike a blow, however feeble, in its own behalf.[106]

As American society becomes ever more urban, industrialized, and bureaucratic, the need to challenge these impersonal forces increases. Congress, whatever else it may be, is a highly human institution with a demonstrated capacity, when stimulated, to challenge these forces. Congress is not an anachronism. To say that Congress remains a vigorous institution is not to downgrade the role of the president or the bureaucracy. It does suggest, however, that the concept of separated institutions sharing powers remains a vital concept as we enter the last decades of the twentieth century. It also suggests that Congress can have an important part in our struggle to make technological progress serve the interests of our democratic institutions and values.

[106] Ralph K. Huitt, "Congressional Organization and Operations in the Field of Money and Credit," *Fiscal and Debt Management Practices* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963), 494.

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An Aspect of United States Policy in Latin America: The Latin American Diplomats' View*

KENNETH A. BODE
State University of New York at Binghamton

In Latin America, the military has always stood as a ready alternative to political parties and the normal electoral processes for the effective mobilization of political power. Between 1935 and 1960, there were forty-five *successful* changes of government by extra-constitutional means among the Latin American states.[1] Since the early 1960s there have been at least fourteen successful major military coups d'etat in that region; and recent history suggests no apparent change in the trend. There have been numerous threats of coups, several abortive coups and even some successful but minor and short-lived military interventions (such as those in the Dominican Republic on January

* The data for this study was collected while I was in residence at The Brookings Institution as a Guest Scholar. The study was conducted under the joint auspices of the Institute of Latin-American Studies of the University of North Carolina and the Latin American Studies Center of Michigan State University. I wish to thank Professor Frederico G. Gil and Frederic N. Cleaveland of the University of North Carolina for their valuable consultation on various phases of this study, the Latin American Studies Center of Michigan State University for a research grant that greatly facilitated this undertaking, and the staff of The Brookings Institution for their valuable support.

[1] See Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, LX (1966), 617.

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16 and 18, 1962). The 1960s saw a return to barracks politics in the region, and this militarism has serious implications both for the internal political order of Latin nations and for hemispheric relations. On the one hand, during the formative years of the Alliance for Progress, which aspires to peaceful social revolution by democratic means, the major political forces in Latin America have found cause to interfere frequently with the democratic processes. On the other hand, the direction of United States diplomacy in response to military overthrows of legally constituted governments has been subject to "meanderings of policy" reflecting the varying whims of policymakers.[2]

Latin American military establishments consistently have been dominant in domestic politics for several reasons. First, the armed forces have abundant manpower, leadership, and economic resources. Also, the various branches of the military are probably the most efficient and rationally constituted public organizations in many, if not all, of the Latin American nations. Effective sanctions, hierarchical internal structures, and autonomous systems of internal communication all serve to reinforce this superior organizational capacity—particularly during a crisis. Finally, the military possesses an often-noted legitimate monopoly over the means of violence, a resource which has increased in importance with the acquisition of modern, technologically sophisticated military equipment.

By contrast, civilian political institutions in Latin America are frequently weak, poorly organized, and without material resources. Moreover, these deficiencies are complicated by a lack of consensus on political means and ends; in short, political parties, interest groups, and governmental institutions—the agents for organizing political support and competing for the legitimate authority to govern as well as those involved in discharging that authority—are performing inadequately. Complicating these circumstances further in many Latin American states is the absence of a procedural consensus that would enable political actors to cope with substantive conflict without threatening the existence of the regime. There is often no widespread agreement about

[2] Donald Marquand Dozer, "Recognition in Contemporary Inter-American Relations," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, VII (1966), 335.

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who the legitimate political actors are nor what constitutes legitimate political activity. In many countries, furthermore, political and social cleavages overlap to deepen the intensity of political strife. Finally, few Latin American countries have an established tradition of civilian supremacy over the armed forces; however, there are ample precedents for military intervention in the governmental and political processes.

Each change of government effected by the military in the western hemisphere requires an important diplomatic response from the United States. Although there are nuances of response available in such situations there is no multiplicity of alternatives. The State Department may vary the time before extending diplomatic recognition or the cordiality with which the new regime is received, or it may place conditions upon recognition. However, United States recognition is a matter of some importance in inter-American relations, and since the establishment of the Good Neighbor Policy, administrations have generally been willing to recognize *de facto* governments regardless of the means by which they attained power. This policy has been closely tied to the U.S. commitment to nonintervention in the internal affairs of other hemispheric countries.[3]

Periodically, the argument is heard in official circles that a coordinated policy of nonrecognition by the United States and other democratic nations of the Americas might be an effective instrument to encourage the growth of democracy in the hemisphere. The major Latin American republics, however, have generally opposed such actions, arguing that rather than nourish democracy, such a policy would, more likely, undercut the traditional nonintervention doctrine. In his historical review of the international relations of the western hemisphere, Professor J. Lloyd Meacham notes that on several occasions the United States has made concrete, formal proposals for collective actions against

[3] There have been some obvious exceptions to this policy, such as the withdrawal of recognition from the governments of Argentina and Bolivia during World War II. A thorough discussion of the extent to which U.S. recognition policy has varied over time may be found in Martin C. Needler, "United States Recognition Policy and the Peruvian Case," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* (Spring 1963), 61-72.

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dictatorships, but has never been able to enlist sufficient support for these proposals among the Latin American states.[4]

The view that the United States ought to distinguish between dictatorships and representative democracies reemerged in the waning years of the Eisenhower administration, but it never became a part of operational policy. This view implies that the act of withholding or withdrawing recognition by the United States constitutes a compromise of the principle of nonintervention. The policies of the Kennedy administration, although not always consistently applied, signaled a departure from the criteria for both recognition and aid used during the Eisenhower years. Shortly after assuming office, President Kennedy spelled out the provisions of the Alliance for Progress. This partnership between the United States and the Latin American states was to constitute a peaceful revolution over the span of a decade that would eliminate hunger, raise the standard of living of all, and provide the foundation necessary for building institutions to sustain social, economic, and political development. Subsequent performance notwithstanding, the Alliance for Progress infused inter-American relations with an idealism absent since the earliest days of the Good Neighbor Policy. At the heart of the Alliance was the notion that development could be achieved through the democratic process, and this commitment became an influential, if not determining, element of the Kennedy administration Latin American policy. Economic aid, technical assistance, and even diplomatic recognition came to be viewed as integral parts of a policy designed to encourage the growth of democracy. In retrospect, however, the diplomatic responses of the Kennedy administration to the military interventions that occurred between 1961 and 1963 indicate that aid and recognition were actually employed very inconsistently to that end.[5]

The first test of the Kennedy administration's Latin American policy came in January 1961 in response to a military coup in

[4] J. Lloyd Meacham, *A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations* (New York, 1965), 175-76.

[5] It is not necessary to record detailed accounts of these instances here. The interested reader will find thorough accounts of most of these military coups and the diplomatic response of the United States in Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America* (New York, 1964).

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El Salvador. A change in policy was immediately apparent. Washington elicited promises of prompt elections and an early return to constitutional government before extending recognition to the military directorate headed by Colonels Aníbal Portillo and Julio Rivera. Similarly, in Peru, when the military intervened to annul the national elections in 1962, recognition, military assistance, and Alliance for Progress aid were cut off and restored only when assurances were given that free elections would be permitted. Here, the Kennedy administration seemed willing to stand firm, even to the extent of insisting that the election results be respected; however, other Latin American nations had little sympathy for a hard-line U.S. policy, even one that purported to support democracy.[6]

Military coups in Guatemala in March 1963 and in Ecuador in July 1963 presented the United States with a dilemma. Both civilian governments were replaced in an extra-constitutional manner through the use of force; however, the ousters relieved Washington of having to cope further with unhappy situations in both countries. In Ecuador the army toppled President Carlos Julio Arosemena, whose inefficient administration was plagued by seemingly irreversible economic deterioration. The coup in Guatemala ousted President Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, but it was obviously inspired less by Ydígoras than by the return to the political scene of leftist ex-president Juan Arévalo. Arévalo had returned to Guatemala after nearly five years of exile to enter the national elections scheduled for December 1963. In both cases the basis upon which the new recognition and aid policies were made contained an element of expediency. In each instance the newly empowered military officers gave routine assurances that elections would be held, and the United States bestowed recognition on the new governments in less than three weeks. Aid programs were never interrupted in either nation.

United States policy took another tack in Argentina. In the elections of March 1962, the followers of the exiled Juan Perón scored impressive victories in several provinces. President Arturo Frondizi was first pressured by the armed forces to annul the electoral results, then forced to resign. José María Guido, presi-

[6] See Needler, "United States Recognition Policy" and see Lieuwen, 116.

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dent of the Argentine Senate and constitutional successor to the presidency, was immediately named president. Initially, the Kennedy administration considered following a hard-line diplomatic policy; however, it finally accepted the argument of the Argentine military that since Guido was effectively installed as president, constitutional processes had not been interrupted. As a result neither aid nor recognition was withdrawn.

In the final two instances of military overthrows of civilian governments to be faced by the Kennedy administration, Washington adhered more closely to its hard-line policies in support of democratic processes. In September 1963, elements of the army of the Dominican Republic ordered Juan Bosch out of the country. In early October, the Honduran military ousted President Ramón Villeda Morales. The Kennedy administration had committed itself to make the Dominican Republic a showcase for the Alliance for Progress in the Caribbean, and when Bosch, the first freely elected president of that country in over three decades, was overthrown, Washington immediately cut diplomatic ties, suspended all aid programs, and withdrew all official personnel. The same rigid policy was followed in Honduras—despite assurances of early elections from the military in each country. This policy was continued, with no sign of pending interruption until John Kennedy was assassinated. The effects of a complete commitment to a policy of non-recognition are unclear. Professor Edwin Lieuwen believes, however, that the total severance of United States economic, military, and diplomatic relations with the governments of Honduras and the Dominican Republic seriously weakened the positions of the military leaders in those two nations.[7]

The advent of the Johnson administration produced a somewhat different set of priorities for Latin American policy, including an adjustment in recognition and aid policies. First, the Kennedy hard-line toward the military governments in the Dominican Republic and Honduras was abandoned. In December 1963, Washington resumed diplomatic ties, and by February 1964, all aid programs had also been restored in both countries.[8]

[7] Lieuwen, 142.

[8] The resumption of U.S. aid and military assistance in the Dominican Re-

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This adjustment in priorities seems to have been primarily the responsibility of President Johnson's Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Thomas C. Mann. Secretary Mann let it be known early that he disagreed with the basic tenets of the Kennedy policy. First, he regarded the use of diplomatic recognition and international economic assistance to stimulate democracy as unrealistic, based on misguided idealism. Moreover, judged in purely pragmatic terms, the Kennedy policy had failed to discourage military interventions. An unusually strong resurgence of militarism occurred in the hemisphere during Kennedy's administration. On the other hand, ebbs and flows in the consistency and severity of its application had made the Kennedy policy in a crisis unpredictable—almost a random factor—for both decision-makers in Latin America and the State Department itself. Furthermore, Secretary Mann was not inclined to underestimate either the dangers of communist subversion in the hemisphere or the abilities of the military establishments in the various Latin American republics to cope with that threat. Overall, as shaped by Thomas C. Mann, United States policy came to regard effective control and anti-communism as central considerations for the extension of diplomatic recognition and aid.

The adjustment in priorities became apparent as soon as recognition and aid were extended to the Dominican Republic and Honduras. When leftist President Joao Goulart of Brazil was overthrown by joint military-civilian action on April 1, 1964, certain aspects of U.S. diplomatic policy had clearly been reformulated. Taking a cue from the actions of the military in Argentina, the instigators of this overthrow attempted to legitimize their actions by elevating Ranieri Mazzilli, the president of the Chamber of Deputies and constitutional successor to Goulart, to

public on January 5, 1964, was accompanied by the statement that future assistance would depend upon progress made by the ruling regime (New York *Times*, Jan. 5, 1964, p. 19). Actually, the total amount of aid committed to the Dominican Republic during the first full fiscal year of the Johnson administration (1965) was 55 per cent greater than similar commitments during the last full fiscal year of the Kennedy administration (1963). See Carl C. Moses, "United States Intervention in the Dominican Republic: Its Implications for the Inter-American System," a paper presented at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Gatlinburg, Tennessee, p. 30.

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the presidency. Before Goulart could escape from Brazil, Washington again acceded to the technicality that there had been no disruption of constitutional processes and sent its accolades and "warmest wishes" to the new regime.[9] No one doubted that the United States considered this coup beneficial for Brazil and for Brazilian-American relations. The economic and administrative inefficiency of Goulart's government had been widely proclaimed and inflation was apparently out of control. More significant, however, was the charge that Goulart had permitted his government to become infiltrated with communists and other partisans of the extreme left, whose influence was considered critical.

The military intervention in Bolivia in November 1964 was the last successful military coup of the period covered by the data gathered for this study of Latin American diplomats. After thirteen years of uninterrupted governmental control by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, the military unseated President Paz Estenssoro and charged him with severe abuses of power and economic mismanagement. The resulting military junta headed by Paz's former vice-president General Rene Barrientos promised early elections, and it obtained U.S. recognition within a month. Again, the change seems to have been welcome in Washington since the Paz regime had grown overzealous in its curtailment of political freedom in the months prior to the overthrow.

Three more military overthrows of legally constituted civilian governments in Latin America occurred after the data for this study were accumulated, and will, therefore, be treated more summarily. The diplomatic response to each of these coups indicates a trend toward a more considered and cautious approach on the part of the United States. When the Argentine military ousted President Arturo Illia on June 28, 1966, the U.S. "suspended" diplomatic ties for eighteen days. When Presidents Belaunde of Peru and Arias of Panama were removed by action of their respective armed forces in October 1968, diplomatic relations were again suspended. Suspension is not a formal rupture of diplomatic relations, but it rules out official contact when a new regime

[9] New York *Times*, April 3, 1964, p. 1.

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takes power "under conditions that are not immediately clear."[10] Obviously, it allows time to determine the political composition of the new regime (if any doubt exists), to maneuver and negotiate if United States economic interests seem jeopardized, and to avoid an unfortunate association with a regime that is politically repressive in its internal policies.

United States policy toward military overthrows of Latin American governments during 1961-1965 can be best described as flexible. The Kennedy administration incorporated a variety of responses into its policies toward diplomatic recognition and aid. There were also significant differences between the Kennedy responses and the responses of the Johnson administration when it came to office in November 1963.[11]

I

The most important and comprehensive network of political communications among governments is at the level of the diplomatic mission. Notwithstanding exchange visits and other direct communication links between heads of states and their personal emissaries, the need for accurate, first-hand information and the magnified costs of misunderstanding have combined with expanded functions (including scientific, economic, military, cultural, and social relations) to enhance the importance of missions abroad. The composite picture that a diplomatic mission can provide for its home government is more complete and more crucial than even before. Not much is known, however, about the embassy or legation as a unit of interaction between the home government and the host government, nor of the structure or dy-

[10] New York *Times*, Oct. 13, 1968, p. 1.

[11] The views presented here differ somewhat from those of Professor Donald Marquand Dozer, who sees greater consistency in the Kennedy and Johnson policies. Citing the examples of U.S. diplomatic response in Peru, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Bolivia, Professor Dozer sees "substantially the same procedure" involved in each case; see Dozer, 3. It would seem to me that there were substantial differences in the tone and subsequent interpretation of U.S. actions in these three instances, all of which occurred during the Kennedy administration. The warmth with which the ouster of Goulart was received in Washington and subsequently reflected in official pronouncements adequately illustrates the different priorities of the two administrations.

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namics of a diplomatic mission.[12] Also, there have been few cross-national studies of elites; fewer still have focused upon political personnel through the use of opinion data. There has never been a systematic and comparative study of the personnel involved in traditional diplomatic interaction indicating their attitudes toward either international problems or the domestic politics of their home countries or the manner in which they, as official governmental spokesmen, represent the political priorities of their respective regimes.[13] These gaps are understandable. This lack of direct academic analyses of diplomatic personnel is attributable to the combined difficulties of gaining access to the subjects, characteristic of all elite studies, and of the special sensitivities of the business of diplomacy.

The data reported on here were gathered during the summer of 1965 through questionnaires distributed to the diplomatic representatives of those Latin American republics, with which the United States at that time was maintaining normal relations (which excluded Cuba, of course). Fifty diplomats of all military and civil ranks from fourteen Latin American countries responded to the question asked.[14] In order to preserve the anonymity of the respondents, neither diplomatic rank nor country of origin will be reported for any respondent. Instead, the data will be divided into two analytical categories: (1) type of regime represented and (2) the military or civil status of the respondent, that is, whether the respondent served in a military or nonmilitary diplomatic capacity. It should be noted that at the time of this survey 66 per cent of all embassy personnel served in a civil

[12] Richard C. Snyder and James A. Robinson, *National and International Decision-Making* (New York, 1963), 148.

[13] One minor exception to this is Suzanne Keller's social background study of British and American diplomats, which makes use of no direct data on attitudes; see Suzanne Keller, "Diplomacy and Communication," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XX (1956), 176-82.

[14] With respect to diplomatic rank, the sample closely resembles a proportionate stratified random selection of elements; that is, insofar as rank of all possible respondents is concerned, the number of elements from each stratum in the sample is very nearly proportionate to the number of elements from each stratum in the population. See Leslie Kish, "Selection of the Sample," in Leon Festinger and Daniel Katz (eds.), *Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1953), 193-98.

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diplomatic capacity and 34 per cent were attached in a military capacity. Of the respondents included in this sample, 67 per cent were civilian diplomats while 33 per cent were military.

The respondents were classified by regime into two groups on the premise that their attitudes would reflect, in part at least, the nature of the political systems they represented. Judgments determining categories were based on the kinds of regime current in the summer of 1965, for those governments had chosen the representatives under consideration. Two categories—democratic and non-democratic—were based wholly on the way in which the regime obtained its mandate; only governments that came to power as a result of free elections were classified democratic. This classification scheme does not differentiate among regimes within each general category; however, since we are principally concerned with the issue of extra-constitutional assumptions of civil power, this simple operational criterion is adequate to distinguish the diplomats where that matter is concerned. On the basis of this criterion, the various Latin American regimes in power during the summer of 1965 were classified as follows—democratic: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela; non-democratic: Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the Dominican Republic.[15]

The diplomats were asked to respond to four items directly related to the problem of militarism in Latin America. Two of these items concerned military overthrows of democratic governments and military influence on domestic politics; the other two were related to United States policy when a legally constituted government in a Latin America republic is overturned by the military. First the respondents were asked if, in their opinion, military overthrows of democratically elected governments and excessive military influence in politics are, for the hemisphere: (a) major and critical problems, (b) fairly important problems, (c) relatively unimportant problems, (d) not problems at all.

[15] During the period of the survey, the Dominican Republic alternated between a military junta and a provisional government; both fall in the non-democratic category.

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TABLE 1-A

Military Interventions and Military Influence in Politics as Hemispheric Problems, All Diplomats (in per cent; n = 50)

	Military Overthrows of Democratic Governments	*Excessive Military Influence in Politics*
Major, Critical Problem	32	18
Fairly Important Problem	38	34
Relatively Unimportant Problem	16	26
Not a Problem at All	8	16
Other, No Answer	6	6
	100	100

TABLE 1-B

Military Interventions and Military Influence in Politics as Hemispheric Problems by Type of Regime Represented (in per cent)

	Military Overthrows of Democratic Governments		*Excessive Military Influence in Politics*	
	Democratic (n = 26)	*Non-Democratic (n = 24)*	*Democratic (n = 26)*	*Non-Democratic (n = 24)*
Major, Critical Problem	46	17	27	8
Fairly Important Problem	38	37	35	33
Relatively Unimportant Problem	12	21	19	33
Not a Problem at All	4	13	19	13
Other, No Answer	0	13	0	13
	100	101*	100	100

* Total per cent deviates from 100 due to rounding.

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TABLE 1-C

Military Interventions and Military Influence in Politics as Hemispheric Problems by Diplomatic Status (in per cent)

	Military Overthrows of Democratic Governments		*Excessive Military Influence in Politics*	
	Military ($n = 19$)	*Civil* ($n = 31$)	*Military* ($n = 19$)	*Civil* ($n = 31$)
Major, Critical Problem	37	29	11	23
Fairly Important Problem	42	35	26	39
Relatively Unimportant Problem	5	23	37	19
Not a Problem at All	16	3	26	10
Other, No Answer	0	10	0	10
	100	100	100	101*

* Total per cent deviates from 100 due to rounding.

The most important trends that emerge from the data presented in these tables are as follows:

(I-A) The entire sample of diplomats expressed substantial concern about active military interventions that overturn the normal processes of government; there was feeling that excessive military influence in politics constitutes a relatively important problem.

(I-B) Controls for type of regime represented polarized the diplomats somewhat. Respondents from democratic governments took a predictably harsher view of military overthrows and registered considerably more concern about excessive military influence than did their counterparts from non-democratic regimes.

(I-C) Those diplomats serving in a military capacity took a surprisingly harsh view of the proclivity of the armed forces to disrupt the civilian political processes through active intervention, but they were considerably more tolerant of military influence in domestic political processes than were diplomats classified civil. The representatives of the Latin American armies react somewhat critically to overt interventions by the military establishments, the effect of which may be to impair two important resources of the armed forces, its reputation and its neutrality. They are nonetheless apparently convinced that some measure

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of military influence in the domestic political process is necessary or justifiable, and that this influence is not a significant problem.

Between January 1961 and July 1965, the United States government made some diplomatic responses to nine major military overthrows of legally constituted governments in Latin America. Two inquiries regarding these matters were included in the questionnaire. One inquiry dealt with the recognition policies of the United States in the event of a military coup and the other dealt with United States aid and assistance policies in such an event. The question and response alternatives were phrased as follows:

RECOGNITION:

When the military deposes a civilian government in a Latin American republic:

(1) The United States should extend diplomatic recognition to the de facto government no matter how it obtained power and regardless of its domestic and foreign policies.
(2) The United States should withhold diplomatic recognition of the de facto government until it demonstrates that it will honor its country's international commitments.
(3) The United States should withhold diplomatic recognition until the de facto government demonstrates that it will allow free and democratic elections.
(4) The United States should withhold diplomatic recognition until a freely elected civilian government is restored.

AID:

When the military deposes a civilian government in a Latin American republic:

(1) The United States should continue economic, technical, and military aid to the de facto government no matter how it obtained power and regardless of its domestic and foreign policies.
(2) The United States should withhold economic, technical, and military aid until the de facto government demonstrates that it will honor its country's international commitments.

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(3) The United States should withhold economic, technical, and military aid until the de facto government demonstrates that it will allow free and democratic elections.
(4) The United States should withhold economic, technical, and military aid until a freely elected civilian government is restored.

The first two alternatives for each question obviously represent the traditional diplomatic criteria for recognition in the event of a governmental change. These alternatives provide that diplomatic recognition and the various assistance programs should be both automatic and uninterrupted if a new and effective government is immediately established. It seems clear that since 1960 these criteria have been applied at least twice, in Argentina (March 1962) and Brazil (March 1964), with no additional conditions.

The third alternative coincides with what would seem to have been the basic intent of the Kennedy policy and implies minimum approval of the use of diplomacy and aid as implements of policy. In El Salvador (January 1961) and Peru (June 1962), this alternative was adopted and followed with serious intent and effective results. In three other instances—Ecuador (July 1963), Guatemala (March 1963), and Bolivia (November 1964)—the United States ostensibly withheld recognition until promises of elections were obtained, although few observers doubt that the deposal of each of the incumbent civilian governments was regarded with favor in Washington. None of these latter three extra-constitutional maneuvers by the military caused a disruption in U.S. aid programs.

The final alternative presented in each question clearly proposes that United States recognition and aid policies be employed as active instruments of foreign policy and that they be used to stem further military activity in the politics of hemispheric states. The issue of intervention in the internal affairs of these nations is more than implied here. This alternative strongly supports United States action against military overthrows of civilian governments, nonintervention notwithstanding. In the Dominican Republic (September 1963) and Honduras (October 1963), the diplomatic responses of the Kennedy administration were

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TABLE 2

United States Recognition and Aid Policies in the Event of an Armed Forces Overthrow of a Civilian Government in Latin America, All Diplomats by Diplomatic Status and by Type of Regime Represented (in per cent)

	A	B Diplomatic Status		C Type of Regime Represented	
	Total Sample (n = 50)	*Military (n = 19)*	*Civil (n = 31)*	*Democratic (n = 26)*	*Non-Democratic (n = 24)*
RECOGNITION					
Recognize *de facto* regime with no other considerations	4	0	6	4	4
Recognize *de facto* regime if it honors international commitments	34	37	32	11	58
Recognize *de facto* regime on condition of assurance of democratic elections	36	47	29	47	25
Withhold recognition until a freely elected government is restored	14	5	19	32	0
Other, No Answer	12	11	13	7	13
	100	100	99*	101*	100
AID					
Continue aid to *de facto* regime with no other considerations	2	0	3	0	4
Continue aid to *de facto* regime if it honors international commitments	32	37	29	8	58
Continue aid to *de facto* regime on condition of assurance of democratic elections	36	42	32	46	25
Withhold aid until a freely elected government is restored	16	11	20	31	0
Other, No Answer	14	10	16	15	13
	100	100	100	100	100

* Total per cent deviates from 100 due to rounding.

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sufficiently strong and explicit to fit this category. Washington ultimately backed down in each case, but the initial response represented a significant departure in policy, and since it was effected concurrently in both countries, it was a highly visible and controversial course of action.

For the most part, there was little variation in response on these two questions.[16] Most diplomats seemed to view recognition and aid as convergent aspects of a single policy. In general, there was little support at any level for the proposition that the United States should simply recognize and continue aid to any and all de facto governments in Latin America. However, a substantial proportion of the total sample felt that only the simple act of demonstrating intent to honor its country's international commitments should be required of a newly established regime following a military overthrow to ensure both recognition and continued economic, military, and technical assistance (Table 2-A). Half of the diplomats expressed some basic agreement with the more hard-line Kennedy policies. They felt that the United States should hold out for meaningful assurances that free and democratic elections would be held.

When the results of these inquiries are examined with diplomatic status held constant, we find that the military and civil diplomats favored traditional de facto diplomatic responses (alternatives 1 and 2) in approximately similar proportions. Among those who preferred firmer responses from Washington, however, the military was less likely to favor the withdrawal of recognition and withholding of aid until a freely elected government was restored. About 20 per cent of the diplomats serving in a civil capacity favored both aspects of this policy. Only 5 per cent of the military favored a stringent recognition policy and 11 per cent favored a similar policy with respect to economic, military, and technical assistance.

Probably the most important finding in Table 2-B is that over

[16] These two questions were directly related to United States policy and were therefore considered to be sensitive by a few diplomats. Consequently, a larger number than usual either did not respond or answered meaningfully, but in a manner that did not fit any of the coding categories. These are reported in the "Other, No Answer" cells of Table 2-A-B-C.

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half of the military favored a United States policy that would make diplomatic recognition and aid at least a condition of meaningful assurance of free elections. It is somewhat surprising to find the representatives of the Latin American military establishments generally supporting a firm United States policy in the event of a military coup. These results may be viewed as further evidence of increasing professionalism among the armed forces of Latin America—a growing climate of opinion which regards overt, unconstitutional political activity to be outside the legitimate concern of the professional soldier.

When the responses are grouped according to the nature of the regime being represented by each diplomat (Table 2-C), important differences of opinion are again apparent. Of the respondents in the non-democratic group, 92 per cent represent regimes that resulted directly from military ousters of legally constituted civilian governments. We might expect, then, that the representatives of these governments in Washington would favor more lenient recognition and aid policies following a military coup. Indeed, the differences in opinion between the respondents from non-democratic regimes and those representing democratic regimes are striking.[17] Respondents representing governments classified as non-democratic overwhelmingly favored a lenient recognition and aid policy by the United States. Over 60 per cent of this group indicated that the most that need be expected of a de facto government following a military overthrow is an act of good faith respecting its country's international commitments. The remainder favored minimum assurances that free elections would be held as a condition of recognition and aid. Not one respondent in the non-democratic category favored a policy whereby the United States would withhold either aid or recognition contingent upon the restoration of civilian governments. The respondents from regimes classified as democratic took a significantly more severe view of the matters of recognition and aid following the toppling of a legally constituted government. They showed a far greater willingness to see aid and recognition used

[17] To repeat, there is little difference in the respondents' apparent willingness to see aid and recognition policies as common parts of a single whole; therefore, little meaningful shift of opinion occurs between the two items.

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as instruments in support of the democratic process. Nearly 80 per cent favored a policy that would at least require meaningful assurances that elections would be permitted. Furthermore, roughly one-third of these respondents were willing to have the United States pursue an extremely firm and vigorous policy similar to that followed by President Kennedy in Honduras and the Dominican Republic. In the event of a military overthrow of a civilian government, these diplomats would seem to welcome a policy whereby Washington would withhold both aid and recognition until a freely elected civilian government were restored.

II

Concern over the resurgence of militarism in Latin American politics and the expressed preference for a more discriminating recognition policy evident among diplomats in this study representing democratic regimes found formal expression at a meeting of hemispheric foreign ministers in 1963. After the back-to-back *golpes de estado* in the Dominican Republic and Honduras, the governments of Venezuela and Costa Rica proposed that the nations of the OAS consider rather stringent criteria before extending recognition to regimes that had originated through forceable overthrow of legally constituted governments. These provisions essentially required assurances that free elections would be permitted and a return to the regular constitutional order would be effected within a reasonably short period.[18]

North American academic observers by no means agree that it is desirable for the recognition and aid policies of the United States to embody an effective commitment to the democratic ideal. After a detailed analysis of the hypothetical internal dynamics of a coup d'etat, Martin Needler concludes that a credible United States threat to withhold recognition from a provisional government may be sufficient to deter military action.

> Since the success of the *coup* may well depend on its being joined by relatively few officers with a relatively weak commitment to its goals, it seems overwhelmingly likely that *any* deterrent to intervention—such as the suspension of military aid, or a credible threat not to recog-

[18] For a more complete discussion of this proposal, see Dozer, 131-34.

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> nize the new government—while not sufficient to deter the hard-core organizers of the *coup*, may nevertheless be sufficient to tip the scales against intervention for the crucial 'swing man,' or for the small group occupying the same tactical position, and thus may cause the *coup* to be abandoned, or to be launched without adequate support and thus to prove abortive.[19]

Edwin Lieuwen comes out firmly in support of a similar hard-line recognition policy. He sees the rising wave of militarism as a threat to the goals of the Alliance for Progress and urges a U.S. policy consistent on all fronts with the principles of human freedom and social justice:

> Admittedly, nonrecognition has so far failed to prevent unrepresentative military regimes. But this is no reason to abandon all efforts to encourage democracy. The attempt to do so by eschewing all overt cooperation, including military and economic aid, with counterrevolutionary military regimes has not been given a full and fair trial as yet. Its trial in Peru, the Dominican Republic and Honduras was abandoned too soon to have any effect.[20]

Professor Donald M. Dozer, arguing for a return to simple de facto considerations, presents a contrary view of the use of the traditional instruments of diplomacy to encourage democracy:

> The old-new policy of recognition, now being used for the purpose of ensuring the establishment and maintenance of 'democratic' governments dedicated to social 'reform' suggests the possibility of transforming the inter-American system into a modern Holy Alliance dedicated to a new form of legitimacy. . . . Such crass factors of physical security have been sublimated since World War II into a concern for ideological security which seemingly requires an American hemisphere of 'democratic' peoples and governments. For this purpose new uses are being found for the diplomatic process of recognition and non-recognition. As this process is applied in inter-American relations it necessarily derogates from the principle of sovereignty and equality of all states in the inter-American system and raises fundamental questions as to the right of one government or several governments to pass judgment on another government's use or abuse of power in domestic

[19] Needler, "Political Development," 625.
[20] Lieuwen, 145.

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matters and to do so by coercive measures of which non-recognition is one.[21]

Whatever one's views of the uses of United States aid and recognition to encourage the growth of democracy in the hemisphere and their ultimate juridical or political effects, it seems clear that the inconsistencies in policy since 1960 have been dysfunctional to hemispheric relations. Not only has the potential influence of the sort Professors Needler and Lieuwen might deem desirable been dissipated by virtue of vacillating diplomatic responses, but United States policy has appeared arbitrary and at times opportunistic. It is apparent that the problem of extra-constitutional military interventions will continue to pervade hemispheric politics in its apparent cyclical fashion.[22] The armed forces remain a powerful and richly endowed political element. Only with the evolution of stable political institutions to serve as effective countervailing forces may we expect the armed forces to be satisfied with a professionalized and apolitical institutional status. To the extent that successive United States administrations and policy-makers remain committed to the growth of viable representative democracy in Latin America, they will continue to face the dilemma of reconciling the active use of the economic and political resources of North America to sustain the democratic ideal with the durable commitment of the Americas to an effective doctrine of nonintervention.

[21] Dozer, 330, 335.
[22] Needler, "Political Development," 617-19.

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Book Reviews

War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression *edited by Morton Fried, Marvin Harris, and Robert Murphy. Garden City, New York: The Natural History Press, published for the American Museum of Natural History, 1968.—xxii, 262 pp. $6.95.*

With the advent of nuclear weapons, war has ceased to be the exclusive domain of military scientists and historians to be studied at leisure and from a safe distance and has claimed the interest of all students of human behavior, who are motivated not only by the intellectual challenges it offers but also by the awareness that it threatens to disrupt their own lives as members of a society continually teetering on the brink of a war that may destroy it. This book records a symposium organized in response to a petition of some 350 members of the American Anthropological Association who were concerned with the general failure of papers at annual meetings to deal with critical issues of contemporary society, notably the war in Vietnam. Although a symposium called under such auspices might be expected to consist chiefly of polemics, this is far from the case. Almost all the contributions meet high standards of clarity and objectivity, even when the emotional involvement of the participants is obvious.

As befits a profession to whom nothing human or even sub-human is alien, the contributors explore the topic from a wide range of vantage points, including, for example, a highly abstract systems analysis, a detailed field study of war patterns in a small South American Indian tribe, a consideration of the implications of primate fighting behavior for the understanding of its human counterpart, and an analysis of why the United States cannot rid itself of the draft.

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The contributors wrestle with most of the perennial questions, such as whether war is essentially a form of social pathology or a phase of the international system no more nor no less abnormal than peace and how far it is legitimate to draw analogies from animals to humans, from simple to complex societies, and from conventional wars to nuclear holocausts. These questions, of course, remain unresolved, but the discussions about them are illuminating.

All in all, this book confirms that, like all complex social phenomena, war escapes the domain of any one academic discipline—all have a contribution to make to its understanding and, one may hope, its eventual control. It also confirms that this is not likely to be achieved by any brilliant breakthrough; the best that can be hoped for is that partial solutions of one aspect or another will stave off the final holocaust long enough to permit the creation of new social and political institutions to replace it, and it is to this slow and halting process that students of human behavior are contributing. This book indicates that anthropologists are doing their share and accurately reflects the present status of what they have to offer with respect to conceptualization and information. Despite inevitable gaps and inadequacies, it is stimulating and informative. From a technical standpoint, the editing is excellent, the index is exceptionally good, and the margins contain ample room for the reader to jot down his reactions. One cannot ask for more.

JEROME D. FRANK
The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine

How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy *by Louis Henkin. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1968.—xii, 324 pp. $7.50.*

Among political scientists, particularly members of the "realist" school of thought in the United States, it has long been fashionable to derogate the role or value of international law. According to this view, international law is, at best, tangential to the really crucial issues affecting the relationships among nations; at worst, it is irrelevant to a world where the pursuit of power is the motivating force behind all political relationships. Louis Henkin, an experienced State Department official and currently Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University, has written a long needed reappraisal of the role and utility of international law in contemporary world affairs.

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The basic theme of this book is perhaps summed up in the author's contention that "a dynamic, developing world . . . has not abandoned traditional international law or radically departed from its principal tenets. The old infrastructure of principles, assumptions, and institutions has survived."

If, in the present context of global politics, Professor Henkin has a difficult case to make, it must be said that he makes it extremely well. He acknowledges most existing criticisms of the shortcomings and *lacunae* of international law; and he offers what are, in most instances, persuasive counter-arguments. In foreign policy, Henkin contends, "those who do not sense the law's significance are merely taking it for granted." To the skeptic who complains that nations seldom observe international law, he retorts: "there has not been a major challenge to the system of international law as a whole, to the bulk of its content, to its major norms." To the charge by the political "realists" that only a state's "national interest" induces it to observe international law, Henkin counters that the same national interest can, and usually does, motivate a nation to *comply with* international law's requirements. Nor has the emergence of the new nations in the postwar era basically obviated or undermined international law, although the law has obviously been affected by this phenomenon. New nations want greater influence in shaping international law; but, Henkin maintains, "it is not clear that the shape of that law will emerge very different from that of yesterday."

One of Henkin's most illuminating chapters deals with the pervasive and increasingly grave problem of "intervention" in the internal affairs of other states. He describes one major category of global conflicts as involving essentially "a competition in interventions." In his view, a reformulation of international law dealing with sundry new forms of intervention is a necessity.

Henkin's treatment of the role of law in modern international relations is, in general, perspicacious, persuasive, and interesting. Now and again (when he deals with concrete problems like the Suez Crisis of 1956), the reader may disagree with his interpretation or, more rarely, with his assertions of fact. Admittedly, his book has a thesis. If it is occasionally pushed too far, this may be excused in part by the realization that critics of present-day international law have tipped the scales much too far in the direction of derision and cyncism. Henkin's study ought to go far toward restoring an intelligent balance.

CECIL V. CRABB, JR.
Louisiana State University

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A Strategy of Peace in a Changing World *by Arthur N. Holcombe. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967.—332 pp. $7.95.*

This is a collection of nine papers published by the author at different times and on different occasions since 1949. The collection is divided into three Parts; each Part is provided with an introductory chapter and the whole collection is provided with a prologue and an epilogue. The book as presented is not a mere collection of papers, but is a unified work devoted to a single subject, world peace through a better world order. In Part I, the need for a better world order is examined from the national perspective of the United States. After drawing attention to the increasing concentration of power in the president in relation to the conduct of foreign affairs, the author suggests the desirability of evolving a system whereby the responsibility vested in the national executive is shared with a representative world body. The author rejects the views favoring a return to isolationism on the part of the United States and the pursuit of a "realistic" foreign policy based upon the primacy of national interests, and stresses the need for harmonizing the national special interests with the common interests of mankind. This process, he considers, should be attempted through the instrumentality of the United Nations.

In Part II, the experience of the United States in organizing a federal union is examined for the light it throws on the problems of constructing a world order. The following points are brought into clear focus: for maintaining peace and securing conformance to federal law, political processes rather than force should be relied on; force may be employed only against individual lawbreakers; a role of political parties is essential, to effectively coordinate the various factions engaged in legislative process and to mediate among different sections of the people.

Part III begins with a discussion of the views of Edwin Ginn, the founder of World Peace Foundation, on world peace and world government. In the last two chapters, the author undertakes a very scholarly and penetrating inquiry into the operation of the political processes in the United Nations and the possibility of managing them so as to secure due consideration of the universal interests of mankind. He stresses three imperatives of peace-keeping in the nuclear age: first, the development of a party system in the United Nations. The prevailing two-party system in the Security Council and the General Assembly is shown to be unsatisfactory, and a preference is expressed in favor of a multiparty system, consisting of at least as many political parties as there are permanent members of the Security Council. Second, he proposes the adaptation of the international law-making process to the needs of the nuclear age. The processes currently obtaining within the framework of the Security

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Council and General Assembly may continue to be employed, but a consensus reached at least among the nuclear powers must form the basis of legislative measures. Third, he proposes adaptation of the international administrative process to the demands of the time; in particular, there should be developed procedures to deal directly with individuals who may disturb peace. In the epilogue, there is a discussion of the problems of political organization of the world after disarmament and the close connection between arms control, national security, and world government. Even if some parts of the book may not be found now to have the same topical interest they must have possessed at the time of their publication, any student or statesman conversant with the complexities of the problems of a better world order would find the book highly illuminating and rewarding.

B. S. MURTY
Andhra University
India

A New Foreign Policy for the United States *by Hans J. Morgenthau. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1969.—xii, 252 pp. $6.95.*

Professor Morgenthau arrived before World War II as a refugee from Germany and moved from being professor at the University of Kansas City to distinguished posts at Chicago and City University of New York. He has not been alone (George Kennan did the same) in exposing to the American people their traditional weakness in foreign policy, especially moralism and Wilsonianism, and what it should do to attend to its national interest. Although he disclaims with vigor the name of political scientist—we should be artists, he early held, of demonic dynamism and moral serendipity (he has sobered since)—he is yet himself no mean exponent of the nature and implications of power as the key in political and especially foreign affairs and of the neglected study of the efficient and possible means to the many ends man may dream about. Professor Morgenthau sometimes seems to confuse his bogey of political science with the follies of misapplied "game theory" and computerizing theorists. I doubt whether (despite Weber) any political scientist worthy of the name thinks that he can produce a valid political theory of ends without judgments of value or that (measurable) intensity and consistency of political conviction is irrelevant.

Morgenthau most rightly (if perhaps not originally) argues that the

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Soviet Union must be regarded primarily not as the Islam or crusading force of an ideology—Communism can equally dynamize the latest Soviet enemy, Maoism, or Titoism—but as the traditional Russian imperial and colonialist Great Power. It has to be handled, in strategy or in *détente*, on this basis. Marx-Leninism remains a useful propaganda spearhead against vulnerable opponents, e.g. the United States, seduced by contemporary liberal anarchism. What Morgenthau's thesis occasionally seems to overlook (so concerned is he with power science) is that since Jefferson and de Tocqueville, the United States has itself been the spearhead of a "great experiment" and possesses a most useful asset, sometimes indeed recognized and equally sometimes lost in anarchist follies, of being the great liberal World Power. (What we have to reflect upon is that Communism will always win against Anarchism.)

In a chapter on "The United States and the Developing World," Professor Morgenthau is pretty blunt, if possibly imprudent: "As there are bums and beggars, so there are bum and beggar nations." The conclusion is that to foreign aid there should always be strings dictated by the national interest. This is indeed a policy which Gaullist France has steadily adopted. Even in humanitarian aid there is a case for stipulating population control. What is certainly true is that the strength of the domestic national economy must be put first, because upon this the financial aid is contingent, while "know-how" aid may have, as Gandhi foresaw, disruptive cultural effects. Not all the world desires to become Detroit or the Bronx.

A discussion of foreign policy inevitably includes reference to Vietnam, where Dr. Morgenthau seems to go beyond the admirable "on-the-spot" General Gavin. The political task is how to withdraw from this American Boer War (the Boers were not so nice as the liberals supposed) without giving an opening for the proclamation which many want to make of "a Port Arthur," a vast American rout which will destroy the balance of power. It should be relevant that Ho Chi Minh began life as an anti–Chinese nationalist. However, Morgenthau rightly suggests that Europe is more central for America than the Pacific. The Department of State has to awake from its six-year Vietnamese obsession. Here Morgenthau reverts to emphasis on one of the oldest technical ploys (known since Wolsey) of political science: the balance of power. He tries hard to contend that this has always been the real U.S. policy. It won't work. In the nineteenth century America was too weak to hold it. Whatever Woodrow Wilson may have done in distrusting "predominance," he certainly was unconscious of practicing the "balance" technique and vainly hoped he had destroyed it. The Union of Europe program seeks to ignore

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it but can not. The precise danger is that it, as "Third Force," may hold this balance. America cannot because, as one of the two Great Power protagonists, she is herself in the balance. The alternative proposition would be a "Roman" consolidation and *pax Romana* (with an East and West Rome). The Chinese won't like it.

It is here that Professor Morgenthau is quite at his best. As a matter of *Realpolitik* he wants to see an Atlantic Union (one hopes based upon "engineered" consensus; critics would say "camouflaged"). Morgenthau, perhaps too optimistically, blesses in the interim a United (north-western) Europe, cheerfully hoping that this previous "partnership" may not prove an anti-American Third Force. This is a most lucid and brilliant book, full of good judgments—and peppered with a few bad ones.

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN
London

Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty *by Daniel P. Moynihan. New York, The Free Press and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1969.—xxi, 218 pp. $5.95.*

In essence, this book is a case history of the community action aspects of the so-called War on Poverty. It is filled with the special perspectives that only one participating in the origins of the program could report. It is a highly contentious book, written from a particular point of view and, I am sure, contains "interpretations" that many would and do dispute. It is well written and, on the whole, fun to read and highly informative.

Moynihan starts his study by attributing the intellectual origins of the community action program to the *anomie* hypotheses of Weber, Durkheim, and their successors. In particular, the "opportunity" theory of juvenile delinquency, as propounded by Cohen, Miller, Cloward, Ohlin, and others, is viewed as influencing the development of the community action concepts. Thus, community action is based on an unproved hypothesis, in Moynihan's view, that anti-social behavior is largely the result of individuals "resorting to desperately deviate and dangerous measures in order to conform to the routine goals of the larger society."

Support for the community action program was not limited, however, to the strictly intellectual. As Moynihan points out, some (e.g., Paul Ylvisaker) saw community action as a means to focus the energies and

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activities of many existing government agencies upon the new and quite particular problems of post-World War II urban America. Others saw community action and particularly "maximum feasible participation" by those to be served as a device to circumvent white southern institutions in order to better channel federal aid to needy southern Negroes. Still others, mainly in the Bureau of the Budget, favored community action as a promising device for achieving some coordination of new programs in urban areas.

With such good auspices why did the program not prosper? The major difficulty, as Moynihan points out at length, is that no one had thought through the practical and political implications. The community action agencies tended to become foci for various kinds of activities aimed at undermining the power of existing urban political institutions. In particular, as the community action program coalesced with the desire of urban blacks to have more say about their communities, the community action agencies, funded by the federal government, became organized centers of opposition to many mayors and city hall bureaucracies. The great irony of it all to Moynihan was that this essentially meant pitting Negroes, by and large supporters of the Democratic Party, against mayors who were also members of that party.

Moynihan's most serious charge against community action, however, is that it lost a great opportunity. He feels that substantial reform is usually only possible at a few critical moments in legislative history. If the particular moment allocated to community action had been allocated to employment or income maintenance programs instead, the nation would have been considerably better served in Moynihan's view.

It is one thing, of course, to say that other programs might have served the purposes of the War on Poverty better than the community action program and quite another to attribute to community action most of the political ills of urban America in the 1960s, as Moynihan comes close to doing at several points. One might suspect that a transition in urban politics was well underway, and perhaps badly needed in many cases, long before the community action program appeared. The community action program may have accelerated these difficult and often highly traumatic processes, but it seems doubtful that it single-handedly motivated these transitions. In short, the community action programs were perhaps a catalyst, but not necessarily a basic element in this process of political change.

Some small act of faith is required, moreover, to assert with great confidence that if we had not had community action we would have had an employment or income maintenance program. Approximately

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$500 million of *new* federal money was apparently available for program innovation in the poverty area at the time the community action decision was made. That sum does not buy much in income maintenance or even employment programs (though it might have made a significant beginning on the latter).

To his case study, Moynihan appends one final chapter, "Social Science and Social Policy," in which he attempts to sum up the lessons for social science research and method that one might derive from the experience with the community action program. From a scholarly standpoint, this is easily the most important and interesting chapter in the book. The major lesson, as Moynihan sees it, is that "the role of social science lies not in the formulation of social policy, but in the measurement of its results." He even goes so far as to insist that social scientists should not be interested in causal hypotheses; rather they should simply establish "a set of understandings as to what is associated with what."

This is clearly rather disturbing advice. Measurement, data generation and collection are usually not done well without some guidance from theoretical concepts. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how a scientific basis for social studies could ever develop if one were *not* to engage in hypothesis testing. To develop social policy on an ad hoc, pragmatic, or experiential basis would repeat, in fact, much of what was wrong in the community action program. One can therefore guess that Moynihan really does not mean to be quite as anti-theoretical as some of his protestations might suggest. Rather, his real complaint, and almost certainly a valid one, would seem to be that sociologists have not done as much empirical testing and sorting of their various competing hypothesis as they should have *prior* to influencing and convincing others to implement policies based upon these hypotheses.

Indeed, Moynihan himself seems to be of two minds on this question of method. Specifically, one page after his appeal for limiting social sciences to a determination of what is "associated with what," he suggests that: "This hardly precludes experimentation. On the contrary, as techniques of evaluation evolve, outright laboratory type investigations of social issues are likely to become more frequent, and certainly more useful."

The obvious question which the practicing social scientist must ask in light of these rather conflicting recommendations is: "OK, which should it be?"

JOHN R. MEYER
Yale University
National Bureau of Economic Research

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Dilemmas of Urban America *by Robert C. Weaver. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965.—ix, 138 pp. $3.50.*

The Urban Complex: Human Values in Urban Life *by Robert C. Weaver. New York, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1964.—xii, 297 pp. $4.95.*

Dr. Robert C. Weaver, who retired as Secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to become a university professor has long been at home in both scholarly and government circles. His government career has stretched over thirty-five years, and he made a firm place in academia with his two early major books, *Negro Labor, A National Problem* (New York, 1946) and *The Negro Ghetto* (New York, 1948).

He has written profusely during much of the period between publication of that pair and the two published during his term of office as Administrator of the United States Housing and Home Finance Agency, and also subsequently during his two years as Secretary. The speech-making which necessarily occupies much of the time of an Administrator and Cabinet Secretary has been accompanied by methodical placement of his writings in journals of scholarship and public affairs, and his work has frequently been included in anthologies on urban problems.

But Weaver is his own best anthologist. His *Urban Complex* is a skillful blending of previously published material, including twelve articles published between 1955 and 1963, as well as six book-sections referred to as "previously put in the public domain." Essentially, this volume restates the issues enunciated in *Negro Labor* and *The Negro Ghetto* for the current setting of much greater governmental participation in housing and city building. The first pair of volumes announced the theme of the Negro in modern America as an arrival in the city, attempting to make his home but confronted by obstacles imposed by business and supported by government—especially race-restrictive covenants which prevented the normal march toward outlying housing. The *Urban Complex* sounded the alarm that the newer governmental aids to housing and city renewal were becoming additional barriers. That such a book could appear well after critic had become Administrator made quite a stir and attracted much comment on his frankness.

Dilemmas of Urban America, his three Godkin lectures delivered at Harvard on three successive evenings in March 1965, is a better, more unified book. Like the *Urban Complex*, it portrays the maze of public law and administration bearing on the Negro's hopes to break out of the

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ghetto. But Weaver is the accomplished expert in this volume, dealing with highly technical dilemmas—for instance, "In an effort to achieve two laudable objectives, low-income and moderate-income housing on the one hand, and integration on the other, there is the danger that neither will be accomplished." Of the three chief chapters, one is now a classic statement on "new communities," one on "urban renewal," and the final one states the dilemmas of race in urban housing and planning policy. The first is a technician's warning that much remains to be done before American institutions will encourage the provision of "new towns" such as long have been an ideal in city planning and a warning that the concept itself has limited if genuine value. The chapter on renewal is a skillful exposure of the exaggerations and out-of-date data used in currently fashionable criticisms.

Clearly, Weaver's whole scholarly career to date unfolds an early commitment to the Negro's housing in American cities, a theme which has, however, been broadened and kept up to date with a rapidly changing situation. The first part of *The Negro Ghetto* was itself a concise review of the literature on the subject prior to 1948. But the resolution of conflicts through effective use of technical means is now perhaps more difficult than ever. The *Dilemmas*, for the first time in Weaver's writings, refers to development which "had it happened a generation ago," it "might have offered hope." In a time when others can no longer "react with detached logic," we shall need Weaver's.

GEORGE S. DUGGAR
University of Pittsburgh

Liberty and Authority: Early American Political Ideology, 1689-1763 *by Lawrence H. Leder. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1968. —169 pp. $5.50.*

Based upon an examination of "all materials in print—newspapers, magazines, books, broadsides, pamphlets, sermons, brochures, and so forth—which . . . issued from American presses . . . and . . . were written by Americans" between 1689 and 1763, this brief and ambitious volume is intended to present a comprehensive description of American political thought during those years. Despite the thoroughness of the research, the result is unsatisfactory. In large measure, the disappointing character of the volume can be traced to the author's failure to treat

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many of the more important problems subsumed under the concept political ideology. By eschewing any explicit concern with either the origins or genealogy of American political ideas or the several contexts in which they were used, the author has consciously chosen not to consider such important questions as the extent to which they were either similar to or different from traditional or contemporaneous British and European notions and their relationship to the socio-political process in the colonies. Even more significant limitations derive from the author's decision to restrict his discussion almost entirely to issues that are either conventional (and now mostly quite dated) organizing categories for discussions of political thought—freedom of the press, the state of nature, the origin of government, relationships between church and state, the function of constitutions, and concepts of individual rights and liberties—or certain explicit problems common to colonial political life—the nature of the British and colonial constitutions and of the empire. Because he has also chosen merely "to try to recapture the ideas of the eighteenth century rather than perform an autopsy on them," this decision has effectively prevented him from penetrating below the surface of colonial political thought and either describing or analyzing many, perhaps most, of its most basic assumptions and underlying problems. Thus, the author tells us almost nothing about colonial ideas concerning the nature of man, the process of social and political change, the relationship between the governors and the governed as well as between the governors and the government, the moral imperatives of political life, representation, consent, parties, the franchise, the preferred qualities of rulers, the role of interest, the proper distribution of power, the social foundations of politics, the nature of the common good—subjects we know to have been of major importance to seventeenth and eighteenth century Anglo-American political thought from the recent studies of segments of that thought by Bernard Bailyn, Richard Buel, Jr., H. Trevor Colbourn, C. B. Macpherson, Harvey Mansfield, Jr., J. G. A. Pocock, Caroline Robbins, and others.

The author's failure even to confront these subjects both raises the question of how familiar he is with this recent scholarship and makes it difficult to evaluate what appear to be his two central hypotheses: first, that Americans developed "a generally uniform . . . ideology which met" their needs prior to 1763 and, second, that that ideology was so "inadequate" to meet the challenge presented by Britain between 1763 and 1776 that Americans were forced to develop a new one, epitomized by the appeal to the natural rights of man in the Declaration of Independence and representing a sharp ideological discontinuity in American po-

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litical life. In view of Bernard Bailyn's thorough and convincing demonstration of the underlying unities between colonial and Revolutionary American political thought in *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,* the second hypothesis appears extremely doubtful indeed.

This volume does add some details to what is already known about the several aspects of early American political ideology it discusses and, more importantly, calls attention to a considerable number of hitherto unused political writings in colonial newspapers. In general, however, it s very much like the author says American political ideology was in 1763—"full of gaps, and inadequate as a tool" for understanding the intellectual content of early American politics.

JACK P. GREENE
The Johns Hopkins University

American Science in the Age of Jackson *by George H. Daniels. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1968.—xii, 282 pp. $7.95.*

Professor Daniels set for himself the task of writing an intellectual history of American science between the years 1815 and 1845. The author first sought to identify the "scientific community" in America during these years. After a survey of articles in sixteen scientific journals he arrived at a group of fifty-six men who were the most frequent contributors and therefore, presumably, the most active scientists in the country. In his first two chapters he characterizes this group and concludes that these four commonly accepted generalizations about the period are *false:*

> 1. Natural history, as opposed to the physical sciences, was the dominant research interest and, as such, accounted for the overwhelming bulk of American scientific work. 2. Science was dominated by interest in the practical, as opposed to the merely theoretical. 3. There was a marked absence of specialization during the first half of the century. 4. Science was still largely a pursuit of amateurs, whose main interests, or sources of livelihood, were elsewhere (p. 19).

The concluding seven chapters are concerned with what Daniels believes to be an intellectual portrait of the scientific community just defined. He asserts that up to about 1820 American scientists were ardent Baconians, that is, they made a fetish of raw data, worshiped taxonomy, and reviled hypotheses. The scientists allied themselves with and drew heavily upon evangelical religion and Scottish common-sense philos-

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ophy to guide and explain their work. By 1820, however, so many facts had piled up that scientists, hard-pressed to make sense of the jumble, sought refuge in either rash and speculative theorizing or in the denial that knowledge beyond the data itself was possible. In the late eighteen-twenties some scientists seized upon "analogy" as a method of saving a by now tattered Baconianism while still allowing for some generalization from the raw data. Daniels characterizes the age as one of "intellectual ambiguity," and his study certainly supports such a conclusion.

This is an important book without being a really good one. It is important because the first two chapters are a pioneer attempt to make a quantitative analysis of a community which has always been dealt with qualitatively on the basis of a very small and atypical sample. The fifty-five biographical sketches appended are particularly useful. Similarly, the last seven chapters try to get at what scientists thought they were doing, rather than how close they came to believing what we do. At the same time the book has several major weaknesses.

The worst is that the two parts of the book bear little relation to each other. Some of the men whose ideas figure most prominently in the second part (such as Samuel Tyler and Francis Wayland) are not among the fifty-six scientists he identifies as being in the scientific community of the period. Again, although he calls the welding together of a "community of such professionals" "the most significant development in nineteenth-century American science," no effort is made to relate the development of professionalism to the "intellectual" development of that same group of men.

Daniels' book is the opening assault on the accepted picture of science in antebellum America. This first attack has failed to carry the battle, but it has brought forward some of the methods and insights which will, I believe, eventually win the war.

CARROLL PURSELL
University of California, Santa Barbara

"The Best Men": Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age *by John G. Sproat. New York, Oxford University Press, 1968.—ix, 356 pp. $7.50.*

Mugwump reformers came primarily from upper and upper middle class groups who feared that party bosses, ethnic minorities originally from Ireland and southern and eastern Europe, the radical left, and labor

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unions threatened America's survival. These gilded age crusaders sought to resist these forces by upholding the canons of laissez-faire liberalism, by arguing for repression of leftist movements and organized labor, and by demanding civil service reform to curb political corruption and party patronage. Uneasy in the industrial era, the conservative "liberals" identified the decline of their own status with the nation's future and projected their own defeat into a threatened disintegration of the republic. Articulate, verbose, and intellectual, their story has been told many times. Geoffrey Blodgett, Ari Hoogenboom, Kermit Vanderbilt, Earle D. Ross, Joseph Dorfman, Sidney Fine, and the biographers of Mugwump leaders have analyzed the reformers' strategies, influences, and ideologies. *The Best Men* is largely a clearly written, balanced summary of material and interpretations brought forth in previous studies. With the exception of a stimulating discussion of the transformation of abolitionists and Radical Republicans into conservative civil service reformers, Sproat retreads the well surveyed ground of Mugwump organization, policies, and social attitudes. Too many paragraphs paraphrase the well known ideas of Edwin L. Godkin, Richard T. Ely, Henry Adams, Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, George William Curtis, and other prominent figures of the period. Too often the technique of historical overkill is applied by quoting three or four contemporary authorities to prove or describe beliefs and concepts that previous research has made common knowledge. Surely it is now an elaboration of the obvious to summarize at length Mugwump views about economic individualism, the strike, the sanctity of private property, and the divinity of the gold standard.

Sproat's subject has been too frequently investigated to yield returns from traditional methods of historical description. We know what genteel reformers thought about the major issues of the day. We even know something about their motives and the reasons for their failure, but we would know more if future students of the movement ask these questions: What, if any, distinctions existed between patrician reformers and new men in the movement? Why was Mugwump reform concentrated in such dissimilar cities as New York and Boston? Why was it not formidable in other old Atlantic cities with traditional upper classes? What is the source of its ambivalence regarding industrial capitalism? Why did liberal reformers, such as the Adams brothers and Charles Eliot Norton, who considered themselves vocational failures and worried about their status, differ in social views from fellow civil service advocates like Charles William Eliot and Thomas Wentworth Higginson? Why did some patricians become reformers while others remained

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party loyalists? How did genteel liberals respond to the modern developments of bureaucracy, organization, power, and rationalized efficiency. Geoffrey Blodgett in *The Gentle Reformers* provided the deepest insight into Mugwumpery because he used some of these dilemmas as categories of analysis. Unfortunately Sproat has not followed Blodgett's promising beginnings.

FREDERIC COPLE JAHER
University of Illinois

American Catholics and the Roosevelt Presidency, 1932-1936 *by George Q. Flynn. Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1968.—xvi, 272 pp. $7.50.*

The New Deal was an era of advancement in national politics both for individual Catholics and the Catholic establishment. It helped bring the transition between two landmarks, the nomination of the first Catholic, Al Smith, for the presidency in 1928 and the election of the first Catholic, John F. Kennedy, in 1960. Less tangibly, it helped lower the barriers between Catholics and those of other faiths, and helped bring them more fully into participation and concern with national affairs. This is the purport of George Q. Flynn's solid, thoroughly researched monograph on Catholics and the Roosevelt presidency.

It was a disappointment to Catholics that Smith did not again receive the nomination in 1932, that depression year when he scarcely could have failed to win. Yet most of them rallied firmly to the support of the Episcopalian Roosevelt, who enthusiastically incorporated them in his New Deal coalition. In one of his campaign speeches he cited the famous encyclical of Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*, and in subseqnent years, as the New Deal unfolded, did nothing to discourage the view of some Catholic liberals that he was acting in the spirit of the encyclical.

Basic to Roosevelt's incorporation of Catholics in the New Deal alliance was the statistical fact that a heavy proportion of them were among the underprivileged who benefited from the New Deal program. He also courted and won the enthusiastic support of some of the most powerful church leaders, especially George, Cardinal Mundelein, and the most prominent figure in Catholic welfare, Father John Ryan. Lay Catholics received high appointments. Incredibly enough, James A. Farley was the first Catholic to receive a cabinet post in the twentieth century. Catholics had received only one judicial appointment in twenty-

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five in the Republican era; during the New Deal they received one in four. Thus, Roosevelt built strong bonds of loyalty among Catholic Americans. While there were such famous lay defectors from the New Deal as Al Smith and clerical opponents such as Father Coughlin, in 1936, Roosevelt received 70 per cent or more of the Catholic vote.

It would have been interesting for Flynn to have distinguished in more detail between those issues in which Catholic leaders reacted as a cross-section of Americans and those in which they reflected their religious beliefs. Some of this is apparent in his study, which examines the gingerly fashion in which the President avoided serious trouble with the Church as he negotiated the recognition of Russia and declined to take a strong stand on behalf of Catholic interests in Mexico. (A third issue, which Flynn has not discussed, was Catholic alarm over the Republican government's politics in Spain during the early 1930's.) Again, one can separate out as a reaction based on church policy the vigorous opposition to the Child Labor Amendment because it might open the way to government control over the education of youth.

There is much of factual value in this monograph, and basically it is sound in interpretation, although Flynn stays close to his notes and forces part of the task of synthesis and evaluation upon the reader. One wonders, for example, how the ascendancy of the Catholics during these years compared with that of the Jews.

FRANK FREIDEL
Harvard University

American Railroad Politics, 1914-1920: Rates, Wages, and Efficiency *by Austin K. Kerr. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968.—viii, 250 pp. $7.95.*

This is a clear and thorough analysis of the formation of federal policies for the railroads of the United States from 1914 to 1920. The author's thesis is that there was an "essential political continuity between the Progressive Era system of deciding railroad policy and the regulatory system redefined by the Transportation Act of 1920" (p. 4). This is to deny the "prevailing assumptions" that World War I was a " 'watershed' dividing the Progressive Era . . . from the pro-business, 'conservative' decade which followed" (p. 4). The author does not provide precise criteria as to how much change or whether it is a reversal of direction which counts as a "break" or makes a "watershed." He

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shows that many of the same interest groups that had guided policy before 1914 into the mold of commission regulation continued to do so again in 1920. In particular they were able to reject a new alternative of nationalization proposed by certain labor groups. The question remains as to whether the new terms of regulation of a continuing private operation were different enough to constitute a "watershed." From the point of view of economic analysis of basic market structure, certainly the 1920 Act made major changes. For one, new entry into the railroad business was essentially foreclosed except in respect to a relatively few undeveloped parts of the country. Withdrawal from the business in the whole sense of abandonment of a line of track was no longer permitted without federal approval. Also the earlier restraints on reduction of competition were replaced by positive means of eliminating competition, with the I.C.C. empowered to approve such steps under the provisions of the Act. If such market structure changes had been provided for in any other industry they would easily have qualified for designation as a "watershed" of some sort. The fact that the railroad industry was already under federal regulation does not make the magnitude of the changes any less startling. But a greater error in the continuity argument lies in the underestimation of the significance of the federal entrance in the labor relations field of railroading. The first step came with the Adamson Act of 1916 making eight hours the basis for the standard day's wage. From 1918 to 1920 under federal control of railroads, opportunity was provided for more widespread union organization and the strengthening of unions in collective bargaining. Finally the 1920 Act marked the beginning of formal federal involvement in company-labor relationships. A measure of the significance of all this was that while in the years 1912 to 1914 wages averaged 43 per cent of railroad revenues and interest together with dividends averaged 27 per cent, after the period under discussion, for 1921 through 1923 for instance, the proportions were 48 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. This was a major change, a break in continuity but not, as "prevailing assumptions" would have it, "pro-business." The author gives emphasis to the advocacy of "scientific management" by a variety of groups. As scientific management is ordinarily defined it is hard to support this. It is true that Brandeis had dramatically called for it and professionals in the field actively proclaimed its virtues. But in the legislative lobbies there was no significant effort to have it prescribed in regulatory policies nor did the I.C.C. attempt to enforce its adoption. The widespread ideas about efficiency were not about detailed work loads, planning of processes and layouts, and the like. The ideas were about restructuring the industry by reducing the number of firms, equal-

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izing their relative strength, and providing joint operations, all reducing the extent of competition. As the author states, there was much said to the point that the industry's competition was "wasteful" and that rationalization would improve efficiency. But there is no analysis of whether all this was to a major degree directed toward greater market control hoping for higher profits. In the end, the results of the restructuring, considerable as it was, were submerged by more powerful forces not really seen by the policy-makers of the time, namely, vastly increased labor power and new means of transportation that were just coming into being.

KENT T. HEALY
Yale University

Anatomy of the Law *by Lon L. Fuller. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.—v, 122 pp. $4.50.*

Law in a Changing America *edited by Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1968.—xiii, 207 pp. $5.95.*

The Supreme Court and Political Freedom *by Samuel Krislov. New York, The Free Press, and London, Collier-Macmillan, 1968.—x, 239 pp. $5.95.*

The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform *by Archibald Cox. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968.—vii, 144 pp. $4.95.*

These four books about the law—all different from one another and all of good quality—raise, when read together in mid-1969, some deep and troublesome questions about the American legal system. A quiet crisis has overtaken earlier optimism about the role of law in this country, and particularly its capacity to rectify pressing civic wrongs. In the twilight of the Warren Court reflective and angry men are asking whether the course of decisions in the Supreme Court will continue to favor disestablished interests, and, far more important, whether it really will make much difference.

The first question is largely predictive: will the Burger Court of the nineteen-seventies respond imaginatively and humanely to its legal challenges? The answer will not be known or knowable for many years, and the uncertainties of judicial appointments compound the

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difficulty for any would-be seer. The second question concerns the actual impact of the Court's efforts on the nation's titanic problems. A noted constitutional lawyer recently observed that the legal process "does not touch" our chief concerns—war, poverty, race, and population pressure. Actually, this was something of an overstatement, because the Supreme Court has exerted influence in each of these areas in recent years. The fact remains, however, that growing numbers of the blacks, the poor, and the young are turning from the courts to the streets, from the traditional (or at least the accepted) methods of change-seeking to disruption, confrontation, and violence. Whether or not this alienation is justified may turn out to be less important than the fact that it has occurred. This is the context in which I read the four books under review.

The two volumes that deal most directly with the recent achievements of the Supreme Court are those by Professors Cox and Krislov. Mr. Cox writes with the special qualifications of a senior law professor and former solicitor general, and he writes for the cogniscenti. He trenchantly analyzes decisions on civil rights, criminal procedure, free speech and association, and voting rights. A participant in some of the cases, he reviews their historical and legal context, the constitutional policy choices that confronted the Court in the cases, and their doctrinal potential. I know of no better summary of the chief themes enunciated by the Warren Court.

Mr. Krislov, a political scientist by training, writes from a different perspective. He views the Court over a period of decades, evaluating its performance on issues relating to "political freedom," particularly those produced by the delphic First Amendment, which bars Congress from "abridging the freedom of speech." Krislov reviews the holdings of the key cases and their implications for the Supreme Court's role in our scheme of government. This book, also solid intellectual fare, has the distinction of touching on some topics ordinarily slighted, such as day-to-day enforcement of constitutional commands and the training of police for this practical assignment.

In turning from where we have been to where we are going, we reach the American Assembly volume edited by Geoffrey Hazard, the executive director of the American Bar Foundation. This is a series of essays written mainly by eminent professors and practitioners at a foundation-supported national conference called to consider "goals for the legal profession in the years ahead in the light of the social changes of the present and recent past." The essay topics range widely and include new patterns of social and political structure, private decision-making, protection of individual rights, legal regulation and

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economic analysis, legal education, and others. The book has received some scholarly criticism for the failure of the essays (and the conference itself) to clarify goals, identify meaningful trends in society and the law, to probe deeply, and to represent non-establishment positions. Like most collections, the book is of mixed quality, but there is little in it that will mollify or encourage those who are disenchanted with the law or questioning its potency for social change.

Anatomy of the Law is written by perhaps our major legal philosopher, Lon Fuller of Harvard Law School. It deals with recurring questions such as the differing roles of legislatures and courts, the purposes of the criminal law, and the difference between "law in books and law in action." Lucidly written, informed by well-chosen concrete illustrations of theoretical points, it serves well as a clear (though not simple) introduction to legal institutions. It also shares with the other three books an optimism about the capacity of reasonable, well-motivated men to cope with difficult legal problems of public importance.

Not too long ago such optimism was widespread, and these volumes reflect the climate that then prevailed. Already there has been a detectable change in the attitudes of the disaffected, and I suspect that we shall shortly be reading somewhat less about the achievements of the courts and the legal profession and more about the limits of the law. But these four fine books will not be displaced, they will merely be pushed back a little on the shelf.

NORMAN DORSEN
New York University School of Law

Splendid Isolation: A Study of Ideas Concerning Britain's International Position and Foreign Policy During the Later Years of the Third Marquis of Salisbury *by Christopher Howard. London, Melbourne, Toronto, Macmillan and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967.—xv, 120 pp. $6.50.*

The Illusion of Permanence: British Imperialism in India *by Francis G. Hutchins. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967—xv, 217 pp. $6.50.*

Christopher Howard's *Splendid Isolation* is subtitled "a study of ideas concerning Britain's international position and foreign policy during the later years of the Third Marquis of Salisbury." It is a short exercise which sets out to discover whether the "policy" of "splendid isolation" was a reality, whether it is appropriate to call it the "traditional" British policy

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or not, and whether it was upheld by Salisbury. Howard draws upon a sizeable collection of quotations from the writings and speeches of contemporary statesmen, with rather ambiguous results. But he does not attempt to come to serious grips with the questions or to suggest why they might be important ones to ask; the result, consequently, is less an analysis than a lengthy footnote.

The Illusion of Permanence, on the other hand, is a thoughtful, stimulating, and well-argued effort to trace the sources of the "ideology of permanence" which saw the British governors of India, as the nineteenth century progressed, increasingly convinced that the British raj would never end. Francis Hutchins finds among the sources of this ideology the missionizing efforts of the Evangelicals, who believed that England must bear the burden of rule and reform in India in expiation for the sin of conquest, and in the reforming activities of the Utilitarians, who aimed to bring India closer to the English middle class model. The "cult of good conduct," one of the surrogate, secular religions of Victorian England, in which Duty itself became a religion, made Englishmen value India, Hutchins suggests, for the travails it imposed, as a testing ground of character, an extension of the public school atmosphere, to prove English moral superiority. As the century progressed, no longer were the "deficiencies" of Indian character traced to religious or social causes, but to considerations of climate and race which would prove unresponsive to efforts at reformation. All this gave rise to a view of Indian character as verging on the Satanic and a faith that the continuance of English rule was essential to Indian progress.

The Mutiny of 1857 hardened these English views of Indian society and helped the spread of a "popular imperialism." India was removed entirely from the direction of the Company (Hutchins reminds us of the disinterested motives behind J. S. Mill's defense of the Company's rules), and the Company's special concern for Indian interests, as well as its view of itself as self-liquidating, were both set aside. The Englishman of the middle classes who chose to make his career in India did so because it opened to him the life of an aristocrat which would be impossible for him at home. The interests of the Anglo-Indians became paramount, and every Englishman was regarded as a "master" in India, providing the basis for racial elitism. The new forces of technology, Hutchins shows us, were harnessed so as to widen the chasm between master and subject, and the social-Darwinist analysis made the chasm appear permanent and irremediable.

The Englishmen who came to India in the latter part of the century, we are told, came as refugees from the triumph of democracy at home and found in India justification for a confidence in aristocracy, or, at

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least, in the rule of a "disinterested" and "expert" bureaucracy. With the twentieth century, there came an increasing recognition of the crucial role played by India in making the Empire powerful, and the decision was taken that the "orientalization" of British rule, i.e., the wholehearted support of the Indian princes and the pageantry associated with their rule and of a decadent native landed aristocracy and caste system, was necessary to the maintenance of the raj. The whole edifice, Hutchins concludes, was destroyed by the twin forces of Indian nationalism and English democracy.

The book must be seen as a lengthy essay, whose suggestions deserve further exploration, rather than as a definitive treatment of its very complex subject. It is, however, a very useful beginning, indeed.

BERNARD SEMMEL
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Angels in Marble: Working Class Conservatives in Urban England *by Robert McKenzie and Allan Silver. Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1968.—ix, 295 pp. $11.00.*

This long-awaited book on British working-class Conservative voters meets the high expectations set by admirers of Professor McKenzie, author of the standard work on British parties, and of Professor Silver, his American co-author and fellow political sociologist. The value of their study, begun in 1958, is not diminished by the slightly earlier publication of Eric Nordlinger's useful and interesting work on much the same subject. The perspective here is different, since the authors do not share Nordlinger's broad theoretical concern with the relation of working-class attitudes to the maintenance of a stable democracy. Instead, McKenzie and Silver concentrate their analysis on the nature of the working class's contribution to the impressive electoral success of the Conservative party in recent British politics. Like Nordlinger, they employ the survey method, but with intensive reinterviewing of a larger portion of the original sample. The reinterviewing provides numerous direct quotations illustrating working-class thought and attitudes. Findings from the 1958 sample survey are reinforced by subsequent testing in a 1963 survey.

More striking in distinguishing the McKenzie-Silver volume is its strong historical focus. This is most apparent in an excellent chapter of fifty-five pages on the various Conservative appeals to working-class voters since the mass enfranchisement of a century ago. But a sense of historical development also pervades the analysis of contemporary voting

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behavior, particularly in estimating the changing nature of Conservative working-class support. That support, the authors make plain (as did Nordlinger), comes from two different groups—one whose attitudes are deferential and another whose attitudes are secular (or pragmatic, in Nordlinger's terminology). The latter group, younger and with higher incomes, is somewhat larger and evidently capable of increasing, or of decreasing, in response to circumstances and policies. Thus KcKenzie and Silver suggest that by becoming more dependent on secular working-class voters, rather than on deferentials, the Conservative party may find that its electoral fortunes fluctuate more widely than they have during the long period when the party counted on about one third of the total working-class vote. Yet the authors also stress that always in the past, even in the late nineteenth century, the Conservative appeal has been to seculars as well as to deferentials. McKenzie and Silver do not appear to doubt the likelihood of continued Conservative political success in attracting enough working-class voters to win elections much as they have during the first hundred years of mass suffrage. This sense of continuity is meaningfully conveyed by the book's title, excerpted from a commemorative sentence in *The Times* on Disraeli's discernment of "the Conservative workingman as the sculptor perceives the angel prisoned in a block of marble."

Except for a few parenthetical references, the study is devoted exclusively to British experience (really to English experience, since Scotland and Wales were outside the sample survey). Although this encourages the inference that there is something special about both the British Conservative party and the British (or English) working class, it remains possible that in other Western democracies parties of the moderate right would be found to have similar appeals for working-class voters both in quantity and in deferential-secular characteristics. The possibility is worth examination.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin

Burghley: Tudor Statesman, 1520-1598 *by B. W. Beckingsale. London, Melbourne, Toronto, Macmillan and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967.—x, 340 pp.*

A mass of detail has been collected and systematized about Tudor government and finance, diplomacy and foreign affairs, religion and law. This is well and good, even if Tudor scholars often remake Henrician

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and Elizabethan England into Camelot, where only wisdom, happiness, and nothing evil prevails. But pitifully little is known specifically about the personalities of men of even the first rank in society. Their political styles, administrative techniques, and responses to the crucial issues of their day tell us next to nothing of the flesh and blood people who shaped the destiny of England. The kind of men they were had a great deal to do with how they shaped their age. Lord Burghley is such a man. Comparatively few biographies of him have been attempted, doubtless because he is sufficiently complex a person to intimidate authors. The senior lecturer in modern history at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne is to be commended for his courage and obvious abilities. He must also be congratulated for restoring humanity to history—for bringing the whole man Burghley back to life, and not simply repeating the details of his administration. What this biography lacks by way of a felicitous style, an unimpeachable organizational skill, or a balanced view of religious dissent is more than compensated for by the thoroughness of research, the clarity of expression, and the overall perspective.

It is problematical whether the author has advanced or retarded the art of biography by dividing his book into two parts. The first part, about two-thirds of the book, describes Cecil the administrator. There is nothing essentially new in this section, although it does explain Burghley's career better than any other account. The second part focuses on various ancillary aspects of Cecil's life, particularly such interests as patronage of learning and the arts and his role as family patriarch, petty capitalist, and aristocratic landowner. The last two chapters of the book are a particularly spirited and imaginative reconstruction of the Elizabethan aristocrat *par excellence*. Beckingsale raises important, speculative questions, for which there are not always answers, but the questions themselves are often more meaningful than the answers.

There are certain overall weaknesses in this otherwise admirable biography. It is dislocating to readers, for instance, to attempt to follow a strictly chronological sequence of events involving Burghley's work in domestic, foreign, and personal affairs. This pattern of development makes it next to impossible to see the evolution of policy and destroys historical continuity. It must be asked, how did Burghley shape policy in the various, significant offices which he held—master of requests, master of wards, principal secretary, treasurer. Mr. Beckingsale also has the annoying habit of reading too much into Burghley's early experiences as they related to his later career (e.g., military expertise based on his brief sojourn with Somerset in Scotland in 1547). The author likewise has incorrectly sided with Burghley in misinterpreting the charac-

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ter of Roman Catholic dissent under Elizabeth, in contradiction to massive evidence to the contrary developed by recent historians. The tenor of Beckingsale's remarks about the Catholic threat borders on the Whiggish view, which is now thoroughly discredited. It is likewise hard to believe that Cecil relied quite as heavily as Beckingsale asserts on Providence or on the influence of his puritan second wife, Mildred.

Finally, would the author think again on these questions: who are the "puritan extremists" in the 1563 parliament? Is gout caused by overwork? Did not Burghley formulate economic policy after all? Were ecclesiastics really excluded by the Tudors from participation in secular government? Did not Cecil actually compromise his principles by working for Queen Mary Tudor early in her reign? Can Burghley really be given virtually all the credit for making the Elizabethan settlement? Were Tudor Englishmen so sensitive as to be "shocked by fratricide" (p. 31)?

MARTIN J. HAVRAN
University of Virginia

Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch *by R. N. Rosecrance. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1968.—ix, 308 pp. $7.50.*

It will not surprise anyone familiar with the relative strength of defense studies in Britain and the United States that the first serious study of post-war British defense policy should come from an American academic. There will be those in both countries to claim that the lack of sustained independent criticism does much to explain the uncertainties which have characterized recent British policy.

Cynics are saying that Britain now has no defense policy, only an economic policy. Professor Rosecrance clearly shows the importance of economic factors in shaping British policy. In retrospect, the Labour government's 1950 figure of £4,700 million for defense spending over three years, looks like an attempt to defy the laws of economic gravity. In fact, the Conservative government's reductions over the three years were relatively modest (£450 million). The limits on subsequent defense expenditure were really set by the unwillingness of the British electorate to return to the wartime austerity of the years of Labour rule. Defense expenditure had to compete with the demands of the affluent and increasingly consumer-minded society created by the Conservative

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governments of the 1950s. Thus a defense budget which represented approximately 10 per cent of GNP in 1952, in 1967 represented only 6 per cent of a GNP which, in money terms, had trebled in value.

Against this background, Professor Rosecrance identifies the concern to commit the United States to Europe as the most persistent theme in British policy. The Korean rearmament and the Paris agreements of 1954 in which Britain, breaking with tradition, undertook to commit four divisions and a tactical air force to the continent, were the United Kingdom's most substantial contributions to that end.

Professor Rosecrance rightly sees the middle fifties as marking the apogee of British military and political influence. During these years, Britain was the pivot of the United States' European policy, she was developing her own independent deterrent, and she was engaged in the process of shedding her imperial responsibilities. British military doctrine, shaped by political responsibilities, retained a surer balance between nuclear and conventional forces than the American doctrines which were behind Eisenhower's "New Look."

In Professor Rosecrance's account, Suez changed all. Britain forfeited her role of honest broker between the United States and Europe and became more and more the client of the United States. The new relationship was symbolized by Britain's growing dependence on American technical aid in maintaining a viable independent deterrent. There can be no argument but that Suez marked a turning point in British post-war politics, internal as well as external. However, one would have liked Professor Rosecrance to examine more closely the origins of the post-Suez decline in British influence. How much was it the consequence of earlier decisions to stay out of the developing European movement and to develop a nuclear capability as well as to maintain substantial conventional commitments throughout the world? How far, in fact, was the eminence which Britain enjoyed in the first half of the fifties based on the temporary exhaustion of the continental European countries?

Professor Rosecrance writes with an Atlantic bias. Britain's extra-European interests are discussed only as they influenced Britain's European policies and strategies. The whole debate on Britain's overseas bases, of which the Suez controversy was an important part, is barely mentioned. It is a measure of the change in Britain's position over the last twenty years that the latest government decisions to accelerate withdrawal from East of Suez has virtually closed the debate.

STEPHEN MAXWELL
Institute for Strategic Studies
London

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The New French Revolution *by John Ardagh. New York and Evanston, Harper & Row, 1968.—xvi, 501 pp. $8.95.*

The French record since 1789 has given the word "revolution" an aura of respectability in the country and almost elevated the practice into tradition. Violence has usually accompanied these upheavals, but revolution of a quieter sort need not be less fundamental, as witness the transformation that has taken place in the English-speaking domain for example. In this contrast lies the key to the long record of decline characteristic of the French position for a century and a half. If the French remained fertile in ideas during this interval, their numbers, their economy, and their backwardness in technological development gradually pushed them toward the bottom of the list of advanced nations. The impact of the first World War upon this enfeebled organism was nearly that of a death blow, and many saw in the events of 1940 the formal registration of demise.

But the past quarter of a century has seen an unexpected revival. That is the transformation which this perceptive, sympathetic yet critical survey endeavors to sift and appraise. Appropriately, the emphasis of Ardagh's treatment is not on politics. For the New French Revolution is in the English rather than in the French pattern and can best be summed up as the attempt of the entity France to integrate itself into the modern world. The accomplishment to date has been impressive, no less in the surprising reversal of the century-old demographic trend than in the modernization of industry. But the latter transformation is far from having been fully accomplished, and the implications of it raise a multitude of questions and problems that affect all aspects of French life in truly revolutionary fashion.

Two issues in particular stand out. Given the traditional structure of French society and the unusually centralized nature of the French state, the attempt to break the old mold creates inordinate stresses. It probably could not have been initiated but for the shock of 1940 and its aftermath, and it is significant that the leadership has in large measure come from the top. A number of gifted and forward-looking individuals—Jean Monnet is their best representative—were given their lead. Interestingly, this was done under the Fourth Republic, outwardly a replica of the outmoded Third; but the Fifth continued the process. The resistance of a multitude of vested interests and deeply ingrained habits remains understandably strong with the result that "the real dilemma is that, in a great many cases, the State technocrats appear to be *more* vigorous, liberal, and far-sighted than private and local bodies might be" (p. 438).

The attempt strikes at the very roots of an ancient culture, the accom-

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plishments and merits of which ought not to be lightly discarded. The second question is therefore whether the modernization of France, "... the new cult of progress—France's essential salvation and her greatest danger" (p. 365), may not destroy her very Frenchness, making her but another indistinguishable cipher of banal material affluence. The issue is especially sharp in France, whose future record promises to be full of interest and significance, perhaps not for herself alone. It would be difficult to imagine a better introduction to the problem than this excellent book.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ
Columbia University

The Royal Provincial Intendants: A Governing Elite in Eighteenth-Century France *by Vivian R. Gruder. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1968.—xiv, 293 pp. $10.00.*

The first half of this book is a conventional description of the education and recruitment of top provincial officials in eighteenth-century France. Little here will help the specialist who has already mastered the works of François Bluche. The non-specialist, on the other hand, must be wary; on page 5, we find Cardinal Mazarin credited with what Richelieu in fact did in August 1642. There is confusion on one important matter as well, particularly over when royal officials in the sovereign courts earned various kinds of nobility *de jure*. Dr. Gruder seems to have taken various historical works at face value, for there are almost contradictory answers to this crucial question (pp. 57, 102, 123ff.), and in each case there are almost entirely different references in the notes.

Only in the second half of the book does her purpose become clear. By analyzing the social origins of each intendant, Dr. Gruder tests part of Georges Lefebvre's views on the effects of the "aristocratic reaction" on the recruitment of high officials. Were men with relatively new wealth and titles of judicial nobility having more difficulty in purchasing an intendant's office in 1789 than in 1715? Dr. Gruder finds a remarkable continuity in the social requirements for being an intendant. Her methods and purposes are similar to those of N. Ravitch, who in *Sword and Mitre* (The Hague, 1966) found continuity of recruitment from the sword nobility in the French episcopacy during the same period. Unlike Ravitch's work, however, Dr. Gruder's is more precise because of her careful reliance on the definitions of nobility established by F.

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Bluche and F. Ford. The analysis by generation demonstrates that the need for noble status seems not to have increased or become more categorical among two governing elites in the *ancien régime*.

So where does this leave Georges Lefebvre's thesis? His point (cf. for example, *The Coming of the French Revolution*, trans. R. Palmer (New York, 1958], pp. 15-16) was much more subtle and complex than any question which could be answered by analyzing noble versus non-noble origins of the intendants. Did these officials, as has been so often contended, settle down in the provinces they were supposed to govern, marry into local noble families, buy land and châteaux, and become part of that traditional aristocracy which had been the nemesis of absolute monarchs for centuries?

By 1715 so few intendants lacked hereditary nobility that this criterion for admission to the elite had become nearly meaningless. Favor at court, influence in the sovereign courts, perhaps local support, and, most important, sponsorship by royal ministers still fixed the recruitment of intendants from a rather large pool of noble *maîtres des requêtes*. Dr. Gruder notes in passing three variables which changed in the eighteenth century, but she declines to discuss them or to measure changes in them statistically. The need for formal education seems to have declined, which, when combined with relaxed age requirements and the declining price of the office, suggests that sons of prominent families did not want the post.

Historians will never completely be able to figure out the value systems and motivations of the intendants, but we should be able to go much farther than Dr. Gruder has. Perhaps her greatest error was to assume that the office of intendant was the highest aspiration of these men, while in fact we know that it was only one rung on a long ladder to higher office and status and perhaps greater power. We need to know, at a minimum, what the fathers, uncles, and fathers-in-law of the intendants held as offices at the height of their careers, before we can discern either generational or corporate changes in the status of office-holding families. Furthermore, what does it mean to call a man a "native" Parisian (p. 99) when nearly all of the status of *maître des requêtes* inherited lands in the provinces and lived part of every year on family estates? A better criterion for native Parisian status would be whether the individual intendant's family had already held prominent offices in the capital.

Dr. Gruder's conception of the intendants as offering "dedicated service to the Crown" and possessing "deep loyalty to it" is often asserted but never really pinned down. There is also some insensitivity in the

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translation of terms which define social groups. The word *laboureur* is translated as peasant (p. 175) without any discussion of the implications of such a translation, and such terms as "large businessman," "tradesman," "shopkeeper," and "peasant bourgeoisie" are used here and there without discrimination.

Finally, there is the omission of Anne Turgot, not only from the general discussion of his family (pp. 144ff.) but also from the statistical tabulations. This caused me considerable confusion at first, for I knew the great Limousin intendant had served in 1774, but by Dr. Gruder's definitions had not served long enough to be counted. Statisticians warn us again and again that three points are never enough to discern a trend or continuity, and with the last decade of Louis XV's reign omitted altogether, it is very difficult to learn much about part of the period which Lefebvre was supposedly most concerned about. Certainly the addition of Turgot would not make Dr. Gruder's picture of the predominant rise of new men to one of "aristocratic reaction," but still one wonders whether a general slowdown of promotions did not coincide with the decline in the prices of venal offices.

OREST RANUM
The Johns Hopkins Universitty

Germany 1789-1919: A Political History *by Agatha Ramm. London, Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1967.—x, 517 pp. $13.50.*

Despite its subtitle this book is much more than merely a political history of nineteenth-century Germany. It contains perceptive surveys of economic and intellectual developments, and Miss Ramm's summaries of the thought of Kant, Hegel, and Marx are among the best parts of the work. Her political discussions cover familiar ground, but the pace is brisk, and some old viewpoints are challenged. Thus Miss Ramm wonders whether the Revolution of 1848 can properly be called a revolution, and she has some interesting thoughts on Germany's policies prior to the outbreak of World War I. Above all, she rejects the conventional periodicization of nineteenth-century Germany which begins with 1815 and the Congress of Vienna and ends with 1914 and the outbreak of World War I. Since the complex of problems on which the book centers was set in motion by the French Revolution of 1789, Miss Ramm has taken that year as the starting point of her discussion. The first attempt to arrive at an overall settlement of these issues in accordance with the ideas of 1789 was made after Germany's defeat in the First World War, and so the

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book ends with that settlement, the drafting of the Weimar Constitution in 1919.

The main theme of the work is the rise of Germany from the centrifugal weakness of the Holy Roman Empire to the concentrated power of the unified state of Bismarck and William II. Accompanying this *leitmotiv* are the correlated problems of the relations of the various German states to each other and the internal adjustments of the states to the times. In discussing these issues, Miss Ramm has avoided the common mistake of identifying the history of Germany with that of Prussia. While Prussia, of course, is accorded a predominant part in the story, Bavaria, Württemberg, and, until 1866, Austria receive adequate attention, and there is also a considerable amount of information on many of the minor states, some of it based on archival research.

Discussing Germany's social history, Miss Ramm points out its remarkable steadiness in the sense that "German society was aristocratic in 1789 and, if one may generalize, it was still to some extent so in 1918." While the aristocratic social framework was widened, she notes, it was not itself greatly changed, and the *Bürgertum* was admitted into the political nation "with very little stress in proportion to the changes of convention involved" (pp. 462-63). Owing to Miss Ramm's self-imposed limitations, this theme is never fully developed, however, though it touches closely on matters political, and the reader will have to substantiate it himself as he goes along.

A bibliography including the very latest literature adds to the usefulness of this perceptive readable book.

ANDREAS DORPALEN
Ohio State University

The Frankfurt Parliament, 1848-1849 *by Frank Eyck. London, Melbourne, Toronto, Macmillan and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1968.—xiv, 425 pp. $14.50.*

A problem in individual biography is where to restrict it to what its subject says and does and where to make inferences about motives and causes he does not show himself to be conscious of or affected by; is the biography of a political assembly the same? Professor Eyck builds his life-story of the Frankfurt Parliament from public debates, votes, and personalities without reference to the kind of environmental feature that might be expected to appear even in a life-and-times. He deliberately

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avoids the matters of popular unrest, social anxiety, and political fever that historians of 1848 have come to write about; did the Parliament do the same? Books like Theodore S. Hamerow's *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction* (1958) and Paul H. Noyes' *Organization and Revolution* (1966) do not appear in Eyck's fifteen-page bibliography. He writes only of the questions of national identity and free institutions that the Paulskirche talked about.

Certainly it was sound composition for Eyck not to be drawn into a general history of 1848. But his decision was more than a scholar's practical delimitation of subject. There *were* movements of social discontent, he allows, "reflecting deep popular feelings, but outside the main stream of political development" (p. 32). That world outside seems to have affected the Paulskirche only by way of irrelevant noise in the galleries and insofar as the radical left tried to exploit popular discontent to its own advantage in the Paulskirche. Eyck's stance matches that of the moderate majority that made the personality of his subject.

The parliamentarians are located in German society at large mainly by quantitative analysis of their backgrounds and of how their backgrounds related with the positions they took on specific issues. The professional composition of the Parliament turns out to be mainly law and the civil service—no surprise there. Then the analysis jumps to the relations among regions, religions, parties, and votes; but Eyck does not use his computer to move beyond an arithmetical, one-plane description. An example of what I mean: it is not remarkable to find in Eyck's figures that Prussians and North Germans were generally Kleindeutsch and South Germans Grossdeutsch, and one expects to find Protestants generally Kleindeutsch and Catholics Grossdeutsch. But are the reasons regional or religious, or are the two inseparable; and how does the political spectrum left-to-right fit with the rest? To help sort out the political currents we should like to know how Prussian Catholics voted on the constitutional issue and how South German Protestants voted and whether, or when, Southerners on the left voted with Northerners on the left rather than with their own regions or denominations. Perhaps the numbers are too small to carry that far; perhaps, in these added dimensions, barren tactical factors and local circumstances (Baden liberal Catholics?) would break the groupings down into a shambles. Still, that might be worth seeing too.

Neither in the statistical parts nor in the narrative of debates and ballotting, therefore, does the reader sense a complex, restless German society outside the Paulskirche and the royal governments with which it negotiated. Both where that is intentional and where it is not, it is the

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feature of Eyck's book most likely to attract criticism. But if his description of the Parliament in this respect reflects historical reality (as I think it does), then he should properly answer, "Just so." Then the question is: who is wrong, the Paulskirche or the social historians?

MACK WALKER
Cornell University

The Free City: Danzig and German Foreign Policy, 1919-1934 *by Christoph M. Kimmich. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1968.—ix, 196 pp. $6.50.*

In the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic, Danzig played a special role. Although part of the eastern areas that Germany had lost as a result of the Versailles Treaty, it had not been ceded outright to Poland; and, as a Free City, it remained open to German influence. In the eyes of Weimar policy-makers, it was therefore the fulcrum of their revisionist plans, the point at which pressure, properly applied, might bring not only the city itself but West Prussia, parts of Posen, and the southern tip of East Prussia back to the Reich. At no time was it considered that this pressure would be military in nature. General von Seeckt might think in terms of a future war with Poland, but Stresemann and his Foreign Ministry aides believed that they would be able to persuade their Locarno partners that the revision of the eastern borders would ensure European peace and hence was as much to their interest as to Germany's and, further, that the endemic financial troubles of the Poles would sooner or later persuade them, under Great Power urging, to sacrifice Danzig and the Corridor in return for economic rehabilitation.

The elaboration and ultimate failure of this policy is the subject of Christoph M. Kimmich's excellent study, a work based on careful research in archives in Bonn, Koblenz, and Geneva and marked throughout by shrewdness of judgement and objectivity in presentation. Mr. Kimmich points out that the revisionist policy adopted by the German Foreign Ministry in 1919 had the immediate result of making Danzig an economic satellite of Germany and thus denying the possibility that its citizens, by cooperating with the Poles, might secure "a return to Hanseatic particularism and prosperity." In the long run the policy was self-defeating. Throughout the 1920s Danzig's well-being was really the result of Poland's forbearance; after the onset of the great depression, which came just as the Polish port Gdynia began to equal Danzig in

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shipping, that well-being dwindled rapidly. So did the city's political importance. If Danzig was no longer useful to Poland economically, it could hardly be used by the German government to force concessions from Warsaw.

Despite these facts, German Foreign Ministry officials clung stubbornly to the policy they had followed since 1919. To their dismay, however, their course was rejected both by the new president of the Danzig Senate, Hermann Rauschning, and by Reichskanzler Hitler, who moved swiftly towards an accommodation with the Poles. Their motives were, to be sure, not the same. Rauschning sincerely believed that Danzig could be made a "link and intermediary" between Germany and Poland if the city ceased to be a German dependency and re-entered the Polish economy. Hitler, who seems to have sensed what the Weimar diplomat Ulrich Rauscher had seen earlier—that the Corridor could never be recovered by the revisionist tactic but only by war—but who wanted no trouble with the Poles until he had consolidated his power in Germany, supported Rauschning's line by negotiating the pact of January 1934 with Poland. But he did so, in Mr. Kimmich's words, not "because he intended to reconcile himself to a situation which the Weimar politicians had not been able to change, but because he intended to change this situation while accomplishing a larger purpose. . . . When he turned to the East again he sought expansion," and Danzig, "an outcome of the First World War . . . constituted the grievance which ostensibly produced the Second."

Among the most enlightening pages in this fine monograph are those that deal with Stresemann's Polish policy, with the sharpened line that the Polish government took with regard to Danzig after 1930, and with such critical moments in the Free City's existence as the Westerplatte incident of 1933.

GORDON A. CRAIG
Stanford University

The Life of Francesco Guicciardini *by Roberto Ridolfi. Translated from the Italian by Cecil Grayson. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1968.—ix, 336 pp. $10.00.*

Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) was the greatest historian between Tacitus and Gibbon. His masterpiece, the *Storia d'Italia*, written and rewritten from 1536 to 1539 (some sections went through as many as seven redactions) in an astonishing burst of creative energy covers the history of the peninsula from the invasion of Charles VIII to the election

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of Cardinal Farnese as Pope Paul III in 1534. To discover for the first time the psychological penetration, intellectual power, and architectural splendor of this work is an experience as moving as a first reading of Thucydides.

Roberto Ridolfi's biography of Guicciardini, first published in 1960 and which now appears in English accurately and sympathetically translated by Professor Cecil Grayson, crowns over thirty years of research and discovery. Future readers of the *Storia d'Italia* will find it the indispensable introduction to the career and character of its author. In his preface Ridolfi remarks that his biography of Guicciardini "should almost form a single unity" with his earlier biography of Machiavelli; and there is no doubt, as Felix Gilbert's brilliant *Machiavelli and Guicciardini* has recently shown again, that knowledge of one of the great Florentines broadens understanding of the other. Ridolfi's biographies make a related point: the very great importance of biographical knowledge for the proper understanding of both men's historical and political thought.

Although their families were indistinguishable in social origin and had been in the early fourteenth century very similar in wealth and the power and prestige of civic office, the fortunes of the Machiavelli had been in steady decline since the beginning of the fifteenth century while those of the Guicciardini, linked to the triumphant Medici, waxed with them. Machiavelli thus belonged to the social group which Florentines called *mezzani*, men of modest means, high above the multitudinous pleb but overshadowed by the great and rich, the *case* of Medici, Salviati, Strozzi, Ruccelai, Ridolfi. By birth, fortune, marriage, and employment, Guicciardini belonged among these *grandi*. Machiavelli was a bureaucrat. He served the Florentine republic as second chancellor. Guicciardini made his political career in the service of the Medici popes: Governor of Modena and Reggio; president of Romagna with jurisdiction over Ravenna, Imola, Faenza, Forli, Cesena, and Rimini; Clement VII's "Lieutenant-General in the army and whole state of the church with fullest and almost absolute power," Governor and Vice-Legate of Bologna. Like Caesar and Henry Adams he described himself in the third person: "In gestures, preoccupations, desires, in all his actions he no longer resembled in any way a private person. Already his speech, his manners, his haughtiness, his desire to be understood and obeyed at a sign, were no different from what is found in a man who has been and always lived a prince." Fourteen years older than Guicciardini, Machiavelli devoted his active life to consolidating and defending the least oligarchic regime Florence had ever had. Guicciardini, from the very beginning, chose the party of the *optimates*. He ended, and this choice

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too was dictated by both conviction and private interest, a courtier of the ducal principate.

These contrasts are among the bare bones of Ridolfi's story, but even they allow us to understand more exactly, for example, the different senses the two men attached to the word "liberty" and suggest the exceptional interest of the material Ridolfi has assembled with such indefatigable energy and skill.

EUGENE F. RICE, JR.
Columbia University

Pobedonostsev: His Life and Thought *by Robert F. Byrnes. Bloomington and London, Indiana University Press, 1968.—xiii, 495 pp. $15.00.*

The name of Konstantin Petrovich Pobedonostsev (1827-1907) is associated with the most rigid, bigoted, and baneful conservatism that dominated the policy of the imperial government in the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II until the revolution of 1905. Pobedonostsev was universally hated and condemned, and this reviewer is unaware of any sympathetic or positive appreciation of the man. His fellow officials compared him to a venomous snake or spider, while the intelligentsia and progressives saw in him the devil incarnate. The feelings of the revolutionaries and of members of national and religious minorities he did so much to keep down or eradicate can be easily imagined. It was universally believed that he was the power behind the throne in the last quarter of a century of the Autocracy and responsible for killing all attempts at liberalizing Russia. Little wonder that no Russian scholar ever cared to study dispassionately such an odious figure.

Professor Byrnes deserves our thanks for having undertaken this somewhat ungrateful task and for having given us the first, and in many ways definitive, full account of the life, career, and thought of Pobedonostsev. The diligent and attentive reader will find chronicled and described practically every activity and facet of Pobedonostsev, from the serious student of law who played a not insignificant role in the preparation of the famous liberal judiciary reform of 1864 to the harsh and sinister director-general *(Ober-prokuror)* of the Holy Synod, intimate of the last two emperors, and unflagging advocate of rigid immobility in all matters political, social, and cultural. Of particular interest is the description of Pobedonostsev's part in promoting mis-

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sionary activities among the non-Christian in the Russian East, the spread of church-controlled schools and literature, his clumsy and unsuccessful efforts at extending the influence of his office over the Orthodox in the Austrian empire, in Abyssinia, and the pilgrimages to the Holy Land. Equally interesting is Professor Byrnes' account of Pobedonostsev's literary associations and activities and of his dishonest polemical practices. The key role played by Pobedonostsev in bringing Alexander III to abandon the path of "liberalization" taken by his father on the eve of his assassination has been well described and documented in Russian historical literature. But it was a story worth retelling in English, and Professor Byrnes has done it briskly and judiciously with a wealth of detail that throws an interesting light on the workings of the Autocracy and on the character of the leading personalities. In spite of the unappealing, nay unsavory, character of his subject, Byrnes manages to draw an understanding and well-balanced portrait of the able but narrow scholar and official.

Unfortunately Professor Byrnes has not made the reading of his book easy for those who are not familiar with Russian history and circumstances. He is very thin, at times even a bit misleading, on the background, so that Pobedonostsev's actions and attitudes appear in a vacuum, detached from the conditions that helped to fashion them. True enough, Pobedonostsev did live and think in an artificial, two-dimensional world of his own making; but is it not the historian's duty to provide the third dimension which his subject ignored? The reasons for Pobedonostsev's power and his eventual dismal failure are not adequately explored or explained. While Pobedonostsev may not always have been consistent, he was very systematic in his thinking and actions—given a few basic premises. These are not analyzed as searchingly and sharply as they might have been. Frequently, too, basic concepts, such as radical reformer, conservative, Slavophil, and the like are used loosely and their specific connotation in the context of Russian tradition or Pobedonostsev's thought not made clear. As a matter of fact, the chapters dealing with Pobedonostsev's political and social ideas are too descriptive, and, tacked on at the end of the book, they do not provide assistance in understanding his career and public acts which are chronicled in the earlier chapters. Nor is it helpful to be referred to Loris-Melikov's "constitutional" scheme (which, in my opinion, Byrnes accepts too uncritically as having been genuinely constitutional) without being given full details or without being told clearly about similar schemes that had been presented and discussed earlier The impressive achievement of Pobedonostsev in obtaining more money for the church should have been balanced by a better understanding of

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the relative role of these sums in the context of Russian ecclesiastical policy and conditions. The bland assertion (p. 240) of Pobedonostsev's influence in nominating provincial governors is hardly sufficient when unaccompanied by either illustrations or an indication of the usual method of selecting these high officials.

The unprepared reader's task is made more difficult still by flaws of presentation. On Professor Byrnes' own candid admission in the preface he worked on this book at the same time he shouldered a great number of other obligations. Quite obviously he had neither the time nor the necessary span of intellectual concentration to master the background and weave into a clear tapestry the many activities in which Pobedonostsev was involved. The book gives the impression of a set of chapters, notes, and essays written separately at different times, and strung together to make up one volume. There are many annoying and useless repetitions, and the time sequence is not made clear as the chapters do not follow a logical or chronological order. Finally, the style of the footnotes is somewhat disconcerting. At the end of almost every paragraph, whether dealing with analysis or mere description, there is a battery of references to primary and secondary sources, all jumbled together. It is not clear to what they are referring—to a fact, to a statement by Pobedonostsev, or to support Mr. Byrnes' description and interpretation? An extreme, but not untypical case (p. 247 n. 11) follows a quotation from an official decree. There is no reference to the legislative source but to a series of letters of Pobedonostsev's and to secondary works on Russian education. Such a system gives no guidance to the serious student who wants to follow up on Mr. Byrnes' material, while the suspicious scholar is handicapped in his understandable wish to check on the sources.

MARC RAEFF
Columbia University

Israel and the Developing Countries: New Approaches to Cooperation *by Leopold Laufer. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1967.—xiv, 298 pp. $6.00.*

As political instruments economic aid and technical assistance are no longer really fashionable. A great deal of money and effort continues to be expended by the industrial states on those countries with less impressive economies, but the once firm conviction that aid to the underdevel-

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oped can be made the basis of political relations by those major powers which seek a measure of influence over them has largely eroded. So too has the belief that the most successful of the existing industrial states constitute fully relevant models for those members of the third world who wish to emulate them. The value of Mr. Laufer's book lies primarily in the fact that it offers an opportunity to look at a pattern of donor-recipient relations which differs markedly from the kind which is best known and where both the donor's motivation and the character of the aid have interesting and original characteristics of their own.

Israel's extraordinary effort to provide technical assistance on a nearly world-wide basis (some 3500 aid assignments in 1958-66 alone) in fields ranging from regional agricultural planning to guidance in the establishment of pioneer youth organizations has had political objects which have little in common with those of the major powers; and it was made possible and attractive to the recipients because of, rather than despite, the fact that Israel is herself a small, developing country. There is no question of Israel attempting, still less of being able, to exert a "neo-colonialist" political influence over the recipients of her assistance. Her political sights, such as they are, have been set lower—at a target which might be crudely defined as making friends and influencing people in an environment which might otherwise tend, on balance, to be pro-Arab.

But, of course, the really crucial factor accounting for Israel's positive success in this sphere has been the Israelis' ability to make the best possible use of their own direct and fresh experience of agricultural and industrial development and of their own construction of a social and educational infrastructure of the kind on which all modern, technologically-oriented societies must come to rely, but which has nonetheless been carefully tailored to their own specific needs. Mr. Laufer is right, therefore, to emphasize the importance of what he terms the "human equation." The Israelis bring with them a less stereotyped, less systematic, less complacent, and more flexible approach to the recipients' problems than is customary. They understand very well, for example, that an unsophisticated economy based on a population of two or three or ten million cannot possibly work or be made to work according to the norms and rules that are appropriate to one based on a population of fifty or one hundred million or more. They believe in listening very carefully to what the recipient has to say about his own affairs, and they have made it a matter of doctrine that it is for the recipient alone to determine what he needs and for the foreign expert to limit himself to helping him to attain it.

The author stresses his belief that such organization of technical assistance by one developing country to another has not been paid adequate

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attention. Where it succeeds—as in the case of Israel—it has implications and contains a promise that would, in his view, repay careful study by all. But it is a little less easy to join him in his sanguine view that in such mutual aid may be found a means of encouraging political cooperation between Israel and her Arab neighbors as well. That is surely another story.

DAVID VITAL
Bar-Ilan University
Israel

Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964 *by David C. Mulford. New York, Oxford University Press, 1968—xii, 362 pp. $8.80.*

This is a straightforward, detailed history of political parties and contests in Northern Rhodesia from the introduction of the first multi-racial constitution to the moment when, as Zambia, the country became independent. Mr. Mulford has been unusually fortunate in his access to official documents and admirably diligent in amassing his own collection of private papers. He quotes largely from "special branch" and other intelligence reports as well as from the correspondence of African politicians. More ingenuity was devoted to the elaboration of electoral provisions in Northern Rhodesia than probably in any other emergent territory. Ostensibly directed to secure the return to the legislature of at least a small number of men who were not committed to the exclusive interests of their own race, it never forgot calculation of the distribution of seats between the races that different rules were likely to produce. The requirements for the election of the "National" members, who had to obtain votes from both Africans and non-Africans, were so complex and specific that many of the National seats could not be filled. Mr. Mulford's criticism that no European voted for a "typical" African nor African for a "typical" European is a little exacting. This could hardly have been expected; the intention of the arrangement was to encourage compromise candidates.

The attitude of the officers, both central and local, of a colonial government engaged in the process of transfer of power has not previously been so fully documented. Their position is uneasy at best; it is their prime responsibility to preserve order, and therefore to take action against violence to persons and property. Perhaps one cannot hope that they would be detached enough to see these illegal actions as aberrations of permis-

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sible movements. From Mr. Mulford we learn in some detail of their attempts to discredit or outmaneuver the African National Congress—justified in one case, which he quotes at length, by the assertion that it was "not regarded [officially] as a political party." What is pathetic in the light of hindsight is the belief that they could destroy it.

Owing to the maintenance of reserved seats for Europeans in the independence constitution the activities of the European party retain their interest to the end of the story; and competition between African parties also continues to the end, largely because the Europeans sought an alliance with one of them. Not being completely excluded from a share in legislation as they were elsewhere, the Europeans had to rethink their position when they had given up hope of playing a dominant part; they adopted the role of a "loyal opposition" whose advice they expected the government to accept.

This excellent book could have been made even more so by the inclusion of a map, the lack of which is exasperating when some place or other is referred to on every page.

LUCY MAIR
London School of Economics

Industrial Labor in the Republic of Senegal *by Guy Pfeffermann. Foreword by Thomas Balogh. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.—xx, 325 pp. $15.00.*

The Labor Sector and Socialist Distribution in Cuba *by Carmelo Mesa-Lago. New York, Washington, and London, Frederick A. Praeger for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1968.—xix, 250 pp. $15.00.*

These two books are of widely varying quality. The first contains an excellent analysis of the labor market of an African nation, while the latter is a collection of statements relating to ideology, law, and administrative regulation, that never quite gets off the ground.

One cannot do full justice to Mr. Pfeffermann's monograph within the confines of a brief review. He discusses most of the problems relevant to the role of labor in the development process: wage policy, manpower training, trade unionism, the choice of technique in manufacturing, the residual impact of the colonial labor market structure. His conclusions, based upon close analysis of available data, tend to confirm accepted

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doctrine..The Senegalese labor force is extremely stable and quite responsive to economic incentive; there is little evidence of a backward-bending supply curve of labor. Trade unions have little independent influence on wages and employment, but are political bodies engaged in carrying out government policy. Despite low labor costs, manufacturing techniques in the modern sector are mainly capital intensive, for a variety of practical reasons. One novel finding, which probably has relevance beyond Senegal, has to do with the difficulty of raising worker living standards because of the institution of the extended family. When a man's wages go up, more peripheral family members move into the city to live at his expense. There are also some interesting pages on the relationship between family allowances and polygamy.

Professor Thomas Balogh, who contributed a foreword, noted that this application of neo-classical methods of economic analysis to Senegalese industrialization yielded negative results, though the effort was worth while. It is true that most of the assumptions of traditional theory do not fit the Senegalese labor market, but neither do they apply to any other real-life labor market. The point is, however, that the analytical tools used by Mr. Pfeffermann as the framework for his study enable him to ask the right questions and, by suitable modification of some of the assumptions, to provide definitive answers.

A good example of the results of lack of theory is provided by Mr. Mesa-Lago's study of Cuba. Rules and regulations are listed in detail, interlarded with quotations from Castro, Che Guevera, and other luminaries, both domestic and foreign. Extensive comparisons with the Soviet Union and China are made to demonstrate that Cuba borrowed some labor market institutions from her Communist colleagues. But the central question of whether these institutions make any sense in the Cuban context is not handled with either precision or sophistication.

One final matter applies to both these books, and to others in the Praeger Special Studies series that I have seen. Considering the fact that the format is poor—typewritten rather than printed face, margins not justified, footnotes at the end of the chapters or of the book, lack of indexes—the books are grossly overpriced at $15 or more. The publisher is obviously relying on an inelastic library demand, since no individual scholar in his right mind would buy at that price. But libraries as well should think carefully before allocating scarce resources to the Praeger series, for many of the titles appear to be Ph.D. theses that interested scholars could consult through interlibrary loan.

WALTER GALENSON
Cornell University

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The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development *by Lucian W. Pye. Cambridge and London, M.I.T. Press, 1968.—xxii, 255 pp. $8.95.*

It would take a book of at least equal length to properly criticize Lucian Pye's view of *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*. By making this statement I mean simultaneously to acknowledge its grave weaknesses, intrinsic interest, and considerable importance. It cannot escape notice that this is the kind of book that anthropologists once wrote, but from which they seem to have turned, possibly because of the hostile reception such books received from other anthropologists and from some political scientists. It is therefore somewhat ironic that Lucien Pye's new book should be reviewed by an anthropologist in a journal of political science and that the reviewer must make some of the nasty remarks addressed to data control and method that political scientists formerly addressed to anthropologists engaged in the field of national character studies. Indeed, were this not so proper an academic journal, this review might appear under the heading, "Pye in the Sky."

Before getting to some of Pye's sharp insights and myopic oversights, his thesis may be briefly stated. The Chinese Communists, Pye argues, have failed to establish a competent and effective government. The traditional form of authority rested on the structure and ideology of Confucianism, which required sharp suppression of individual aggressive tendencies. The overturn of the traditional system was accompanied by the release of formerly repressed aggression, creating a situation with which the newly emerging forms of authority could not cope. The outcome has been, in Pye's words, "the extreme vacillations in Chinese politics between monolithic order and intense but not always bloody conflict" (33). Pye carries the analysis further into the Chinese basic personality structure. Infancy and early childhood continue to be dominated by the traditional view of authority and emotion-control resting on filial piety and "a rigidly defined order of role relationships" in the family and other primary groups. With maturation comes knowledge of the gap between childhood orientations and adult reality and this is complicated by the growth of tension between father and son. The tendency toward personal revolt against paternal authority is countered by a strong desire for the promised benefits of guidance and security. The resulting ambivalence produces anxiety and hostility, both of which can lead to aggression. In the political sphere, the need for strong government is linked with resentment over the failure of the government to fulfill its programs.

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It is not surprising that we experience symptoms of *déja vu* at reading this. Goeffrey Gorer made a somewhat parallel analysis of basic personality factors underlying Soviet Russian political structure. In Gorer's analysis, the Russian penchant for swaddling infants carried much of the weight that Pye places on Confucianism and filial piety. Actually, as explained by Margaret Mead ("National Character" in A. K. Kroeber *et al., Anthropology Today*, Chicago, 1953, p. 644), Gorer's attempt, frequently misunderstood, is rather more sophisticated than Pye's. Mead tells us that Gorer did not say, "Swaddling them as infants makes Russians capable of freedom." Instead, what was said was "The prolonged and very tight swaddling to which infants are subjected in Russian child-rearing practice is one of the means by which Russians communicate to their infants a feeling that a strong authority is necessary." Of course, "filial piety" and "a rigid order of role relationships" are much more complex than the simple institution of swaddling. Nonetheless, to the extent that the statement, "indoctrination in the concepts of filial piety and rigid role relationships, as an experience of certain human infants and small children, somehow produces an attitude in adult Chinese, independently of the entire history of China" (to paraphrase Mead) represents a fair digest of Pye's main thesis, he is guilty of the gross oversimplification that was feared in earlier work in the genre of national character studies.

We may go further, however, to press an equally telling query about the methods of such studies. Following Anthony F. C. Wallace, among others, the question may be paraphrased as follows: What is the evidence that all Chinese do experience this conflict structure; that their adult institutions are the cultural equivalents of this uniform conflict structure; that their early-age experiences are uniform; that this early-age experience determines their adult personalities? (cf. Wallace, *Culture and Personality*, New York, 1961, p. 108).

There is nothing in Pye's book to help us answer these questions. Instead, we are given a fascinating, sometimes elegant, but never more than plausible scheme. There are some fine flashes, as when Pye sees that the red/expert dichotomy is in a sense the latest act in an ancient drama pitting Chinese power holders against intellectuals and technical specialists (p. 42). In another context Pye reflects on the readily confirmable Chinese disinterest in psychiatry, especially psychoanalysis, and relates this to a deeper view of Chinese medical belief in which the approach to emotions is "wooden and even mechanistic" (p. 150). These and other provocative thoughts, which call for further investigation and analysis, are outweighed by the heavy freight of assumptions, voiced or

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implicit, which shape Pye's thought. For one thing, he seems to have no idea of his own culture, for he frequently identifies some element of Chinese culture as strange when it is merely a variant of a familiar theme in ours. On further reflection, it seems that Pye's problem is not unfamiliarity with the culture of the United States, but rather an apparently uncritical view of that culture. Thus oblivious to Fourth of July oratory, he asserts that no other people in history have had as much need as the Chinese to dress up their politics in formal ideological trappings (p. 31). And, on another tack, while it is true that Pye contrasts the Chinese intellectuals' alienation from politics with examples from the "developing world," he might have noted the situation closer at home. As a final example of this kind of thing, I cite one of Pye's statements that struck this member of the Columbia faculty with particular irony: "the youth of China have not lost faith in the efficacy of demonstration" (p. 169). I presume that refers to indoor as well as outdoor demonstrations.

There are more substantial unanalyzed assumptions of the sort anthropologists are sensitive to. In Pye's view there is a natural superiority of political systems involving publicly institutionalized systems of checks and balances (p. 30). He also regards traditional Chinese medicine as "strange," "esoteric and bizarre" (which it certainly is for him) and Chinese logic and views of causality as "hard to explain" (pp. 151-2, 155). As for the possibility that China might make out economically in the 70s by becoming a major purveyor of cheap textiles and light consumer goods, he finds it unlikely, "most serious of all, because world standards of taste will be much higher" (p. 421).

Although illuminating some of the deficiencies in Pye's approach, these are perhaps picayune details. Much more serious are such defects as the terribly constricted background of primary and secondary sources with which Pye worked. Only a fraction of the available relevant literature on culture-and-personality is mentioned in any way and some of the omissions are difficult to understand. The same thing may be said of the sinological literature, of the community study work on China, and other highly significant resources. There is even a myopic use of the writings of Mao: Pye asserts that the Chinese Communists "stress the wonders of immediate conditions in China rather than [talking] of a protracted process of working toward distant ideals" (137). Incredible! Surely Lucian Pye is as familiar as I with "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains."

Pye reveals much when he casually employs such a phrase as "the former colonial world" (58). There is some mention in the book of

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colonialism and imperialism, but no feeling is conveyed of what these meant for indigenous forces of development. What is more, there is little feeling for the continuation of the effects of colonialism and imperialism and the fact that these present the Chinese with a very real political and economic environment which is at least as determinative of Chinese developments as a psychological authority crisis. Thus, when he gets down to it, Pye believes that the leading problem in Communist China at this time is the struggle of succession. In line with his thesis he sees the Mao–Liu struggle as the clash of "two different approaches to the authority crisis" (242). If he could but assume for one moment that the Chinese have some basis for believing that they may be subjected to invasion by the military forces of the United States, and that the Soviet Union either would be neutral or would join in as it did when Germany invaded Poland in 1939, he might see a totally different basis of explanation for the events which have taken place in China in recent years.

This review has already exceeded the mite allotted me by the editor so I must rush to conclude. Pye is well aware of what he has chosen not to consider in his book. His preface tells us that he is aware of the importance of a host of things, such as the pressure of population on land, political structures, and economic factors, in the shaping of Chinese politics. Yet I think it a vital question to pose, whether any analyst can so easily shed the consideration of so many basic forces without jeopardizing the seriousness of his work and emasculating his contribution.

MORTON H. FRIED
Columbia University

Soundings in Modern South Asian History *edited by D. A. Low. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press and London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.—xi, 391 pp. $8.75, 63s.*

This volume produced by eight authors connected with the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Australian National University contains ten essays plus an introduction by the editor. There is only a rough chronological organization tying the pieces together and Dr. Low wavers on the question of whether there is any underlying theme to the collection. Most of the essays have a regional focus dealing with economic, political, or social developments in Maharashtra, Bengal, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh,

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while four are concerned with national politics from 1909 to 1953. On the whole, these essays are interesting, detailed, and well-written, except for the pretentious and quite irrelevant use of sociological concepts borrowed from Talcott Parsons in the essay by Dietmar Rothermund. The political sympathies of what one might call the Australian school seem to lie with the Indian moderates like Tej Bahadur Sapru, M. G. Ranade, and G. K. Gokhale, and the authors show an antipathy to the threats of violence common in liberal thought.

Three of the ten essays focus on Bengal, two by J. H. Broomfield on the communal riots of 1918 and the non-cooperation decision of 1920 and another by B. D. Graham on Syama Prasad Mookerjee. All three make illogical and misleading use of the notion of the high-caste Hindu *bhadralok*. This term which simply means *gentleman* in Bengali has been turned by British officials and the two authors into a concept referring variously to a social class, a landed group, and a corporate group organized to preserve its social and economic status through the political process. As an explanatory concept it seems woefully weak and does not illuminate why many of the important political conflicts in Bengal have taken place among members of this supposedly monolithic class. Ideologically *bhadralok* has been used to denigrate justifiable political ends and ideologies.

Broomfield and Graham also stress the communal element in Bengal politics and the latter gravely overestimates the importance of S. P. Mookerjee, the one Bengali communalist leader of any significance. The appeal of communalism in Bengal has been much weaker than that of secular and socialist ideologies and the more important political leaders in Bengal since 1920 including Fazlul Huq, H. S. Suhrawardy, C. R. Das, Subhas C. Bose, and B. C. Roy have all been inclined in a secular direction. The weakness of communalism is shown in the very election figures for 1951-52 to which Dr. Graham refers (p. 357) after telling us for twenty-seven pages how important communalism was in Bengal. S. P. Mookerjee's popularity was due more to his personal appeal and his ability to play upon communal fears that doubtlessly have existed and do exist, but the communal parties have never had a strong organization or much vote-getting power in Bengal. I think that we have to pay more attention to particular political leaders and organizations and try to investigate their specific sources of support rather than borrow from the British notions like *bhadralok* and the stress on communalism which offer only superficial and often incorrect explanations.

There are also a number of errors in cultural history in the essays by Broomfield and Graham which cannot be detailed here, but which point

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to a major defect of the Australian school; they make extensive use of English language materials, but one is hard put to find a single reference in the entire volume to a source in an Indian language. It appears that their advanced studies did not include the study of regional languages and cultures. This work would have appreciably enriched several of these essays, such as the use of Marathi and Punjabi family and caste histories in the economic and social studies.

LEONARD A. GORDON
Columbia University

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Book Notes

In his latest volume entitled *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967* (New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1968; viii, 322 pp. $10.00), Arthur Lall, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at Columbia and former Indian delegate to the United Nations, subjects to close and largely objective scrutiny the role of the U.N. in the events leading to and resulting from the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. Based on official U.N. publications, supplemented by the author's intimate knowledge of the behind-the-scenes maneuvers in both the Security Council and the General Assembly, the book is a carefully researched and eloquently recorded indictment of all the major parties to the dispute.

Lall's case is based on the assumption that the best peace-keeping machinery (which the United Nations, incidentally, is not) will be of no value unless it is properly employed and unless the parties to a dispute display a willingness to compromise. Both of these elements were patently lacking in the 1967 crisis. Thus, the Security Council failed to act in April and May, when tension along the Arab-Israeli frontier was rising rapidly. The failure of the appropriate U.N. organs to react to Nasser's request for withdrawal of the U.N.E.F. from the Sinai peninsula, too, falls into this category. (It could perhaps have been added that while U Thant was legally correct in his stand, as Lall emphasizes, he was hardly a tower of strength throughout the early stages of the crisis.) After the outbreak of the war, the U.N. proved ineffective primarily because of the initial unwillingness of the parties involved to avail them-

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selves of the organization's peace-keeping potentialities; in the obvious belief that they would win, neither Israel nor Egypt requested U.N. intervention during the first twenty-four hours of the conflict. After June 6, the Arabs demanded the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*, while Tel Aviv expressed its readiness to discuss partial withdrawal within the framework of a general peace settlement. With time, the conflict views hardened into irreconcilable positions which no efforts by the United Nations have yet been able to modify significantly.

Lall's outlook is optimistic: "Never was the prospect of peace in the Middle East brighter than at the beginning of 1968" (p. 279). Whether this view is justified in the light of the Arab unwillingness to compromise, only the future will show. In the meantime, Lall is certainly correct in arguing that peace, if and when it finally comes, will be established, in part, through the actions of the great powers (especially with regard to the arms race in the Middle East) and through the auspices of a hopefully more active United Nations.—O. M. SMOLANSKY, *Lehigh University*

American Catholics who lived through the thirties will have their memory refreshed by *American Catholics and Social Reform: The New Deal Years* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1968; xi, 287 pp., $6.50) by David J. O'Brien, who recalls semi-forgotten phenomena of the New Deal years like Personalism, Legion of Decency, Lemke, Easy Essays, Catholic Action, Christian Front, Distributism, NRA. This welter of movements, ideas, and people is put into some degree of ordered analysis by the author who realizes rightly that Catholic social thought and Catholic social reform then constituted (and still constitute) something less than an integrated system. Monsignor Ryan and Father Coughlin were not just different personalities; *Commonweal* and the *Brooklyn Tablet* were not just variant approaches to journalism. These and other contrasts—like supernatural versus scientific sociology, industrial versus craft unionism —were all argued by Catholics on the basis of the social encyclicals, but their multiple and diverse interpretations emerged from the general fuzziness of the encyclicals themselves. In other words, there was no definitive *Catholic* blueprint for social reform beyond the vague sketch of a decent society in which people should intelligently practice the virtues of justice and love. This does not mean that American Catholics made no contributions or had no influence on the secular society. The Bishops'

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pastoral letter of 1919 was ahead of its time and its recommendations have been almost entirely implemented. Catholic workingmen swelled the ranks of organized labor and developed strong leadership there regardless of what some Catholic intellectuals said. The anti-Communist stance of Catholics in the thirties became the popular American attitude in the post-war period. Vigorously protesting their genuine patriotism, Catholics were then still probably conscious of their status as a social minority. O'Brien's lucid and readable account suggests that the events of the thirties represent a logical stage through which Catholics had to go in order to reach their present level of discord within the Church (birth control, papal authority, lay participation, clerical celibacy) as well as in extra-ecclesiastical movements (pacifism, race relations, poverty, urban renewal). What was Catholic pluralism in the thirties seems to have been succeeded by what is American pluralism in the sixties.—JOSEPH H. FICHTER, *Harvard University*.

Chatham had disciples and admirers; he never formed a group or a party in any but the very loosest sense. Shelburne inherited part of his following and added to it by his own interest in the novel and eclectic. Neither of them, dealt with in Part I of *The Chathamites: A Study in the Relationship between Personalities and Ideas in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century* by Peter Brown (London, Melbourne, and Toronto, Macmillan and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967; xv, 516 pp. $15.00), ever enunciated a clear body of political thought; both changed their minds even on the subject of the American colonies. The five men selected by Mr. Brown as "the Chathamites"—Richard Price, Colonel Barré, John Dunning, Jonathan Shipley, and William Jones—were on varying degrees of intimacy with Chatham and each other. They never formed a coterie or faction and they pursued many interests and reforms outside of those listed here as typical. The causes distinguishing leaders and followers were conciliation of America, improved policies concerning India, increased religious liberty, the rights of Englishmen, the improvement of Parliament. Besides the men described by Mr. Brown, others could have been equally appropriate, most outstandingly perhaps the eccentric Thomas Hollis of Lincoln's Inn and his friends, the Duke of Grafton, and Lord Camden, to name no more. The weakness of the book stems largely from a misleading title and a failure to maintain continuity of purpose. A central theme is lost in long discursive accounts of Price's religious

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ideas and economic expedient, of Dunning's legal activities, and of Jones' oriental studies, among others. Moreover, though the biographies themselves of men like Barré, Dunning, and Jones are useful and based apparently on some manuscript sources, neither the list of these (pp. xi-xii) in acknowledgements to owners and repositories, nor the notes (pp. 443-480) provide adequate documentation of their contribution. *The Chathamites* gives the impression of being the result of a good deal of investigation but too little attention to arrangement, selection, and checking of material. Repetitions of phrases and statements remain, and geographical and historical inaccuracies are too frequent. This is not a good book but may perhaps lead to some revised biographical studies of at least two of the five Chathamites studied here, Dunning and Barré.—CAROLINE ROBBINS, *Bryn Mawr College.*

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

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